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THE USAGE OF CAUSATIVES IN CLASSICAL CHINESE: A REVIEW

Suree Choonharuangdej¹

Abstract

Many scholars have looked into relevant problems concerning the usage of causatives in their studies of Classical Chinese grammar. They find that, unlike the derivational system found in most Indo-European languages, the system of word-derivation in Classical Chinese (causative usage included) reveals that certain grammatical and semantic contrasts are regularly associated with tonal contrasts. In spite of such findings, we still consider it rather difficult to separate those derivational causative verbs from the general causative usage to which the syntactic structure is ascribed, not to mention the even harder task of distinguishing the causative usage from the putative one given their similar surface structure.² Thus, beside the review and summary of causative usages in previous works, this paper re-analyzes certain problematic cases of causatives using different linguistic factors (i.e., phonological, morphological, and syntactical) together with relevant context clues. Although we have yet to come up with a satisfactory explanation concerning the distinction between causative and

putative usages, we maintain that the contrast between realis and irrealis can be employed as a means to clarify those subtle differences in the putative usage.

Introduction³

When one reads a Classical Chinese text, one might become confused that some word classes, such as intransitive verbs, adjectives, or even nouns, which are known for normally not having an object or complement⁴ after them in Modern Mandarin, appear to be followed by an object or complement (N/NP)⁵ from time to time, especially in the form of 之 *zhi*.⁶ Earlier scholars then introduced and employed two special types of usage, namely, the causative usage (使動用法 *shidong yongfa*) and the putative usage (意動用法 *yidong yongfa*), as a way of explaining this kind of peculiar phenomena.

As far as the relationship between the verb and object is concerned, we generally

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² For “putative,” see Norman (1988: 91): “when intransitive verbs have an object, the verb must be understood in a causative or putative sense (consider X as Y).”

³ Since Chinese characters will be given throughout this article, we use a broad Pinyin transcription with no tone marks.

⁴ Some might argue that, structurally speaking, either an adjective or a noun can also appear before another noun. In that case, however, adjectives and nouns are both functioning as modifiers of their head noun, not in the sense that we discuss in this paper.

⁵ Here we are assuming a version of X-bar theory; the binary branching projection of any category used as a head (e.g., a noun, a verb, etc.) represents the positions for specifier and complement.

⁶ *Zhi* is a third-person pronominal form (代詞 *daici*) typically used as an object pronoun. It can also be used as a particle (助詞 *zhuci*) or a verb (動詞 *dongci*).

regard the object as a ‘patient’ or ‘theme’ of the preceding verb. Nonetheless, this kind of thematically ‘patient’ role does not always obtain in Classical Chinese. For instance,

(1) 間涉不降楚。(史記 – 項羽本紀)⁷

Jianshe bu *xiang* Chu
Jianshe not surrender Chu

‘Jianshe did not surrender (himself to)
(King Xiangyu of) Chu.’

(2) 欲因此時降武。(漢書 – 蘇武傳)

yu yin ci shi *xiang* Wu
desire with this time surrender Wu

‘(单于 Chanyu) would like to take this
opportunity to allow (Su) Wu to
surrender.’

Sentence (1) is understood to mean that the agentive subject Jianshe did not surrender to King Xiangyu of Chu (間涉不投降項羽 *Jianshe bu touxiang Xiangyu*). Its structure conforms to the typical SVO word order. In comparison, in sentence (2), the post-verbal NP object/complement, (Su) Wu, is the person performing the action *xiang* ‘surrender.’ That is to say, sentence (2) is read as having a causative sense. The omitted agentive subject of the sentence, Chanyu, would like to have the object, Su Wu, carry out the action expressed by the verb *xiang*, ‘surrendering himself.’

In the putative usage, the NP following the adjective⁸, or in some cases, the noun does

not fill the so-called ‘recipient’ role but instead possesses certain characteristics designated by the preceding adjective or noun.

(3) 不貴難得之貨。(老子)

bu *gui* nan de zhi *huo*
not valuable hard get REL commodity

‘Do not think of these rare commodities
as valuable.’

(4) 友風而子雨。(荀子 – 賦)

you *feng* er zi *yu*
friend wind and child rain

‘Think of the wind as (one’s) friends
and think of the rain as (one’s)
children.’

In other words, the perceived objects, *nande zhi huo* ‘rare commodity’ in (3) and *feng* ‘wind’ and *yu* ‘rain’ in (4), reflect the view that people have toward it, being characterized as ‘without value’ in (3) and ‘friends’ and ‘children’ in (4).

The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize previous work on the usage of causatives in Classical Chinese. In the majority of cases, we employ different linguistic factors (i.e., phonological, morphological, and syntactical) together with relevant context clues to re-analyze and clarify these problematic instances. However, as seen in the above examples, it is quite difficult to distinguish causative usage from putative based solely upon their structure. Thus, it is necessary for us to make certain comparison between these

⁷ Source documents for the examples given hereafter are cited in parentheses.

⁸ In addition to their use as modifiers, adjectives in Chinese can be used as verbs.

two usages in order to gain more insight into those ambiguous cases as well.

Causativity as related to phonological changes

Using the notion of cognate words and tonal changes suggested in earlier studies, scholars such as G. B. Downer (1959), Wang Li (王力) (1958, 1982), and Chou Fa-kao (周法高) (1962) have all tried to re-analyze the so-called derivative words (滋生詞 *zisheng ci*) and their grammatical usage, an analysis which can, more or less, help our understanding of word formation in Classical Chinese and provide the means to establish an even more elaborate system of word classes.

Unlike derivatives in Indo-European languages, most derivative words in Chinese (if one believes such morphological processes exist at all) are not attributed to typical derivational or inflectional affixes but rather to an internal change of sound within a single word or syllable itself. Sometimes these changes even reflect or correspond to an alternate form of written Chinese character.

Predicated upon this kind of morphophonemic-like process, both Downer (1959) and Chou (1962) come up with a range of principal word classes, such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives, which (given relevant contents) can convert in their usage from one to another. However, while members of some word classes seem to alter or cross-over from one part of speech to another, members of the verb class tend to behave differently.⁹

⁹ Broadly speaking, adjectives can be included in the verb class due to their predicative nature.

That is to say, not only can a verb convert to other word classes, it can also function in two special applications, namely, the causative and putative usages.¹⁰ The only difference which can be drawn between these two particular functions is that the putative usage, especially in the case of an adjective, tends to be less associated with phonological changes, whereas the causative usage (of verbs) is usually related to them.

Starting from a slightly different ground, Wang (1982) perceives the causative as either a reflection of a morphological process or a representation at the structural level. He suggests that, in the latter case, there is no difference in terms of features between the basic verbal form and its causative counterpart,¹¹ whereas, in the former case, what we call a derivational causative seems to have some connection with its basic verb in terms of sound features.

In such case, the differences of those sound features can be illustrated by

- a) using the same form of characters (字形相同 *zixing xiang tong*),
- b) changing from the same form of characters to different ones (由字形相同變為不同 *you zixing xiang tong bian wei bu tong*), or

¹⁰ Sometimes both nouns and adjectives can engage in the putative and causative usages, as well.

¹¹ Here Wang (1982) uses the term 自動詞 *zidong ci* (basic verbal form) as an antithesis to the term 使動詞 *shidong ci* (causative verb via morphological derivation). Regardless of whether the verb is transitive or corresponds to its causative counterpart, it is regarded as the basic verbal form (自動詞).

c) using different forms of characters (字形不同 *zixing bu tong*).

Nevertheless, it is necessary in all three cases for the basic verbal form and its associated causative to be concomitant alliteratives (雙聲 *shuangsheng*) and rhymes (疊韻 *dieyun*).¹² This means that the derivational causative verb can be formed by any one of three phonological changes, namely, the initial (聲母 *shengmu*), the final (韻母 *yunmu*), and the tone (聲調 *shengdiao*), or sometimes even from a combination of any of them.

With regard to the tones, most of Wang's (1982) examples illustrated a relationship between the *qu*-tone (*qusheng* 去聲) reading and the causative form.¹³ From a historical perspective, it has been suggested that the causative form of verbs was originally made by adding a causative suffix to the verbs. Later on, the suffix was lost and replaced by the *qu* tone.¹⁴

¹² Wang (1982) also includes the homorganic initials (旁紐 *pangniu*) and hedge rhymes (旁韻 *pangyun*) in the above requirement.

¹³ Although there are also a few examples which have a *qu* tone reading for the basic verbal form, Wang (1982) suggests that this might reflect the old hypothesis of the comparatively late origin of the *qu* tone. Once people get this kind of reading, they simply apply it to match up with the other existing tone.

¹⁴ According to Downer (1959: 263), this is not to claim that all *qu* tone words are derivative forms. In fact, there are two morphologically different kinds of words under the rubric *qusheng*, (a) those like 大 *da* 'big,' 面 *mian* 'face,' 卦 *gua* 'divinatory symbol,' and 賤 *jian* 'lowly, cheap,' which are basically *qusheng* words, and (b) words like 好 *hao*, which are *qusheng* by derivation from words of other tones.

Subsequently, most causative verbs have the *qu* tone, and there is only a handful of words for which the causative verb is in one of the other tonal categories, namely, the *ping* (平聲 *pingsheng*), *shang* (上聲 *shangsheng*) and *ru* (入聲 *rusheng*) tones. Examples for all of these possible tonal changes are as follows:

1. causative forms with the *qu* tone¹⁵

Basic form	Causative form
飲 'to drink'	飲 'to give to drink'
視 'to look at'	視 (示) 'to show'
見 'to see'	見 (現) 'to appear'
入 'to enter'	入 (內) 'to take in'
食 'to eat'	食 (飮) 'to feed'
買 'to buy'	賣 'to sell'
啖 'to eat'	啗 'to give to eat'
藏 'to hide, store'	葬 'to bury'
瘳 'to recover one's health'	療 'to cure, treat'
垂 'to droop, hang down'	縋 'to let down with a rope'
回 'to circle, return'	運 'to circulate, turn'

2. causative forms with the *ping* tone

Basic form	Causative form
到 'to arrive, reach'	招 'to attract, incur'
順 'to comply, obey'	馴 'to domesticate, tame'
溼 'damp, wet'	漸 'to dip, immerse, soak'
壞 'to collapse'	隳 'to destroy'

¹⁵ The graph in brackets below is an alternate form of the given Chinese character.

3. causative forms with the *shang* tone

Basic form	Causative form
敬 ‘to be cautious, to be serious, to respect’	警 ‘to warn, alarm’

4. causative forms with the *ru* tone

Basic form	Causative form
趣 ‘to rush, flee’	趣 (促) ‘to hasten’

Among the 24 homorganic initials given in this article, Wang Li claimed that 15 of them were examples of the contrast between voiced and voiceless initials.¹⁶ Usually, the basic verbal form had the voiced initial, while its causative counterpart possessed the voiceless one.¹⁷

Basic form	Causative form
敗 ‘to defeat’	敗 ‘to cause to be defeated’
折 ‘to break off, become separated’	折 ‘to break, cause to be broken’
別 ‘to leave, depart’	別 ‘to cause to be separated’
著 ‘to cling, adhere’	著 ‘to put on, wear’
解 ‘daybreak, to understand’	解 ‘to untangle, intercede’
效 (倣) ‘to effect, imitate, render’	教 ‘to instruct, indoctrinate’
糴 ‘to buy grain’	糶 ‘to sell grain’

¹⁶ Such contrast is no longer true for Modern Mandarin, where the major contrast of certain initials is determined by the difference in aspiration.

¹⁷ Nonetheless, besides the relationship between voiced/voiceless distinction and basic/causative verb contrast, there are still other kinds of morphophonemic-like processes in word formation in Classical Chinese.

進 ‘to go forward, advance’	引 ‘to lead, draw, drag, fetch’
藏 ‘to hide, store’	葬 ‘to bury’
窮 ‘poor, end, thoroughly’	鞫 ‘poor, end, interrogate a prisoner’
移 ‘to change, move, shift’	推 ‘to push, shove, decline’

Another interesting feature with respect to the initial is the contrast between palatal sibilants and retroflex stops as applied to the basic verbal form and the causative form, respectively. Although these pairs of words (such as 至 ‘to arrive, reach’ : 致 ‘to attract’ and 出 ‘to send out’ : 黜 ‘to dismiss’) were of small numbers, they did substantiate the idea that both palatal sibilants and retroflex stops share the same ‘dental stop’ origin with a difference in terms of medials during an earlier period.¹⁸

In case of the finals, we were not able to find a consistent pattern for the alternation between these two verbal forms. Nevertheless, one condition that we should keep in mind is the similarity or closeness of rhyme groups (韻部) to which the related words belong.¹⁹ Below are some examples of hedge rhymes (旁轉 *pang zhuan*, 對轉 *dui zhuan*) mentioned by Wang (1982).²⁰

¹⁸ A medial refers to an element which could occur between the syllable onset, or the initial, and the rhyme proper, which contains nuclear vowel and final consonant or offglide.

¹⁹ Old Chinese rhyme groups can be divided into two major categories, namely, (a) 陽 *yang* groups, those that end in a nasal, and (b) 陰 *yin* groups, those with non-nasal endings (Norman, 1988: 47).

²⁰ The term *pangzhuan* is used to refer to cases for which a *yin* rhyme group converts in its

	Basic form	Causative form
東 陽 旁轉	動 ‘to move, oscillate’	蕩 ‘to swing, shake, loaf’
文 元 旁轉	存 ‘to survive, store, exist’	全 ‘save from damage’
歌 微 旁轉	移 ‘to change, move, shift’	推 ‘to push, shove, decline’
幽 宵 旁轉	瘳 ‘to recover one’s health’	療 ‘to cure, treat’
緝 談 旁轉	溼 ‘damp, wet’	漸 ‘to dip, soak immerse’
微 文 對轉	回 ‘to circle, return’	運 ‘to circulate, turn’

Wang’s (1982) attempt to separate derivational causative verbs from other general causatives making use of sentence structure may help shed light on the nature of the Classical Chinese verb class. In our view, however, it is still doubtful whether the phonological change should be ascribed to only the morphological interpretation or to both the morphological and the syntactic representation.

In addition, Wang (1982) himself admitted that some derivational causative verbs, such as 隄 *zhui*, 警 *jing*, and 鞠 *ju* had a narrower meaning than their basic verbal counterparts. This kind of semantic discrepancy thus led to the question of how it is possible to justify the criteria used to determine the range of meanings of all the relevant entities as we try to

usage to the adjacent *yin* rhyme group, or a *yang* rhyme group converts to another neighboring *yang* rhyme group. As for the term *duizhuan*, it is used to refer to cases for which a *yin* rhyme group converts in its usage to another *yang* rhyme group or vice versa.

compare and categorize them.²¹ And so far, we have not come up with a more satisfactory explanation concerning this kind of lexical problem.

Syntactic representation and causativity

Generally speaking, in Chinese grammar the only type of content word (實詞 *shici*) which can take a noun or noun phrase as its object is the transitive verb. However, if an intransitive verb or a member of another non-verbal word class, such as adjective or noun, is structurally followed by an object, it is considered to be being used in one of two ways, namely, causative and putative, which signify a change in the relationship between the subject and its predicate. What is even more interesting is that a transitive verb can also assume these two functions. For instance,

- (5) 嘗人，人死；食狗，狗死。（吕氏春秋）

*Chang ren, ren si; shi*²² *gou, gou si.*
taste man, man die; eat dog, dog die

‘... had a person taste (food), that person died; ... fed the dog, the dog died.’

²¹ As Downer (1959: 261) has pointed out, the many existing cognates make positing a one-to-one correspondence between *qu* and non-*qu* forms problematic at best.

²² In Modern Mandarin, the character 食 is usually pronounced as *shi* (with second tone) with the meaning of ‘to eat’ or ‘food.’ However, it can also be read as *si* (with fourth tone) meaning ‘to feed.’

- (6) 孟嘗君曰：“食之，比門下之客”
(戰國策 – 齊策)

Meng Chang jun yue: “*shi zhi*,
Meng Chang lord say: “eat him,
bi men xia zhi ke”
compare household under of guest”

‘Lord Meng Chang said: “Feed him the same way as (we) provide to other retainers.”’

- (7) 沛公旦日從百餘騎來見項王 (史記 – 項羽本紀)

Pei gong dan ri cong bai
Pei duke morning day follow hundred
yu ji lai jian Xiang wang
excess cavalry come see Xiang king

‘On that day the Duke of Pei had more than a hundred cavalry follow him to meet King Xiang (of Chu).’

- (8) 吳王濞反，欲從閩越，閩越未肯行
(史記 – 東越列傳)

Wu wang Bi fan, yu cong Min
Wu king Bi rebel, desire follow Min
Yue, Min Yue wei ken xing
Yue, Min Yue not willing to walk

‘King Bi of Wu rebelled and wanted the Min and Yue to follow him, (but) Min and Yue were not willing to go.’

Compare these examples with the following:

- (9) 君賜食，必正席先嘗之。(論語 – 鄉黨)

Jun ci shi, bi zheng xi
King bestow food, must proper seat

xian chang zhi
first taste it

‘The King gave (Confucius) food, (he then according protocol) had to taste the food placed before him first.’

- (10) 吾從衆。(論語 – 子罕)

Wu cong zhong
I follow crowd

‘I followed the public.’

Structurally speaking, there is no difference in the pattern “verb + object” as shown (in boldface) in all the above examples. The transitive verbs *shi* ‘eat,’ *chang* ‘taste,’ and *cong* ‘follow’ are followed by objects like *ren* ‘man,’ *gou* ‘dog,’ *zhi* ‘him or it,’ *bai yu ji* ‘hundred excess cavalry,’ etc. Given the relevant context clues, however, we can see that the patient role which is supposed to belong to the object constituent, as in examples (9) and (10), no longer obtains in examples (5), (6), (7), and (8). Instead, all post-verbal objects in these examples are considered agents, or persons who perform the action.²³

²³ The object pronoun *zhi* in (9) refers to ‘the food which was bestowed by the king.’ And Confucius was the person who, following past practice, would taste the food to guarantee food safety for the king. In contrast, the post-verbal objects *ren* and *gou* in (5) and *zhi* in (6) did not refer to ‘things being eaten’ here, but rather the ‘agents who performed the eating action.’

Although some of the verbs, like 食 *shi*, 飲 *yin*, and 見 *jian*, have two different readings to distinguish one meaning from the other, one cannot avoid relying heavily upon the context clues to get the precise story. Thus, this might again raise the issue of whether the phonological change occurred with only the morphological process or with both morphological and syntactical levels of representation.

Furthermore, when a transitive verb is followed by two objects, namely, direct and indirect objects, we usually interpret the thematic role of the indirect object as either a goal or a source related to the preceding verb. For example,

- (11) 遺趙王書。(史記－廉頗藺相如列傳)

wei Zhao wang shu
send Zhao king letter

‘... sent King of Zhao a letter.’

- (12) 公攻而奪之幣。(左傳－哀公二十六年)

Gong gong er duo zhi bi
Duke attack and take away them coin

‘The Duke attacked and took away their money.’

The indirect objects 趙王 *Zhao Wang* in (11) and 之 *zhi* in (12) are considered the ‘goal’ and the ‘source’ of the verbs *wei* 遺 and *duo* 奪, respectively. However, there are some instances in Classical Chinese in which the indirect object no longer fills these ‘source’ or ‘goal’ roles. Instead, it is thought to develop a causative sense

related to the preceding verb, as in examples (13), (14), and (15).

- (13) 均之二策寧許以負秦曲。(史記－廉頗藺相如列傳)

Jun zhi er ce ning
compare this two scheme rather

xu yi fu Qin qu
promise with bear/carry Qin false

‘If you compare these two schemes, I’d rather promise (the jade) in order to put the blame on Qin.’

- (14) 國老皆賀子文，子文飲之酒。(左傳－晉楚城濮之戰)

Guo lao jie he Ziwen,
state old all congratulate Ziwen,

Ziwen yin zhi jiu
Ziwen drink them wine

‘Senior statesmen all congratulate Ziwen. Ziwen (then) had them drink wine.’

- (15) 晉侯飲趙盾酒。(左傳－宣公二年)

Jin hou yin Zhao Dun jiu
Jin marquis drink Zhao Dun wine

‘Marquis of Jin made Zhao Dun drink wine.’

In example (13), the verb 負 *fu* in the double object construction 負秦曲 *fu [Qin] [qu]* is read as having the meaning of ‘causing someone (i.e., *Qin*) to carry/bear the blame (*qu*).’ In examples (14) and (15),

the verb 飲 *yin* in 飲之酒 *yin [zhi] [jiu]*,²⁴ and 飲趙盾酒 *yin [Zhao Dun] [jiu]* are read as ‘having all senior statesmen drink wine’ and ‘making/having Zhao Dun drink wine,’ respectively.

Instead of viewing the above three instances as having a double object construction, we might to some degree perceive each of them as being a serial verb construction, a structure which consists of two or more verb phrases or clauses juxtaposed without any marker indicating what the relationship is between them.²⁵ Or we might even view them as having a pivotal construction, whereby the direct object of the first verb is simultaneously the subject of the second verb.



The surface sentence structures like *fu Qin qu*, *yin zhi jiu*, and *yin Zhao Dun jiu* in the above cases should be construed as having a causative sense. Thus, semantically speaking, *fu Qin qu* is, in fact, *shi Qin fu qu* ‘have Qin bear the blame,’ *yin zhi jiu* is also *shi zhi yin jiu* ‘have all senior statesmen drink wine,’ and *yin Zhao Dun jiu* is actually *shi Zhaodun yin jiu* ‘make Zhao Dun drink wine.’ The causative usage in examples (13)–(15) results from the contiguity of the implied or insinuated verb 使 *shi* ‘to cause’²⁶ and its clausal objects (i.e., 秦負曲 *Qin fu qu* ‘Qin

bearing the blame,’ 之 (which is 國老) 飲酒 *zhi yin jiu* ‘All senior statesmen drinking wine,’ and 趙盾飲酒 *Zhao Dun yin jiu* ‘Zhao Dun drinking wine’).

The most common causative usage is known to occur with intransitive verbs. Although some people have tried to resolve this unusual structure (i.e., intransitive verb + object) via a semantic approach, it is still difficult to determine the range of inclusive meanings which can be accepted. Hence, we are inclined to ascribe to a causative syntax which views a causative form or phrase as a valency-increasing voice operation adding one argument. Thus, if the original verb is intransitive, then the causative construction as a whole is transitive.²⁷

The causative usage usually triggers a change in the relationship between the post-verbal noun and its role in the sentence, as seen in (16)–(20):

(16) 野人莫敢入王。(史記 – 楚世家)

yeren mo gan ru wang
wild-man not dare enter king

‘None of the peasants dared to let the king come in.’

(17) (華元) 登子反之床，起之。(左傳 – 宣公十五年)

(Hua Yuan) deng Zifan zhi
(Hua Yuan) mount/step up Zifan of

chuang, qi zhi
bed, rise up him

²⁴ *Zhi* used here is an object pronoun referring to ‘all senior statesmen.’

²⁵ The definition of serial verb construction here accords with Li and Thompson (1981: 594).

²⁶ Or we may think of this implicit *shi* as a zero causative morpheme.

²⁷ Likewise, if the original verb is transitive, the causative is ditransitive, i.e., to eat (something) → to make (someone) eat (something), to feed someone something.

‘(Hua Yuan) climbed up Zifan’s bed,
made him wake up.’

- (18) 進不滿千錢，坐之堂下。（漢書－高帝紀）

jin bu man qian qian, zuo
enter not full thousand money, sit

zhi tang xia
them hall under

‘(Those who) sent less than a
thousand (in coins?), seated them in
the courtyard.’

- (19) 畢禮而歸之。（史記－廉頗藺相如列傳）

bi li er gui zhi
conclude ceremony and return him

‘(After) the ceremony was concluded,
(they) sent him back.’

- (20) 項伯殺人，臣活之。（鴻門宴）

Xiang Bo sha ren, chen huo zhi
Xiang Bo kill man, vassal alive him

‘Xiang Bo killed a man, but I spared
his life.’

In examples (16)–(20), since the verbs *ru* ‘enter,’ *qi* ‘get up,’ *zuo* ‘sit,’ *gui* ‘return,’ and *huo* ‘alive’ are all intransitive, they are not supposed to be followed by an object. From context clues, however, we know that the post verbal nouns and/or pronouns, such as 王 *wang* in example (16) and 之 *zhi*²⁸ in examples (17)–(19) are all

²⁸ *Zhi* is used as an object pronoun here.

understood as the agents who carry out or perform the action.

In example (20), 臣活之 *chen huo zhi*,²⁹ if we were to omit the pre-verbal noun *chen* 臣,³⁰ the sentence would then turn into the pattern “intransitive verb + N/NP” (活之 *huo zhi*) just like those found in (16)–(19). And if we go even further and reverse the order of such structure so that it reads as “N/NP + intransitive verb” (之活 *zhi huo*), we find that there is no change in the agent role played by the N/NP *zhi*.³¹ The only difference between *zhi huo* and *huo zhi* lies in the causative reading of *huo zhi*. While 活之 *huo zhi* (in this case, *huo Xiang Bo*) conveys the causative reading *shi Xiang Bo huo* ‘have Xiang Bo stay alive,’ the reversed order phrase 之活 *zhi huo*, which can be read as *Xiang Bo huo*, meaning ‘Xiang Bo stays alive’ lacks this causative sense.

Based on the above observation, it seems that we need to advance our analysis to explain some of the even more problematic cases. Take examples (21)–(24):

- (21) 擊李曲軍破之。（史記－曹相國世家）

ji Li Qu jun po zhi
strike Li Qu army break them

²⁹ *Zhi* in (20) refers to Xiang Bo.

³⁰ The court official usually uses *chen* to refer to himself when speaking with the king.

³¹ A reverse order pattern preserving the same thematic role or semantic relationship as its normal order pattern is one of the characteristics of the causative usage (He and Yang, 1992).

‘... attacked Li Qu’s troops and defeated them.’

- (22) 破宋肥讎，而世負其禍矣。（戰國策 – 燕策）

po Song fei chou, er shi
break Song fatten enemy, and world
fu qi huo yi
bear/carry its calamity PRT³²

‘... defeated Song, fatten the enemy, then the world suffered from this disaster.’

- (23) 楚人敗徐于婁林。（春秋 – 僖公十五年）

Chu ren bai Xu yu Loulin
Chu people defeat Xu at Loulin

‘The people of Chu defeated Xu at Loulin.’

- (24) 公子友帥師敗莒師于鄆。（春秋 – 僖公元年）

Gongzi You shuai shi bai Ju
Gongzi You lead army defeat Ju

shi yu Li
army at Li

‘Gongzi You led troops and defeated the troop of Ju at Li.’

In Modern Mandarin, since neither 破 *po* nor 敗 *bai* can usually appear by themselves, they are considered bound morphemes signifying some sort of resultative complementation. In Classical

Chinese, however, not only can each of them function as a real intransitive verb, they tend to behave like a transitive verb by carrying with them an NP object. Hence, most people prefer to interpret the latter structure as employing a causative usage.

Unlike many scholars, Cikoski (1970) approaches these ambiguous cases from another standpoint. By taking a closer look at the nature of the verb itself, he concludes that it might not be necessary to treat some types of verb as either intransitive or transitive. Instead it could be regarded as another type of verb, namely, ergative.

Given the above-mentioned semantic relationship between the intransitive verb and its post-verbal NP object, we find that Cikoski’s (1970) suggestion quite attractive. To illustrate the connection between these two concepts, let us take the following patterns as examples:

- (25) X 敗 Y; X 破 Y
X bai Y; X po Y
‘X defeats Y’ or ‘X causes Y to be defeated.’

- (26) Y 敗; Y 破
Y bai; Y po
‘Y is defeated.’

As is the case in example (20), the pattern *X bai Y* and *X po Y* in (25) conveys a causative meaning. Thus, *X bai/po Y* is indeed ‘X defeats Y’ or ‘X causes Y to be defeated.’ If, by the same token, we omit the subject X in (25), then both sentences can be read as 敗 *Y bai Y* and 破 *Y po Y*, respectively. And if we further reverse the order of *bai Y* and *po Y* in (25), as suggested earlier, the result would be *Y 敗*

³² The use of sentence final particle *yi* here is similar to that of *le* in Modern Mandarin.

Y bai and *Y 破 Y po*, which comprises the exact same ‘N/NP (here is Y) + verb’ pattern seen in (26) with the only difference being an implied causative sense in the case of (25).

That is to say, in both (25) and (26), regardless of the placement of the verbs 敗 *bai* and 破 *po* before or after the object Y, the object Y still carries the same thematic role referring to the person who is in a state of being defeated. By using this kind of analogy, we might be able to distinguish the intransitive verb from the ergative one. And verbs like *bai* and *po* can be thought of as ergative verbs bearing a certain relation to the causative usage. Now let us consider another example:

(27) 臣能令君勝³³ (史記 – 孫子吳起列傳)

chen neng ling jun sheng
vassal can cause lord win

‘I can make you win.’

If an analogous causative reading were to apply to the verb 勝 *sheng* ‘to win’³⁴ in (27), we might come up with a sentence structure like 臣能勝君 *Chen neng sheng jun*. But the meaning of such a sentence would be ‘I can win against/surpass you,’ without any causative meaning.

In this case, it is apparent that we cannot place the verb *sheng* before or after the NP 君 *jun* at will since the required agent role

³³ In sentence (27), the causative reading is marked explicitly by the verb 令 *ling* ‘to cause’ which is equivalent to the verb *shi*.

³⁴ Its meaning is opposite to that of *bai* 敗 ‘to be defeated.’

of *jun* in (27) would no longer be maintained in the structure *Chen neng sheng jun*. Hence, the verb *sheng*, considered the antonym of *bai*, could not be considered an ergative verb and thus bears no relation to the causative usage.

Because Chinese tends to allow the omission of subjects and objects, there are some cases where verbs like *po* and *bai* seem to lose their related arguments (i.e., subject and object), as in examples (28) and (29):

(28) 起兵與吳西攻梁, 破棘壁。 (史記 – 楚元王世家)

qi bing yu Wu xi
build/set up troop with Wu west

gong Liang, po Jibi
attack Liang break Jibi

‘... set up troops and cooperate with Wu, attacked Liang in the west, and defeated it at Jibi.’

(29) 伐魏, 敗緣澤。 (史記 – 趙世家)

fa Wei, bai Yuanze
attack Wei defeat Yuanze

‘... attacked Wei and defeated it at Yuanze.’

Some people try to resolve such problems by using the so-called progressive (順裁) or regressive (逆裁) ellipsis (Yu, 1986: 110–111). However, there is often no consensus on the allocation of words in dispute. In view of the real nature of these presumed ergative verbs (*po* and *bai*), we see that their related arguments—梁 *Liang* in (28) and 魏 *Wei* in (29)—would still

hold the same meaning and thematic role no matter what types of ellipsis we apply.

The other two word classes which are used in causative constructions are adjectives and nouns. Yet both types of words also have a putative usage. Since the structural pattern of the causative and putative usages is quite similar, we have to rely on the context to resolve some equivocal interpretations.

In the case of the adjective, trying to employ phonological changes to distinguish its putative usage from the causative one is of little use. Compare examples (30)–(34):

- (30) 工師得大木則王喜, ... 匠人斲而小之, 則王怒。(孟子 – 梁惠王下)

gongshi de da mu ze
work-teacher obtain big wood then
Wang xi, ... jiangren zhao
king pleased, ... workman carve
er xiao zhi, ze wang nu
and small it, then king angry

‘A craftsman got a large tree, so the king was pleased, ... the carpenter carved it and made it small, then the king was furious.’

- (31) 孔子登東山而小魯, 登泰山而小天下。(論語)

Kongzi deng Dongshan er
Confucius ascend Dongshan then
xiao Lu, deng Taishan er
small Lu, ascend Taishan then
xiao tianxia
small world

‘Confucius ascended Dongshan and thought the country of Lu was small; he ascended Taishan and thought the world was small.’

- (32) 管仲, 世所稱賢臣, 然孔子小之。
(史記 – 管仲傳)

Guan Zhong, shi suo cheng
Guan Zhong, world by which praise
xian chen, ran Kongzi
worthy vassal, but Confucius
xiao zhi
small him

‘Guan Zhong – the world praised him as a worthy vassal, but Confucius thought little of him.’

- (33) 少君之費, 寡君之欲, 雖無糧而乃足。(莊子 – 山木)

shao jun zhi fei, gua
little lord of consumption, decrease
jun zhi yu, sui wu liang
lord of desire, although no grain
er nai zu
and then sufficient

‘Reduce your expenditure, decrease your desire. Although there were no provisions, you still felt sufficient.’

- (34) 左右素習知蘇秦, 皆少之, 弗信。(史記 – 蘇秦列傳)

zuo you su xi zhi
left right originally accustom know
Su Qin, jie shao zhi, fu xin
Su Qin, all little him, not trust

‘The attendants had known Su Qin for a long time. All of them thought

little of him, and they did not believe in him.’

As far as the context is concerned, examples (30) and (33) are considered to have a causative usage, whereas examples (31), (32), and (34) make use of a putative construction.

From the words 小 *xiao* and 少 *shao*, which are relatively close in meaning, we notice that the range of meanings in their putative usage is much broader than that in their causative usage. In all the putative cases, i.e., (31), (32), and (34), the meanings of *xiao* ‘small’ and *shao* ‘few, little’ have been extended to denote almost a different word, ‘despise or look down upon.’ The causative usages in (30) and (33), on the other hand, seem to cling to the original meaning of both words. Nonetheless, we are still not certain whether this kind of distinction can be replicated in all cases.

With respect to the noun, the discrepancy between its causative and putative usages is much more refined. Let us consider the following examples:

- (35) 爾欲吳王我乎？（左傳 – 定公十年）

er yu Wu wang wo hu?
you desire Wu king me PRT?³⁵

‘Do you want to let me be King of Wu? (causative reading)’
‘Do you want to regard me as King of Wu? (putative reading)’

- (36) 孟嘗君客我。（戰國策 – 齊策）

³⁵ *hu* is used as an interrogative particle here.

Meng Chang jun ke wo
Meng Chang lord guest me

‘Lord Meng Chang let me be his retainer. (causative reading)’
‘Lord Meng Chang regards me as his retainer. (putative reading)’

Even given a relevant discourse context,³⁶ there is still disagreement on whether these two sentences are being used in a causative or putative manner. This might be attributable to the characteristics of the Chinese language itself. As Norman (1988: 84–87) has pointed out, “in the virtual absence of morphology, grammatical processes in Classical Chinese are almost totally syntactic.” Even though most people posit the existence of word classes, most words in Classical Chinese may function as more than one part of speech depending on their place in the sentence,³⁷ which results in the possibility of multiple interpretations of a single structure.

Besides, the ambiguity regarding the two usages might be further complicated by the equivocal definitions of the putative usage itself. As suggested by Chou (1962) and He and Yang (1992), the pattern of the putative usage in relation to the object can be further divided into two kinds, namely, the pattern 視/以賓（爲）動 *shi/yi bin (wei) dong* ‘to regard an object as’ and the

³⁶ The term ‘discourse’ here is broadly defined as “the context in which a given sentence occurs, whether it is a conversation, a paragraph, a story, or some other kind of language situation” (Li and Thompson, 1981: 100).

³⁷ There is also the possibility of ‘class overlap,’ referring to cases where some words may belong to more than one class simultaneously (Norman, 1988).

pattern 稱賓爲 *cheng bin wei* ‘to call/name an object as.’

In our view, however, there is no significant difference between the definitions of the two patterns above. And we are not certain that such a distinction within the putative usage will help resolve the following instances:

(37) 縱江東父兄憐而王我，我何面目見之（史記－項羽本紀）

zong Jiangdong fu xiong
though Jiangdong father elder brother

lian er wang wo, wo he mian mu
fond and king me, I how face eye

jian zhi
meet them

‘Even though those elders and/or brothers cherish me and regard/name me as king, how can I go back and confront them? (i.e., I am too ashamed to go back and confront them.)’

(38) 先破秦入咸陽者，王之。（史記－項羽本紀）

xian po Qin ru Xianyang
first break Qin enter Xianyang

zhe, wang zhi
REL, king him

‘The person who defeats Qin and enters Xianyang first will be regarded as/named king.’

There is also disagreement on whether the two sentences (37) and (38) are being used in a causative or putative manner despite relevant context clues. Provided that the

examples (37) and (38) are read with a putative interpretation, we might apply the notion of contrast between irrealis and realis³⁸ as a means of explaining their subtle distinction. And either of the interpretations should be pertinent to the subject to whom the meaning of the verb 以爲 *yiwei* ‘to regard, consider’ is assigned. That is to say, the event 王之 *wang zhi* expressed in (38) is *unrealized* or *might happen*, whereas the event 王我 *wang wo* expressed in (37) is *realized*, or it is considered real as far as the subject (i.e., *zhong jiang dong fu xiong*) of the first verb is concerned.

Conclusion

As seen in the above discussions, even given the possible word-derivation explanation of the causative in Classical Chinese, it is still very important to make use of all different linguistic factors (i.e., phonological, morphological, and syntactical), together with relevant context clues or discourse, as ways to re-analyze and differentiate problematic instances of causative usage. Even though we have yet to find a more elaborate account of the distinction between causative and putative usages, the contrast between realis and irrealis might be employed as a means to clarify the subtle differences in the putative usage.

Due to the limitations of our scope and of the materials obtained so far, we suspect there are still other cases of the causative usage not covered by this paper. Nevertheless, we hope that some of the arguments presented here may, to a certain

³⁸ To borrow the terms used by Li and Thompson (1981: 611–621).

extent, be useful in the further study of causative usage in Classical Chinese.

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PALI BUDDHIST IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE¹

Steven Collins²

Abstract

This article surveys ideas of the future—specifically whether it will be (i) worse, (ii) the same, or (iii) better, for individuals and/or society—in the Pali imaginaire, a corpus of texts produced and circulated in the agrarian states of premodern South and Southeast Asia and which survives as a resource for Buddhists in the vastly changed conditions of the modern, globalized world.

In considering ideas found in Pali texts, as indeed in any texts, we must not only think about the ideas they contain, but the conditions of the world in which they were composed and transmitted. The Pali imaginaire was the product of a premodern, pre-industrial world, which could not envision continuous technological progress leading to a materially better life and/or ecological

devastation which modern people take for granted. It could, and did, envisage futures better than the present, but these would be in heaven, or in a future world where wishing-trees would supply all the consumer goods then thought possible. In both cases the better future was in a fantasy world where many material and other pleasures would be available, but where the production of material goods, and therefore of society and culture, would not itself undergo any fundamental, qualitative change. There might be an increase in the amount of good things but not in the capacity of human beings and their world to produce new categories of good. In particular, no future would be without the hierarchical, class-divided social order—divided into tribute-givers and tribute-takers—in which all imagining took place. Some modernists have thought to see a classless society in an episode in the *Aggañña Sutta*, reproduced many times in other texts. Here immaterial beings fall to life on earth, gradually become material, and then exist for a short time before theft and the need for punishment bring about authority, hierarchy and then the four *varṇa-s* of Brahmanical society. This was taken to recur at the start of every eon. I think it can be shown that this whole text is a satirical allegory rather than the description of any actual society;³ but even if that is not granted, it remains a brief to-be-abandoned episode, not a continuing state of human society.

These basic, categorial changes in the production of human goods and of human culture have taken place, whether we like it or not, and they have irrevocably affected

¹ This paper was originally given as a talk at Chulalongkorn University in 2001. It is based on my book *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities* (Collins 1998), where references to Pali texts and secondary scholarly literature can be found. To suggest where to look, I will give here the chapter headings of the book: 1. The Concept of Nirvana. 2. The Imagery of Nirvana. 3. Nirvana, Time and Narrative. 4. Heaven, the Land of Cockayne and Arcadia. 5. Millennialism. 6. The Perfect Moral Commonwealth? Kingship and its Discontents. 7. The *Vessantara Jātaka*.

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³ See Collins (1993a). The sutta quite clearly and deliberately uses language from the *Vinaya*: each ‘fall’ from immaterial to material/social life involves transgressing against one or more *Vinaya* rules.

all premodern systems of ideas. Some things, of course, have stayed the same: sexual and family relations, suffering, the inevitability of death. Modernity has not done away with the aporias intrinsic to thinking about time without paradox. In monotheism, for example, the problems arise of conceiving time as having a beginning and end: what did God do before he created time, and what can anyone do after it stops? Do not tensed verbs such as “created” and “stops” presuppose a matrix of time in order to have their meaning? Pali texts do not have these problems: since everything except *nibbāna* exists through the process of conditioning, there can be no absolute beginning to *saṃsāra*. And although individual streams of conditioning and consciousness can end in *nibbāna*, the universe, being infinite, cannot end. The aporia in Pali texts, at least as I understand it, concerns the relation between time and *dhamma*-s, those momentary, conditioned and conditioning events, or collections of events, which temporarily make up the world and ourselves. Time is not a *dhamma*, a real existent; rather it occurs in dependence on real existents (*dhamme upādāya*). It has no *sabhāva*, nothing which defines it as an existent separate from others. However, the concept of a *dhamma* seems itself to presuppose time: no *dhamma* can exist without previous conditions, elaborated into twenty-four causal factors (*paccaya*) in Abhidhamma and other texts. Although some of a *dhamma*’s causal factors can be simultaneous with its arising, they could not all be, or else the universe would be just one moment. So, time is not a real existent but arises in dependence on real existents, while the real existents themselves seem already to need time as a conceptual and interpretative

framework.

Such aporetic questions have little to do with the task of doing good and cleansing one’s heart,⁴ though they may induce a salutary humility. Perhaps there are some things human beings will never understand. Small advances in other matters related to time may be possible, however, and I believe one of them comes from completely abandoning what has become a taken-for-granted cliché: the cyclical time of the east versus the linear time of the west. This originated with early Christians, who foisted on the Greeks a view of so-called cyclical time to which they could oppose their linear time—in fact their obsession with a single story—with a once-and-for-all creation, redemption and end of the universe. In fact there is no clear evidence that any Greek held such a view. With one exception all the evidence comes from Christian writers themselves, and for good reason: while it is possible to believe that events recur in time, even that exactly the same events recur, it cannot make any sense to say that time itself recurs. If one says “everything happens again,” the word “again” presupposes time; there will always be something different, even if it is merely the fact that things are happening for a second, third, umpteenth time. This Christian illogical rhetoric was carried down through the centuries; and when Europeans discovered Asian beliefs in rebirth, they seemed to slip neatly into the “cyclical time” category.

All moments in time have both linear and cyclical aspects, and the choice between them depends on one’s purposes and interests. I suspect that most people reading this sentence are doing so for the first time. This moment is unique and irrecoverable, a

⁴ The reference is to *Dhammapada* 183.

station on a one-way train trip from birth to death. But it is just another article in just another journal. It has probably been read before now, and may well be again. Nothing can be done that has not been done, unless one makes the necessary uniqueness of linear time an over-riding dimension. Dropping the first nuclear bomb, Neil Armstrong standing on the moon, computer scientists in the 1990s working on the Y2K problem—all firsts, in some senses, but just think for a moment and previous analogies easily come to mind.

So when one tries to think about ideas of the future in Pali texts written in the premodern era, one must bear in mind how much has changed, how much has stayed the same, and how much is part of the human condition and not a specificity of tradition. In considering the future, one can think of it as worse than the present, same as the present, or better than the present. And one can think of it in relation just to oneself, or to society or humanity as a whole.

The future will be worse.

A. for the individual. The possibility of a worse future for the individual can be found on innumerable temple walls, in the form of paintings of hell taken from the Traiphum tradition, and the story of Māleyya (Phra Malai).⁵ Who can forget the boiling cauldrons, the misshapen, sometimes half-human half-animal, creatures whose grotesquely large heads are cut in two by whirling serrated metal wheels, the terrified adulterers forced at spear-point to climb the thorn tree? In the Ussada hell, for instance, victims' tongues

are pierced by red-hot iron hooks, and then they are dragged around, before being spread out like ox-hides on a red-hot copper floor, to be further attacked with stakes. Versions of these texts and stories have circulated in manuscripts, books, posters and postcards, and in three-dimensional form in temple grounds and theme parks.

B. for society. There are three ways in which society would get worse, two of which we know a lot about, while the other has not been studied fully. The first is the Disappearance of the Sāsana after 5000 years. For many centuries now kings and others have announced that they were doing this or that, notably sponsoring the writing down of the Tipiṭaka, for the sake of the longevity of the Sāsana, to contribute to its 5000-year life. This is too well-known to need elaboration, as is the second: the gradual deterioration of human society until it becomes a seven-day war of all against all, apart from wise few who meditate in caves, dressed in white, to re-emerge after the carnage to begin society anew. This originates from the *Cakkavattisihanāda Sutta* and continues to appear on temple walls in the modern period sometimes with the addition of aerial warfare. The third is the notion that time moves in a sequence of Four Ages, starting with the Age of Truth (*Satya-yuga*) and ending with our own, the worst, called the Age of Kali (*Kali-yuga*), which will come to an end in huge conflagration. Very little is known about the real history of this idea. The idea of a conflagration at the end of the eon is found in Pali texts, and so too, in commentarial and later texts, is the term *Kali-yuga* for our eon. A great deal more work is necessary before we can understand the origin and influence of this notion. It is true, in any case, that although most of the universe will be destroyed, not all of it will, and after some time another Age of Truth will begin.

⁵ See Reynolds and Reynolds (1982), Collins (1993b).

Premodern Buddhism was spared one modern scenario of the future: destruction of the environmental conditions necessary for human life, without a guarantee that it will re-arise somewhere.

The future will be the same.

A. for the individual. It seems hardly likely that the maintenance of the status quo would be an object of aspiration in a Buddhist perspective.

What do you think, monks? Which is more? Your shedding and crying of tears as you have hurried on through this long road of rebirth, tied to what is unpleasant and separated from what is pleasant, or all the water in the Four Great Oceans?

[They answer: greater are the tears we have shed.]

Good, good, monks. You have well understood the Doctrine as I have taught it.... For a long time you have experienced the death of your mother,... of your sons,... daughters, the loss of relatives and possessions, the distress of disease.... For such a long time, monks, you have experienced suffering, feeling pain and enduring distress; and the cremation grounds and cemeteries grow...

(*Saṃyutta Nikāya* II: 179–80, *Anamatagga Saṃyutta Sutta* 3)

This could well express resignation at the human condition for those with little hope of heroics—up and down, around and around on the carousel of *samsāra*—but scarcely an ambition.

B. for society. In one vital sense, mentioned above, hierarchical agrarian society was a given for the entire Pali imaginaire in premodernity. That could not change. Rich man, poor man, beggar, thief—individuals playing each role as lives passed by. In another sense too, if one ignores changes in individual destiny, the matrix of future time must resemble the present, in that it will contain the appearance and disappearance of Buddhas. The historicism inherent in modern scholarship has affected modernist Buddhism, and indeed all modern Buddhism which seeks to incorporate historical consciousness, so there tends in such contexts to be a focus on the person called in languages which have definite and indefinite articles, the Buddha, i.e. Siddhattha Gotama. It is, moreover, true that those texts preserved as the *Tipiṭaka* have extremely few references to past and future Buddhas by name. This has led some to think that multiple Buddhas are a later development. But references to Buddhas in the plural are everywhere in the *Vinaya* and *Sutta* texts, and it would be impossible plausibly to compile a list of allegedly earlier texts which refer only to Gotama. The true extent and significance of orientation towards future Buddhas in both traditional and modern Buddhism remains to be assessed.

The future will be better.

A. for the individual. Aspirations to a better future life in the human or divine worlds have always been at the center of the Buddhist imaginaire. It is sometimes thought in western scholarship that there is a contradiction between aspiring to heaven, or to better rebirth as a human, and to nirvana. There is indeed a Buddhist conceptual point to support this: craving and attachment to anything are inimical to the attainment of nirvana, and so if better

rebirths give rise to those mental states, they too are part of the problem of suffering, not the solution. But a straightforward and all-pervasive dichotomy is bad psychology and bad cultural history. They are all aspirations to felicity, the celestial, and still more so, the human, with more color and content, nirvana with finality. It is no surprise that many texts see both heaven and nirvana equally as results of merit (*puñña*). It is always easier to imagine suffering in detail than happiness, and so representations of life in heaven, whether in texts or painting, are much fewer than those of hell. Those that exist depict places of jewels, precious stones, beautiful sounds, colors, and perfumes. Deities live in *vimāna*-s, which both resemble palaces surrounded by lakes and trees, and move around. They enjoy the pleasures of the five senses, but those pleasures are sensual rather than sexual.

B. for society. It is not surprising, rather the reverse, that there is no sense in premodern Pali texts that human society could be categorically better, in the material sense. There are narrative fantasies of societies in which, under a righteous king, there is no crime, or wishing-trees bestow all manner of goods, or sometimes both. In the story of the future Buddha Metteyya, he co-exists with the Wheel-turning King Saṅkha. Some other, minor instances of the co-existence of two such Great Men can be found, but it is only in relation to Metteyya that the salvific utopia of a Buddha is conjoined with the material utopia of a Wheel-turning King. In this respect, as others, the time of Metteyya will be an improvement on that of Gotama, and so the term Millennialism may be appropriately used. Rebirth at the time of Metteyya, usually with the

corollary of attaining nirvana then, has often been associated with the ritual practice of listening to recitations of the *Vessantara Jātaka*. Both in this regard and elsewhere, being reborn with Metteyya has long been a common object of aspiration. Sometimes, as with king Duṭṭhagāminī in the *Mahāvamsa*, death in this world can lead both to immediate rebirth with Metteyya in the Tusita heaven, and future rebirth with him in the human world.

Such is a short overview of ideas about the future found in Pali texts. It is unclear what will become of them. In so far as they are dependent on the old pre-scientific cosmology, they must fade, or undergo allegorical re-interpretation. This has already been the case with the very idea of rebirth. Aspirations to future betterment in the modern world are inescapably tied to development and nationalism, and this is happening differently in the different conditions where premodern Pali texts are still a significant resource: with the Dalits in India, in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and southern Yunnan. The 1950s, for example, saw the Burmese Road to Socialism mixed traditional Buddhist ideas with Marxism, looking towards *loka-nibbāna*, nirvana in this world. Fifty years later, alas, Burma has become hell in this world for many people. The contemporary revival of Buddhism in Yunnan, after the devastation of the Cultural Revolution, is in part a vehicle to re-assert local values against the Beijing-Han majority. In this project it co-operates and sometimes contrasts with western youth culture and popular music. In this case, as also in Cambodia, Buddhist ideas of the future are also part of a rediscovery and re-creation of the past.

In the Pali imaginaire, the possibility of nirvana has been central to all hopes for the

future. This too, along with rebirth, has sometimes been subject to allegorical re-interpretation. Traditionally, although nirvana is not describable in terms of space or time, it enters the temporal process by being the object of consciousness at different stages of the Path. So while aspirations to nirvana are usually cast in the mold of future verbs, it is, so to speak, all around us in (rather, not in) space and time in a 360° sphere. Pragmatically, therefore, the issue is not so much whether or not to anticipate it, but whether or not one can see it, now.

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PEACE, ECOLOGY, AND RELIGION: EVOLUTION AND BUDDHISM'S EMPATHIC RESPONSE

David Jones¹

Abstract

It has become increasingly vital to secure some purchase on effecting the requisite changes in the Western Worldview to reintegrate humanity with the natural world. Only two possibilities exist for this reintegration: an affirmation of the evolutionary process and the development of human predispositions that intimately relate individuals to other lives. Such reintegration becomes possible only when humanity re-realizes its animality. This paper argues that these changes are vital to defining peaceful coexistence with not only animals and their environs, but within the human realm as well. By casting the idea of peace in the light of ecological thinking and the hope for creating sustainable environments, a more positive approach to defining peace can be made. Such a definition can lead to designing human habitats, food production systems, and the utilization of natural resources in more ecologically sustainable ways. Such designs and utilizations are known as "permaculture," a position advocated in this paper because it focuses more on the active roles which humans take in their environments. Such a way of thinking moves away from the ethical environmentalism of Stewardship, which

focuses on two emotions: cast in the negative as pity and in the positive as respect. In either emotion, peace is seen as transcendently given in absolute terms. The alternative of Buddhism is presented as a philosophical way out of the conundrum of stewardship. This alternative in itself is not new—these ideas have been in circulation for almost three decades—but what is distinctive in what is advocated is the synthesis of philosophical and scientific ideas such as intimacy, immanence, animality, evolution, empathy, and compassion seen dialectically vis-à-vis integrity, transcendence, stewardship, and pity and respect.²

In a letter written in 1899 to William T. Stead, Mark Twain remarked, "Peace by persuasion has a pleasant sound, but I think we should not be able to work it. We should have to tame the human race first, and history seems to show that cannot be done." Although history has demonstrated the difficulty of "taming" humanity, it has become increasingly vital to secure some purchase on effecting the requisite changes in those worldviews that either fail or overlook the ecological need of reintegrating humanity to its interconnectedness with the natural world. Interestingly, religion needs to take its cue

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² I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for providing their criticisms and prompting me to become clearer in what I was advocating in my more synthetic approach. They correctly reminded me that most people who argue for stewardship do so not because they advocate pity, but rather respect. Such reminders forced me to see why empathy and compassion function much better as a basis for all ethics than do respect, which, following Nietzsche, I generally see more in terms of pity. I also wish to thank *Manusya's* Editor, Dr. Amara Prasithrathsint, for her consideration and thoughtfulness.

from science, especially from the discipline of primatology and more specifically from the Japanese who were the first to really look scientifically at the study of primates as a way of affording us insight into the social dimensions of humans. It is not altogether surprising, as we will see, that the Japanese, coming from a more “intimacy-based” view of the self vis-à-vis an “integrity-base” sense, would be inclined to move in the direction of animals to understand humanity.

In his book *Life of Japanese Monkeys* (1969), Kawai Masao introduces the approach of *kyokan*, which means “feel-one,” and places an emphasis on empathy and an “objective” form of subjectivity; that is, researchers need to enter the group they are studying, develop trust, and become in essence one with the social group where natural behavior can then be observed directly. Others, such as David Watts, have found this method to be invaluable. This identification with animals is necessary in understanding how humanity needs to “tame” itself and develop appropriate attitudes and behaviors in order to stop its devastation of the planet and our species. Two combined scenarios present themselves at this point: 1) affirm the evolutionary process and 2) develop human karmic predispositions that intimately relate individuals to other lives. Such reintegration becomes possible only when humanity re-realizes its animality.

In what follows, this paper suggests that these changes are vital to defining peaceful coexistence with not only animals and their environs, but within the human realm as well. In addition, this paper explores the philosophical underpinnings of religions committed to transcendence and our reluctance to give up religious

beliefs in light of scientific discoveries. The alternative of Buddhism is presented as a philosophical way out of our conundrum as is the requisite action to incorporate some of its tenets such as karma into our religious worldview. This alternative in itself is not new—these ideas have been in circulation for almost three decades—but what is distinctive in what follows is the synthesis of philosophical and scientific ideas such as intimacy, immanence, animality, evolution, empathy, and compassion seen dialectically vis-à-vis integrity, transcendence, stewardship, and pity and respect.

Definitions of peace are often cast in the negative: peace is a state without war and/or conflict. Such definitions presuppose that “to make peace” is to eliminate war or to somehow mitigate conflict. By casting the idea of peace in the light of ecological thinking and the hope for creating sustainable environments, a more positive approach to defining peace can be made, and this idea of peace will include justice not only for the human realm but also for the animal. Such a definition can also lead to designing human habitats, food production systems, and the utilization of natural resources in more ecologically sustainable ways. Such designs and utilizations in ecological thinking are known as permaculture:

Permaculture is about designing ecological human habitats and food production systems. It is a land use and community building movement which strives for the harmonious integration of human dwellings, microclimate, annual and perennial plants, animals, soils, and water into stable, productive communities. The

focus is not on these elements themselves, but rather on the relationships created among them by the way we place them in the landscape. This synergy is further enhanced by mimicking patterns found in nature.³

The emphasis here focuses more on the active roles which humans take in their environments and the way we think about our so-called environs. Such a way of thinking moves away from the ethical environmentalism of Stewardship where *pity* is the primary and operative emotion; stewards lay their pity upon those less developed species who were created by a monotheistic God to serve human needs and wants; pity is the prevailing emotional *modus operandi* and peace is seen as transcendently given in absolute terms in this approach. The idea, however, is to move beyond stewardship and its

emotional consort, pity, towards a healthier and more intimate, immanent, and relational sense of self with the natural world. This process is one of learning to give the human back to the world from which it has emerged; this process means relearning our forgotten wisdom of belonging to the earth and sky.

We see how the realignment of the religious psyche to a more fundamentalist and literal religious understanding of the place and meaning of the human in the vast universe bemoans our crisis of faith in religions prone to such literalization. We have somehow lost our way when we believe the earth is 6,000 to 10,000 years old based upon convoluted interpretations of a literal reading of the original testament of the Abrahamic religious tradition, instead of the 4.5 billion year estimate based upon a variety of scientific considerations and methods such as radiometric dating, which is a technique used to date materials based on decay rates of naturally occurring isotopes in comparison to their current abundance. On the one hand, such scientific considerations convey to us the rates of evolutionary change on our planet; but, on the other hand, this data reveals to us in a religious sense our eternally temporal relation to all that is. But what is it about the human psyche that makes us so insecure in the face of the scientific and philosophical understanding we create in order to comprehend, appreciate, and affirm our place in the world? How did this insecurity arise?

Our current degeneration into fundamentalism and literalism is a setback to ecology, peaceful co-existence, and a sustainable life for human co-habitation on the planet. This is a profoundly religious challenge for our species and it points to the problem

³ “A central theme in permaculture is the design of ecological landscapes that produce food. Emphasis is placed on multi-use plants, cultural practices such as sheet mulching and trellising, and the integration of animals to recycle nutrients and graze weeds. However, permaculture entails much more than just food production. Energy-efficient buildings, waste water treatment, recycling, and land stewardship in general are other important components of permaculture. More recently, permaculture has expanded its purview to include economic and social structures that support the evolution and development of more permanent communities, such as co-housing projects and eco-villages. As such, permaculture design concepts are applicable to urban as well as rural settings, and are appropriate for single households as well as whole farms and villages.” ATTRA - National Sustainable Agriculture Information Service. “Introduction to Permaculture: Concepts and Resources.” <<http://attra.ncat.org/attra-ub/perma.html>>.

that almost all religion foreground in their diverse ways: the problem of the ego. As James Hillman has so aptly put it, "Literalism is an ego viewpoint; it means being locked into an ego. Ego psychology results from being trapped by the ego into its perspective: the other characters on stage are merely characteristics, projections of mine" (Hillman 1975: 48). Historically, with the advent of the ego came monotheism; or with the advent of monotheism, egoism was born through the literalization of all the many gods and goddesses into one economical God; this God was omniscient, omnipotent, and everything the human was not. An example of this is found surprisingly in the "East" (an often visited place for many Westerners for cures for their spiritual malaise and environmental problems) when the *Rig Veda* states in its movement from polytheism to its more monotheistic tendencies: "And let the others die away." And die away they did. As the other gods died away in our primitive past, a mono-centric self and monotheistic God became the Other in its transcendence from the natural—we ourselves were animal-like but somehow not animal. The mystery of the world's "worlding," its ability to self-organize itself, came to be lost.

As Hillman continues, "Literalism prevents mystery by narrowing the multiple ambiguity of meanings into one definition. Literalism is the natural concomitant of monotheistic consciousness—whether in theology or science—which demands singleness of meaning. Precisely this monotheism of meaning prevents mystery . . ." (Hillman 1975: 149). Consequently, the singularity of Truth is born and is held out over the many truths of myths, which are discovered in their multilayered levels of meaning. Again, Hillman is on target

when he writes, "Their tales and their figures move through phases like dramas and interweave one with another. Whether expressed as instincts or Gods ... [o]ne instinct modifies another; one tale leads to another; one God implicates another" (Hillman 1975: 148). Out of all the religions, the movement from myth to philosophy (from a mythic worldview to an institutionalized religious worldview with the need for philosophical justification and mooring of beliefs) would find its most logical development in Buddhism. Buddhism, with its karmic predisposition to connect lives into a great chain of mutually conditioning ensembles, akin to how tales interweave one with another, would escape Nietzsche's criticism of the quest for a singular Truth and one God that it is nothing but "a mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms" (Kaufmann 1954: 46–7).

To understand how the West has arrived at its current crisis of faith, we need to take a brief excursion back to the early Greeks. For the early Greeks, the psyche, or soul, was seen as a multiplicity of centers for the psychic intervention of the gods and goddesses (Snell 1982, Dodds 1951). The human soul was characterized by its openness to the world and its personified characters: the animals, plants, and rocks. This tendency to personify and display an animistic sensibility imbued the natural world with soul—it gave personhood to all beings, animate and inanimate. More importantly, however, it provided a sense of belonging, awe, and worship of the world itself. Nature was divine and the human species was an integral part of nature's sacred unfolding, nature's *lila*, its dance and play. But by the time of Plato and Aristotle, forerunners of the Christian and Islamic sensibility of the human soul,

the soul would begin its unification and separation from other selves and creatures of the world. When Socrates shifts philosophical contemplation from cosmogonic discussions to a teleological inquiry and asks, “What is the purpose, the goal, the end (the *telos*) of life?” something profound happens to our religious sensibility. The question now posed is really the question, “What is the purpose, the goal, the end of *my* life?” And once I ask this question, you (and everything else in the universe) are separate, different, and other from me. I become an essential self, and the hubristic tendency behind this essentialism is egoism.

Even in Hinduism, which consciously fights egoism, ordinary life is seen as something that needs to be gone through so the soul, the introspective self, reaches a higher plane of being. Whether it is the *atman* realization of the *Upanishads* or the socially and politically oriented Mahatma Gandhi, the concentration is placed on the spiritual, not the natural. It is natural, however, for the individual soul to achieve union with Brahman for “He is in us and yet above and beyond” (Iyer 1986–7: 28–29). Although seen and felt as natural, this transcendent naturalism takes one away from the earth, from its animals, for their lives are something we too need to work through for our own karmic purposes so we may attain *moksha*. This transcendence presupposes a certain kind of soul, one ultimately distinct from the mortal body; this *atman* is similar to the conception of the soul Plato put forth, which ultimately leads to the radical dualism of Cartesianism. Herein lies the problem: when one of the most prosperous countries in the world buys into this dualism, commits itself to global capitalism (itself a product of this

dualism), and insists that the rest of the world follow its model, our attitude and subsequent actions and behaviors determine how we as humans will comport ourselves in the world we inhabit. We will be good ecological citizens when we wish, when we can, and when our economic systems provide us with the luxury to worry about those others than just ourselves.

This dualism and its companion economic system have its roots in the Platonic psyche. The soul for Plato was developed as tripartite with the rational part reigning over the spiritual and appetitive parts. Aristotle unifies the conception of the soul even more by giving this singular soul three powers: the vegetative (which we share with plants), the sensitive (which we share with animals), and the rational (which we humans alone possess). Even though humans would be forever linked to animal and plant life for Aristotle, we were, and indeed remain, superior to them for we are of a different kind. For Aristotle, it was a commitment to progress—to a great chain of being—that “all organisms can be put in a continuous line from the simplest to the most complex, from monad to man...” (Ruse 2005: 29). Although Aristotle’s thinking is not straight away evolutionism, it was a necessary step in that direction, and evolutionary thinking had been well-established before him in the works of Anaximander, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Democritus, Empedocles, and afterwards by Lucretius. When Platonic and Aristotelian thinking later gets mixed with Scholastic thinking, we’re well on our way to Descartes’ *cogito ergo sum* and its logical corollary of an encapsulated thinking self; this Cartesian self would be so unlike anything else in the universe, except, of course, God. If the ancient

Greeks were to witness this development, they would be simultaneously entertained, bemused, and bewildered by the development of this hubristic posturing of a self not open to the controlling and conditioning forces of a personified and enlivened nature.

The outcome of this Cartesian way of thinking and being in the world has been devastating for the natural world, other creatures, and for the human ability to relate with each other. Evolutionary thinking, with its emphasis on natural selection, adaptation, mutation, mutualism, symbiosis, successful reproduction, and so forth is by definition immanent and seeks its meaning *in* and *with* nature. By adapting, a species is assiduously bound to its surroundings and internally grasps and appreciates, at least at some level, its world and those other creatures in it—for many of those other creatures will be necessary in developing symbiotic relationships for mutual survival even when they are defined by conflict, such as predator-prey relationships. Evolutionism binds one to the earth, its cycles, mutations, and relates the human to the animal; humanity is defined by its animality, for the human is fundamentally animal.

To be born from the animal is to be responsive like an animal—this is what it means to be an animal; to be responsive, it is necessary for one to acknowledge the other as not only real, but of value, whether that value is good or bad. To learn to be responsive is different from being responsible. Responsibility is the ethical product of a Cartesian self—an ego or encapsulated self that gives primacy to reason in order to locate the ethical. Thomas Kasulis refers in positive terms to this type of self as an “integrity self.” As

Kasulis states, “Integrity tends to think of the world as something external to be managed through knowledge” (Kasulis 2002: 102). Integrity focuses on the “out there” through its use of “concepts, principles, and words” and connects to the world through an external relation between “the polarities of knower and known.” In contradistinction to this self is the self of intimacy, and this will be the self of the *anatman* or *anatta* doctrine of Buddhism, where “intimacy ... tends to see the self and world as interlinking—the goal being to develop a sense of belonging *with* the world, feeling at home in it” (Kasulis 2002: 102). Intimacy will understand knowledge “to reside in the interface *between* self and world” (Kasulis 2002: 103). When applied to environmental issues, Kasulis’ analysis becomes especially insightful:

For integrity’s ethics, nature is that toward which we human beings have a responsibility. Our relationship to nature is external and bipolar insofar as our species is different from the rest of nature; we stand in a distinctive place vis-à-vis the natural world.... We act not only out of simple instinct but also conscious intentions allowing us to foresee the results of our actions. Hence, we are capable of responsibility [and] ... it is a human responsibility to be good stewards of the earth—to use our special capacities to heal the disrupted natural order [we have created].

(Kasulis 2002: 120–121)

Although Stewardship represents an adequate ethical position with regard to protecting the environment, it is necessarily philosophically flawed from

the outset with its focus on responsibility instead of responsiveness. The prevailing emotion in stewardship (and ethics in general) is driven chiefly by feelings and emotions that lead to *pity*. Some would argue, especially those inclined to support stewardship as a viable ecological ethic, that respect, not pity, is the operative emotion in dealing with other species and their environments. This is the position of most Christian environmental ethicists, which should come as no surprise since it is through Christianity that the position of stewardship was born, and those who now wish to “green” God.⁴ Certainly within their contexts, these types of thinkers should be applauded for making the most of their situations and for at least being on the “right” side of the issue. And indeed in a practical sense they are allies to the Buddhist position. This position, however, has some inherent challenges that are difficult to overcome.

Following the lessons learned from Levinas about the other, respect of and for the other requires the treatment of the other as an equal, as having the same set of rights and obligations as the other of the other in a field of mutual reciprocity. But in the relationship of the human and nonhuman there is always a field of disparity between species, especially in systems of thought, often seen in the West, for humans are either created in the image of God or they are the only animals that possess rationality. Hence, I, this superior steward defined as a separate type of being, may respect those nonhuman beings, but the prevailing ethical emotion

is for me to feel sorry for those others outside my scope of what it means to be a self. After all, I am undeniably a steward in a self-conscious position to recognize and self-reflect on my respect and care for them. I will act from my feeling sorry for them more frequently than from my respect for them; I will, in other words, pity those inferior others. Pity is the feeling of being superior through our pious egos, and by placing the human in the role of steward over the inferior—over the animal, the plant, the insect, and the rock—we are the special species created in God’s image. I may be gracious in my application of responsibility, but I do so only because I am more advanced and superior enough to be gracious and loving toward those lesser others in the world. It is no surprise that in capitalistic systems we are good stewards when it is convenient to us. In times of downward dips in the economy and high unemployment, we will compromise that very integrity that constitutes us in order to survive the immediacy of our hard times. Likewise, I may respect those animals that are faster than me, stronger than me, better swimmers, and so forth, but I still do so from a position of superiority of intelligence and convenience. My respect to protect these creatures has its limits, namely when I can afford to be responsible for them. But there is an alternative to this kind of convenient stewardship.

To be responsive is to feel connected and be defined by this connection. Being defined in this connective way is to be a self of intimacy and its most radical and intimate formulation is given expression in the *anatman* doctrine where the self is an interbeing, the term coined by Thich Nhat Hanh to express the enhanced connectivity of a self that emerges from the dynamic

⁴ This is the position or tendency of thinkers such as Sean McDonagh (*To Care for the Earth: A Call to a New Theology* 1986, 1990); Ian Bradley (*God is Green* 1990); and Robin Attfield (*The Ethics of Environmental Concerns* 1990).

play of the conditioning forces of the unfolding world. To realize this emergence and respond appropriately with selflessness to the world and its species is to be committed to the elimination of *dukkha*, uneasiness and suffering; such re-creative activity is to be born anew into life's processes, and this renewal regenerates the self as an interbeing; such a giving over of the self is not only an affirmation of life, it is learning to make the suffering of others one's own. This kind of life is a life of compassion and requires the fundamental capacity to be empathic, and empathy curiously enough is essential to our nature, and the nature of animals. As Dōgen says, "To cultivate-authenticate all things by conveying yourself [to them] is delusion" (Kasulis 1981: 90); this act of "conveying oneself" is an act of pity, not of compassion.

What we find across the many forms of Buddhism from the historic Buddha to Dōgen to Thich Nhat Hanh is the affirmation of compassion. Respect is not absent from Buddhist beliefs or systems of thought, but the Buddhist emphasis is invariably placed on compassion. To extend ourselves through compassion is to suffer the *pathos* of life with all of the world's beings; it is to become an interbeing where we are held together by our subjectivity in the ecumenical web among other subjectivities; to extend ourselves through compassion is to lose the self through first learning to read the text of animals' suffering, which is to learn to be empathic to our nearest kin. This is the situation when the human first realizes its own animality. Buddhism and evolutionism promote this realization and affirmation of life by extending ourselves through compassion. This compassionate extension of self is not the same as pity (to feel sorry for the other or, to put it more

positively, to respect the other as one of God's creatures through a deportment of difference) for to be compassionate, one must learn to suffer the pain of the other and learn to suffer with the other. To learn to suffer with the other is to learn to open up and develop the requisite skills for effective action. Such action is the goal of *permaculture* mentioned above, and it has everything to do with peace, peaceful coexistence, care, and love.

In *Intimacy or Integrity*, Kasulis writes that in the "intimacy orientation, ethics demands that I open myself to the other and accept the opening of the other to me" (Kasulis 2002: 118). Although all religions attempt in their own ways to accomplish this, in the final analysis some are more successful than others because of their original orientation to either intimacy or integrity and immanence or transcendence. In early Buddhism, for example, the morally functional terms "*kusala*" and "*akusala*" meant not "good" and "evil," but "skillful" and "unskillful" (Kasulis 2002: 118). We must learn to become skillful in our actions with respect to (not respect of or for) other species without our egos and pity getting in the way. Only then, can we somehow develop the necessary *karuna*, compassion, and it is through the employment of *upaya*, skill-in-means, that this compassion is instantiated. The emotion or quality of respect as a foundation for an environmental ethics comes from the position of an integral self, a self of integrity that necessarily views itself as being separate and distinct from the other and defines itself by creating and establishing its integrity first and its relationship to the other as secondary. By definition, respect's focus is more on good and evil and less on developing the necessary ability to be skilled in one's

relations with others; the right and wrong of western ethics, of integrity's ethics, are derived from the human capability to reason for we are the rational animal, as Aristotle remarked. Although rationality is an essential attribute of human nature, all ethics is based upon the emotion of empathy, that is, to have compassion for and suffer with others. My suggestion is that Buddhism's focus on and appreciation of skillful means is to have contextual flexibility and appropriateness, and this understanding is closer to the empathic root of ethics. In discussing the Buddha's thinking on *upaya*, John Schroeder states, "From the perspective of 'skillful means,' his ability to shift viewpoints shows that wisdom (*prajna*) is not bound by any single doctrine, practice, or metaphysical view, and exhibits the transformative intimacy of a Bodhisattva's love" (Schroeder 2001: 19). Such perspectival skillful means is what it means to be empty of self in Buddhist thought.

This idea of emptiness, or *sunyata*, is a lesson that can be learned from animals. Although we are beginning to visit these perspectives scientifically and socio-biologically, our visits are often without spirit, without the spirit of the Sâkyamuni Buddha, who attained enlightenment because he directly experienced the reality of suffering in a constantly changing world of conditionality as seen in the interdependent arising of all things—to see oneself as a part of this landscape requires empathy, to be in suffering *with*, not *for* the other. Such a feeling leads to compassion, an experience defined by similarity and resemblance, not by the difference of respect. Through this direct communion, the Buddha became an inter-being with all the other beings found in the earthly celestial landscapes of stones, plants, insects, animals. As Dōgen reminds

us, "To cultivate-authenticate yourself by all things' presenting themselves—this is realization-satori" (Kasulis 1981: 90). The Buddha and his later "incarnations" of Nagarjuna, Kūkai, and Dōgen taught us the emptiness of being, and now, in their absence, the Buddha's diffused incarnation in the animals and plants around us points the way back into that very emptiness and back to our lost world. This is why we need to develop the skill-in-means to cultivate-authenticate ourselves *by all things' presenting themselves* to us. Our lessons for ethics come ultimately from animals and are found in our own animality.

If we take, for instance, the question of poverty and peace and ask whether respect for the other or empathy with the other underwrites the possible solution to poverty's elimination and the creation of peaceful coexistence, what will be our answer? For either of these goals, whether overcoming poverty or creating peace, it seems empathy and its accompanying compassion will always outdo respect. Respect will get us only so far in a world of growing populations and finite resources, especially if the rest of the world continues to desire the standard of living enjoyed by Americans and with Americans demanding the perpetual continuation of that standard for themselves. The carrying capacity of the world would need, it is predicted, to be six times what it is. This is known as "Six Earths" (Harris 2007). Will respect suffice in this regard? Empathy seems to be the more logical and preferred emotion to tap in order to address the issue of poverty and sustain peace. As beings, we are "hardwired," says Frans de Waal, the famous primatologist, to help those with whom we feel close: "We are hardwired to connect with those around us and to also

resonate with them emotionally. It's a fully automated process" (de Waal 2005: 186). Compassion is a result of kin/family empathic ties and provides the basis for the necessary condition of cooperation needed to make societies work in any fashion, for in the family, comforting is natural and instinctual, even in younger members—the empathetic response is the strongest response humans have (de Waal 2005: 183). This empathetic response is, for de Waal, natural and connected not to respect, care, or even concern for the other, but to survival. Alluding to a number of studies on the matter, de Waal concludes, "In all of these studies, the likely explanation is not concern about the other's welfare, but distress caused by another's distress. Such a response has enormous survival value [for if] others show fear and distress, there may be good reasons for you to be worried, too" (de Waal 2005: 186).⁵ These conclusions are derived from the interface of animality and humanity. Such an understanding of the foundation of ethics suggests a much different type of discourse—that of responsiveness and intimacy.

There are profound differences between discourses of responsibility (integrity) and discourses of responsiveness (intimacy) and religious orientations of transcendence and immanence as there similarly are with applications of universal principles and maxims and the development of discourses of love and compassion coming from these respective pairs. As Kasulis reminds us, "We humans are part of nature, not separate from it" (Kasulis 2002: 121) and I might add, our closest relatives are the primates and these relatives of ours

display astonishing levels of empathy and compassion.

Although never developing a theory of evolution, the idea can be found in Buddhism in its early doctrine of interdependent arising (*pratītyasamut pāda*, Sanskrit; or *patīccasamuppāda*, Pali) and it is linked to individuals through the idea of karma. Interdependent arising is more a doctrine of conditionality than one of mere cause and effect.

With this as a condition, that
arises

With this not as a condition,
then that does not arise

All beings in the world are linked in an interdependent and mutually influencing web of conditioning factors. Because of this interdependence, the ontological status of a self (an *atman*) is rejected as nothing but a conventional configuration designed for convenience and utility in everyday life. This is known to be illusory and the source of attachment and delusion and is what Dōgen means when he talks about "cultivating-and authenticating all things by conveying oneself to them" instead of just realizing one's profound relation to every creature. The "conveying of oneself" is more than just realizing a relation to others—this would be what constitutes only respect—for it is to somehow feel the other in the depth of one's own being as many primates, dolphins, and elephants feel with each other and even for other species. Further, the delusory self of *atman* occludes the possibility of developing peaceful co-existence with members of our own species as well as other species and prevents affirmation of the dynamic harmony that has emerged through the mutual conditioning and progressive

⁵ For these studies see Chapter five
"KINDNESS: Bodies and Moral Sentiments"
in de Waal 2005.

binomials such as day and night, and so on found in the world: *dao's yin-yang*. For Buddhists, all delusion can be traced back to the desire of and attachment to an essential self, and this is where Buddhism departs from its religious predecessor in India and from the Abrahamic religions of the West and Middle East that have had such success of conversion throughout the world and are perhaps eclipsed only by the advent of global capitalism. Any talk about the separate and essential being of anything is meaningless whether it be in the dualistic systems of thought found so resiliently in the West, the more monistic tendencies in the varieties of Hinduism, or in other forms of spirituality. Thus, all things are *anicca*, are conditioned by other things and are affirmed as transient, impermanent, insubstantial, and nonessential. In this regard, all things are empty (*sunyata*).

The idea of karma anticipated the need to connect human to human in and throughout time as well as to other species, especially to the animal, and establishes empathy and compassion as the primary ethical disposition. The linking and interdependence of all phenomena in the world is given expression in Indra's net, where multidimensional layers of intersecting fractally meshed webs contain infinite amounts of luminous multifaceted dewdrop jewels. Indra, ironically the god of war and weather, dynamic systems in themselves, weaves gossamer threads and at their intersections places pearls and jewels that reflect each other either in part or more holistically. This process goes on into infinity, and the individual pearls and jewels mirror in themselves the complexity of the vast universe through an array of self-similarity of all that is, was, and will come to be. Humans, too, find themselves in this complex network

stretched out over a succession of lives that connect to each other and are conditioned by their interaction with members from their own species as well as others. Buddhist-like thinking is fundamental to our practice of ecology, and ecology needs to become our new form of religious thinking, our new spirituality. Religions such as Buddhism allow us to develop "a religion of ecology" for the 21st century. To do so, we must relinquish our delusional, ego-besotted idea of self, of soul, and give soul back to the world and its species from which we have evolved and emerged. Such a proposition is more than just forfeiting the ego where we started in this essay; it is to relinquish completely and entirely the idea of a separate, autonomous, integral self because instead of empathy being the end point, the culmination of evolution or the product of rationality, it likely was the starting point that brought us together into functional societies and gave us some sort of peaceful coexistence with each other (de Waal 2006: 23). This proposition is more than a matter of survival; it is also a matter of peace.

In contradistinction to this Buddhist/ecological sensibility is an even more problematic form of transcendence and integrity than pre-Buddhist Indian tendencies because this tendency is more prone to literalization and fundamentalism. The Abrahamic religious sensibility of a transcendent God—a God that is other—will provide opportunities for making metaphysical and scientific claims beyond the scope of science. An example of the otherness of this God in relation to the topic of peace can be found in John 14: 27 "Peace I leave with you; my peace I give you. I do not give to you as the world gives. Do not let your hearts be troubled and do not be afraid" (New International

Version 1984). Peace for the Christian is given; it is sent from heaven with its messenger who enters time through the union of divine spirit and human flesh. His intersection with time is from a transcendent beyond, a wholly other realm, and it is this intersection that spells out a certain ecological policy from God through his son for "I have told you these things, so that in me you may have peace. In this world you will have trouble. But take heart! I have overcome the world" (John 16: 33). In overcoming the world, the message is one of hope for the human species, not the animal, plant, insect, or rock. Isaiah (9: 6–7) predicts this hope of transcendence when he states:

For to us a child is born, to us a son is given, and the government will be on his shoulders. And he will be called Wonderful Counselor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there will be no end. He will reign on David's throne and over his kingdom, establishing and upholding it with justice and righteousness from that time on and forever. The zeal of the LORD Almighty will accomplish this.

But is this kind of hope for peace possible in a world with science? Is this hope to become good stewards in the image of the Good Shepherd, given from the great above, any longer possible in a world of war and conflict, economic injustice, and ecological devastation? Is this hope sufficient without willing ourselves as the human-animal back into the world? As Romans 12: 16 points out, if it is possible, "Live in harmony [peace] with one

another. Do not be proud, but be willing to associate with people of low position. Do not be conceited." To be at peace with all men and women, it is necessary, and now imperative, to affirm a way of being in the world that can actually attain that peace without ego, hubris, self-delusion, and a sense of self that views itself as separate, distinct, and integral to itself. I suggest this new way of being is an old one and can easily be found in a Buddhist-like spirituality for it is in this wisdom and what we realize through science that we can become the species known as the "ecologically responsive *Homo sapiens*" (Kasulis 2002: 123). This is the species that can cultivate love, compassion, and peace unlike any other.

Ours is the species that can learn to overcome the conceit of pity for those of "low station"—for those less fortunate humans, those animals, plants, insects, and rocks. This is the species that can learn to overcome the conceit of pity through empathy and compassion, and learn to cultivate love and peace unlike any other. A "respect for" may be a necessary first step, but the next step should be to the animal empathy found within, for within this animality, our humanity is constituted.

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MUSIC-MAKING *VERSUS* THE COMMODIFICATION OF MUSIC: A CALL TO ENLIGHTENED AMATEURS

Chetana Nagavajara*

Preamble: A foretaste of the supreme moment (*Augenblick*)

Abstract

Music-making, fundamentally a communal practice, is the source of aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual experience of a kind comparable to the Faustian "moment" (Augenblick). The most ideal musical culture is one in which no clear dividing line exists between practitioners and listeners, professionals and amateurs, the remnants of which are still discernible in present-day Thai classical music. The growing professionalism has been exploited by commercial manipulations driven by money and technology, resulting in a smug, push-button consumerism that treats music as a mere commodity. The only way out of this crisis is a return to the practice of music at the family, school, and community levels, whereby chamber music can be cultivated by a large pool of amateurs out of which real professionals can grow.

As a teacher of German, may I be allowed to begin by referring to Goethe's *Faust*? In that important scene in which Faust, out of sheer despair with life, declares himself ready to enter into a pact with Mephistopheles, the

Devil in disguise, there is one word in Faust's condition that is of utmost significance, namely the word *Augenblick*. If the Devil can help him to reach that supreme moment, he can have his soul:

If I say to that *moment*:

Do remain! You are so beautiful!

(ll. 1,699–700)

Faust never quite reaches that moment (or else he would have lost his soul to the Devil), but almost. Nearing his death, having seen so much, done so much (of good and bad), the dying Faust experiences a foretaste of the blissful moment which is the ultimate goal of his pact with Mephistopheles:

To that *moment* I could say:

Do remain, you are so beautiful.

The trace of my earthly days

Cannot dissolve into thin air.

As foretaste of such great happiness,

I am now enjoying the supreme moment.¹

(ll. 11,581–586)

And having uttered these words, Faust passes away.

It takes 9,980 verses and half a decade in the poet's own life to allow Faust to attain only a foretaste of that happiness. There is a joke enjoyed by Germanists who maintain that Faust is rescued from eternal perdition by a subjunctive: "to that moment I *could* say"

What have all these idiosyncrasies of German literature to do with music? My answer would be that we can draw analogies from this literary masterpiece that support the main argument of our common endeavour. First, music can bring happiness; it can bring happiness to many. We may be even more fortunate than Faust in the sense

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¹ My own translation.

that we may be able to experience many *Augenblicke* in our lifetime. Second, each individual has to find his own way to reach that supreme *Augenblick*, but the best that we mortals can achieve within the confines of our "earthly days" is that which Faust achieves, namely a "moment" of a second order, a foretaste of the real thing. Although our command: "Do remain: you are so beautiful!" is never obeyed, to be able to keep happy memories of those "moments" suffices to convince us of the inexhaustible value of music.

I propose to share with you some such moments that I have myself experienced.

The first experience could be called "An Evening Walk along North University Avenue." I was teaching at the South East Asian Studies Summer Institute (SEASSI) at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, in 1985. It was a mild summer evening, and my colleagues and I came out for supper as the sun was setting. We were walking along North University Avenue. A trio was rehearsing a Schubert Piano Trio with the windows and front door of their house open. They were nearing the end of the Slow Movement. We decided to stay on to hear them finish the entire piece. The ambience was right, and in the end, we were enraptured. So we exploded into applause, which was answered with a loud "Thank you." I have heard many concerts played by professional ensembles, but none has imprinted itself indelibly on my memory as this one did. This was an *Augenblick* for me!

I would like to call my second experience "A Wintry Night in the Royal Albert Hall." The Royal Albert Hall in London is a colossal multi-purpose hall that is used for indoor sports as well as concerts. On a wintry night in 1960, I was attending one of those "Sunday Classical Concerts," played by the

London Symphony Orchestra conducted by Sir Malcom Sargent with Yehudi Menuhin (1916–1999) as the soloist. He was playing two concerti in the same concert. The first half of the concert was devoted to the Mendelssohn Violin Concerto, which fell flat, exquisitely uninspired. The world-renowned violinist was not "in tune" with this piece of music, and he was literally out of tune most of the time. I was disappointed and resigned myself to witnessing a calamity for the second half of the concert. On the contrary, Menuhin came back a different person, technically flawless and deeply inspired by the Brahms Concerto. It was an experience that makes you grateful to the composer as well as to the soloist and orchestra for such an (extended) *Augenblick*. The critic of the *Daily Telegraph*, two days later, could find no appropriate expression to describe Menuhin's performance of the Brahms Concerto and simply wrote: "He came back in the second half and played like a God." When a critic resorts to hyperbole like that, it means that words must have failed him. The *Augenblick* was indescribable. There must have been over a thousand people in the audience that night, and I could tell that they were transported and transfixed. After the concert, I took the last train from King's Cross Station back to Cambridge. It was a very cold night, and I had to walk all the way from Cambridge Railway Station and did not get to my room until after 1.00 a.m., but I was feeling warm inside.

Such experiences are unexpected, unpredicted, and therefore even more welcome. I do not mean that musicians can leave everything to chance and rely entirely on their instinct or inspiration. Rigorous training and assiduous practice are required conditions. But the *Augenblick* is "a particular kind of communal experience of a

particular intensity in a particular place."² And that is music-making in the noblest sense of the word, whereby communication becomes communion.

The (attempted) perpetuation of the *Augenblick*

The episodes I have related above would tend to privilege the *live* performance over all forms of modern reproduction. This is a point that we shall have to debate, for the experience of people living in the age prior to the advent of "technical reproducibility" (to borrow the term popularized by the German thinker Walter Benjamin) can never be identical with that of those of the subsequent era in which recorded music can be considered an experience of value. But to return to the last example given above, many of those who were in the Royal Albert Hall that night could only wish that that particular performance of the Brahms Violin Concerto had been recorded so that millions of music lovers could have a chance to share that unique experience. The dilemma facing a member of the audience like me comes from the question whether repeated listening to a recording of that performance would give me the same aesthetic pleasure that I experienced in the real performance. I am more inclined to think that it would not be the same, because the "moment" arose out of my being there, being part of a *community* of listeners/spectators, hearing the real sound, seeing the soloist perform

in front of me, imbibing the congenial and convivial atmosphere of *music-making*, whose uniqueness cannot be repeated (in the same way that my eavesdropping on the Schubert Trio in Ann Arbor could not be). Menuhin, in the television series *The Music of Man*, produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, argued heatedly with the Canadian pianist Glenn Gould (1932–1982), who preferred music being made in a recording studio, while Menuhin defended the traditional live performance, since he could always *feel his audience*. I would go so far as to say that it might have taken him some time to feel his audience and once he achieved that secret communion with them in the second half of the concert, something miraculous did occur (and of course, it did not occur at every concert of his!). In a way, the essence of music-making is the *presence* of all concerned, performers as well as listeners.

Yet one has to admit that a composer of note would wish to share his work with his contemporaries and to perpetuate his work for posterity. Since the West was committed to the written mode of communication, it was only natural that *notation* was invented. (Thai culture being predominantly an oral one, Thai classical musicians to the present day rely almost entirely on memory.) Notation, as a means of perpetuation, is essentially different from recording technology, for notation induces music lovers to acquire skills in reading music, playing musical instruments, and singing according to the notes on the page. In other words, notation enriches *active* music-making, whereas our *passive* listeners of today rely on push-button technology. Chamber music thrived through notation, as family members and friends gathered in the sitting room (i.e., chamber) to perform sonatas, quartets, and other kinds of music

² I have borrowed this succinct formulation from the "Programme and Abstracts" of the conference *The Proms and British Musical Life*, London, April 23–27, 2007. (Day 3, Session 1: Timothy Day, "Malcom Sargent, William Glock and Martin Luther").

for small ensembles for their enjoyment. Most of them were amateurs, and as we know from the lives of distinguished composers such as Beethoven, some of their amateur pupils possessed very high standards. Those who could not read music and could not play an instrument had to rely on competent friends. The French poet Charles Baudelaire (1821–1867), who was an ardent lover of music and a champion of Richard Wagner, had to wander from one friend to another with a piano transcription of Wagner's music, entreating them to play this music for him on the piano. Besides, notation gave rise to music-publishing. It could benefit a composer in material terms as well, if he had an honest publisher to help him. Brahms became fairly well-to-do with earnings from the sale of his piano music to amateurs (the easier pieces, I suppose!). We can perhaps conclude that notation *activates* people to make music. The advent of recording technology has changed all that.

From high fidelity to infidelity

Recording technology started with a noble mission: to perpetuate great works of great artists. It can benefit both the artist and the public. The artist can lend permanency to his work (by simpler means than notation) and reach out to a larger public. The listener can get to know a piece of music through repeated listening, and, in terms of the aesthetic pleasure derived from certain compositions, recording can help a great deal to increase that pleasure. (We need not talk about the supreme *Augenblick* here.) Besides, we have *historic recordings* of memorable *live* performances. The works of great artists can thus be handed down to subsequent generations who are not lucky enough to have been born their contemporaries. So reputation no longer rests on hearsay but on concrete evidence in the form of

recording, however imperfect it may be. I read a great deal about the collaboration between the great composer Johannes Brahms (1833–1897) and his closest friend Joseph Joachim (1831–1907), the great violinist. When I heard a recording of Joachim made during the early years of the 20th century, I could understand why Brahms wrote that great violin concerto for him (which Yehudi Menuhin superbly performed that wintry night in 1960). The recording's fidelity is much below today's standard, but it is adequate to allow us to gauge his style and above all, his *musical personality*.

There is much to be said for the humility of the early generations of sound and recording engineers as well as producers. They grew up with *broadcasting* and were wont to work with original performances. Their ambition was to capture and reproduce the original work as *faithfully* as possible, hence the use of the term *high fidelity* in recording technology. These were honest people; when they came up with a system of amplification, they said so; that is to say, they wanted to amplify the original sound. And their technology did benefit jazz and popular music. They did not want to cheat us. We now live in the age of "virtual reality" which will soon supplant real reality. Technology has now advanced so far as to be able to produce a second reality that is not to be considered inferior to any original. It may not be an exaggeration to talk about the *arrogance* of present-day technology. A recording of a symphony is technologically perfect, and, in musical terms, it is technically perfect as well: there are no wrong notes, not a single instrumentalist in the orchestra plays out of tune. The perfect "performance" is not a performance in the sense that we used to know it, but a concoction from different "takes," or an

edited version with "repairs" made through technological means. The term *editing*, borrowed from the noble discipline of philology where scholars work with different manuscripts or different printed texts in order to get as close as possible to the authorial version, has thus been soiled by the contemporary recording industry, which no longer cares for an "original." (I am not in any way hostile to electronic music which uses technology to create sounds which are not identical with acoustic instruments and whose compositional principle admits of cuts and pastes by design and not by default.) However, contemporary recording proudly adopts *infidelity* as its guiding principle in order to achieve faked perfection.

The recorded sound soon assumes a character of its own which excites listeners: it is grand, resonant, opulent, majestic, especially the orchestral sound. Some musicians, and especially conductors, have known how to exploit these technological possibilities, and some have gone so far as to coax their orchestras into producing a sound that would suit the process of recording. Herbert von Karajan (1908–1989) was one of them, with his renowned Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra; he was even spiteful of colleagues who knew little about such technicalities and once branded a worthy colleague, Eugen Jochum (1902–1987), as a "philistine."³ With the advent of television, many conductors began to use the new medium for a self-serving and self-promoting purpose, which sometimes provoked a negative reaction from other colleagues, such as the Italian conductor Riccardo Muti, who made the following remark

³ A television interview. (I am reporting from memory.)

about his brethren: "We are a race that should disappear."⁴

It would be unfair to stress too much the negative side of technology. It must not be forgotten that *broadcasting* and especially radio broadcasting has achieved much in terms of bringing music (of all kinds) to a vast listening public. In some countries, like the United Kingdom, radio stations set up their own orchestras, including regional orchestras, initially for the purpose of broadcasting, but soon began to launch live concerts that have been shaping public taste for many decades, such as the BBC's annual Promenade Concerts (known as the *Proms*), which are unrivaled in many parts of the world. Some radio orchestras are known for their quality and rank among the best in the country, such as those in Munich, Hamburg, and Stuttgart in Germany. The case of Thailand is also a historic one: the rise of the Thai popular song, a hybrid genre combining Western popular (big-band) music with Thai classical music, must be considered a boon to Thai musical life, as I have elsewhere demonstrated.⁵ The chief protagonist was the big band created by the Public Relations Department in 1939, where the best composers, musicians, and singers of Thailand congregated to deliver a remarkable number of masterpieces that reflect the depths and range of emotions of the Thai people. The popularity of the

⁴ A television broadcast of a rehearsal of Dvorak's Second Symphony with the Bavarian Radio Symphony Orchestra, taped and lent to me privately.

⁵ Chetana Nagavajara, "The Thai Popular Song and Its Literary Lineage" (1989), in Chetana Nagavajara, *Comparative Literature from a Thai Perspective*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1996. 137–163.

genre owes a great deal to radio broadcasting.

I may have put great emphasis on the communal aspects of music-making when talking earlier about live performances, but it must be conceded that the notion of *community* can be applied also to broadcast and recorded music. Not many people are fortunate enough to attend concerts or recitals given by great orchestras and distinguished artists, and radio and recording offer them access to valuable (though secondary!) musical experiences. A community of fervent music lovers can thrive on broadcast and recorded music, and the level of critical acumen expressed through the exchange of views need not be inferior to that connected with live music. It has to be admitted that *music criticism* based, for example, on recorded music can be of extremely high quality, probably because of attentive listening through repeated hearings. One may even go so far as to assert that recording has enriched and enhanced music criticism. The distinguished British music critic Norman Lebrecht has characterized the virtue of recorded classical music in very apposite terms:

Classical records brought delight and enlightenment to millions who never dared enter a concert hall. More than that, they fostered a sense of community by allowing listeners to compare and contrast one interpretation of Bruckner's fourth symphony with another, sometimes to a nerdish extreme but inherently, invaluable, as a

commonly shared cultural artifact.⁶

And of course, he bemoans the imminent demise of the recording industry as a result of the advent of more modern digital technologies. My only reservations would be that while one can enjoy great music in recorded form, one should not deny oneself the (irreplaceable) experience of live performances. Perhaps one can go even a step further: why should one not learn an instrument and assert oneself as an amateur?

Alas, mass-marketed music has more or less killed the amateur—the technical standard is now so high (many professional musicians cannot play live at the technically accurate level of their own recordings) that the amateur is intimidated and embarrassed to attempt an original public performance, for they know they would be compared to the recording artist!

Commodification and commercialization

I have in the previous section described both the weaknesses and strengths of technology in the service of the musical arts. It is well and good to use technology to advance music education for a vast majority of people and in rare cases to capture the unique experiences (those *Augenblicke*) for the benefit of mankind. But let us be honest about it: the dividing line between the noble act of preserving, disseminating, and promoting valuable

⁶ Norman Lebrecht, "Look who's been dumped." *The Lebrecht Weekly*, December 31, 2003. <<http://www.scena.org/columns/lebrecht/031231-NL-recording.html>>.

musical experiences and the commodification of music for commercial purposes is a very thin one. There is inevitably a danger in turning a human and humane experience into a commodity that can be bought and sold. Mind you, we should not forget that musicians too have to survive and that we have to reward them for their artistry.

The question is where the middle path lies. In his book *Who Killed Classical Music?* (1996), Norman Lebrecht demonstrates how the cult of celebrity has destroyed the music world, because star conductors, soloists, and singers are paid so much that there is very little left to pay orchestral musicians, resulting in the disbanding of one orchestra after another. In a consumer society, selling and buying are not always related to the quality of the commodities, for the modern witchcraft of public relations and advertising usually holds the public in thrall. When money and technology join hands in the music business, they become invincible. A rock concert that can attract a gigantic crowd needs to depend not only on the prowess of the performers but also on state-of-the-art technologies and, last but not least, on market stratagems and machinations. At every such concert, the audience must be convinced that the Faustian *Augenblick* can happen every thirty seconds, and, more often than not, audience participation serves to heighten those paroxysms. The domain of classical music is not free from such aberrations. People expect a star conductor to perform a dazzling choreographic feat on the rostrum. I have witnessed one who responded so well to his public's expectations that he had to quench his thirst with a glass of water between the movements of a symphony. Of course, you would expect him to produce those supreme *Augenblicke* every

now and then, and it is inevitable that he would put great emphasis on the *fortissimos* and *pianissimos* and not care much for things in between. How many of our idle consumers know how to distinguish between a conviction and a pose?

The market forces are omnipotent, and even in a Western country with a venerable tradition of criticism, it is the business side of the musical enterprise that always wins the day. This was what happened in Germany in 2006. After six years at the helm of the world renowned Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, the British star conductor Sir Simon Rattle came under attack by a number of German music critics who were of the opinion that the standard of playing had suffered, especially in that part of the repertoire which had always been the pride of the august ensemble, namely the Austro-German Classics. One of them, the resident critic of the national newspaper *Die Welt*, was more outspoken than the others, who very soon followed suit with their own negative evaluations. The critics most probably overestimated the forces of tradition, for Germany since the 18th century had prided itself as the home of "critical" philosophy and on the eminence of its criticism of the arts, be it in the domain of literature, visual arts, theatre, or music. They did not recognize the advent of a new hegemonic power, the market. The critic of *Die Welt* lost his job and had to switch to earning his daily bread by editing a CD magazine for a record store. No compatriot came to his rescue. Only a British colleague dared to concur with him publicly in saying that "what is lacking in the interpretation [of Gustav Holst's *The Planets*] is a coherent sense of direction and that can be taken as a metaphor for the general state of play in the Berlin

Philharmonic. High as Rattle has risen, he has failed to convince with much of his music-making at the level to which Berliners are accustomed." You could probably guess who the British critic is. Of course, we are hearing the voice of Norman Lebrecht, who concludes with a piece of brotherly advice: "Somehow the bite has gone from Rattle's baton. He may need, in mid-life and for the first time in his life, to read some of the bad reviews and reflect on what is going wrong."⁷

Good criticism has no nationality!

Let us face it: one critical voice can do little against a bastion of well-organized PR campaigns in favour of the deliberately cultivated cult of stardom. "Visibility" is perhaps one of the mildest terms adopted by the contemporary music industry. Many opera houses see no need to retain a regular "company" of singers anymore. They can fly in "international" artists to constitute an "international" cast for specific performances at whatever costs (which in some cases are supported by public money). The only "company" in an opera house is the orchestra, traditionally sunk into a pit (not necessarily as deep as the "abyss" [*Abgrund*] in Bayreuth). The musicians are the mainstay of the house, are badly paid in most cases and *invisible*. Every time I see Mozart's *The Magic Flute*, I wish the audience would have a

chance to applaud the principal flautist who makes Tamino's instrument sound truly "magical." But he/she has to remain invisible; only the conductor has a chance to come on the stage for the final curtain call. In a sense and accidentally, tradition supports the PR-driven craze for stardom.

Yet, whatever one may say about the commercial excesses of the musical world, it has one virtue that is also visible: the presence of an audience substantiates its viability. If we cross over into the domain of visual arts, we shall encounter a strange phenomenon, and I am speaking here of the specific case of Thailand. Public museums of modern art are usually empty, and I have a personal predilection of visiting our National Gallery on early Sunday mornings, for until about 11.30, there are only two people in that well-maintained, air-conditioned space, namely myself and a single watchman! But many of our contemporary artists thrive well in our society. Buyers and collectors are there to buy their "commodities," irrespective of the artistic quality. So buying and selling go on vigorously in a society in which there is no *public* for contemporary art. It is a prerogative among the *nouveaux riches* to collect art works, and they can be easily persuaded by art dealers or sometimes by the artists themselves. (It may be noticed that loquacious artists sell better than those who do not know how to promote themselves.) People these days are ready to forgive a self-serving remark made by a *diva*, but tend to regard a similar statement by a Mike Tyson as raucous or uncouth. This is not fair! We do not need to refer to an authority of the stature of Schopenhauer in order to maintain the artistic superiority of music over boxing. But the market-driven behaviour of many musical stars leaves sense and sensibility behind. "What they

⁷ Norman Lebrecht, "Rattle has a battle on his hands." *The Lebrecht Weekly*, August 23, 2006. <<http://www.scena.org/columns/lebrecht/060823-NL-rattle.html>>. See also: Presseportal PARK AVENUE – Simon Rattle bei den Philharmonikern gescheitert. <http://www.presseportal.de/pm/58385/81308/park_avenue>.

lack is the redeeming gift of humility, an urge to be at the service of art."⁸

When music becomes a marketable commodity, humility is not an attribute that attracts a large clientele.

The (precarious) survival of Thai classical music

It would appear that music geared towards mass consumption is not much concerned with quality, for idle consumers with no critical awareness always fall prey to market manipulations. Can we go a step further in positing that a society that consists almost entirely of listeners, with only a tiny fraction of its members practising music—either as professionals or amateurs—is, musically and culturally speaking, not in a healthy state? I cannot help being reminded of Bertolt Brecht (1898–1956), who as playwright, director, and theoretician, has had immense influence on the theatre internationally. Brecht, in his theory of the didactic play, was of the opinion that the ideal theatre could only arise out of a community in which there was no clear dividing line between performers and spectators, and that amateurs were the driving force behind such a community.⁹ The same principle could very well apply to music, and the case of Thai classical music can substantiate the Brechtian theory. Against all the odds, it has managed to survive the

onslaught of modern life and maintain its high standard of performance. The demarcation line between professionals and amateurs is very thin, as confirmed by the results of the research project "Criticism as an Intellectual Force in Contemporary Society."¹⁰ It is no rare sight to see a member of the audience step into an orchestra and take over (and surely not usurping) the place of a performer who steps out to assume the role of a listener. To formulate it in more radical terms, this is music for musical practitioners and not for passive listeners. It does not care for a mass audience and it does not partake of the process of commodification and commercialization. A virtuoso in Thai classical music is usually known in a small circle of connoisseurs and can never get rich. There is a funny practice of the Thai bureaucracy (which I do not find funny!) that most local schools have to employ their music teachers in the capacity of janitors. This is because most of these masters of Thai classical music have had only a four-year compulsory education, although their level of performance would equal that of an M.Mus. or a D.Mus. in the higher education system. So the only place for them in the Thai bureaucracy is that of a janitor. The "education" they have received is an informal one. There are no fixed curriculum, no graded examinations, and no certification, and the training is mostly done on a one-to-one basis; nevertheless, it is rigorous. The guiding principle is quality, and we owe it to these humble janitors of local schools that the standards have been upheld.

⁸ Norman Lebrecht, "The Singing World's Golden Couple?" *The Lebrecht Weekly*, February 16, 2006.
<<http://www.scena.org/columns/lebrecht/000216-NL-alagna-gheorghiu.html>>.
⁹ *Brechts Modell der Lehrstücke*, ed. Reiner Steinweg. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1976. 51.

¹⁰ *From Work of Art Critical Arena. Summary Report of the Research Project "Criticism as an Intellectual Force in Contemporary Society."* (Chetana Nagavajara: Project Leader). Bangkok: Chomanad Press, 2006. 30.

Thai classical music remains community-based, in many cases, with Buddhist temples functioning as community centres. Music contests and music festivals are held, not in the National Theatre or the august Thailand Cultural Centre, but in a multi-purpose hall of a temple. A few years ago, I attended a music contest at a small temple that went on all night, with the Deputy Abbot as the Convener, who also supervised the preparation of the supper for the ten orchestras taking part, which was to be served around 3 a.m. When I took leave of him at around 2.30 a.m., he regretted that I would miss the important part of the event: the orchestras would indulge in musical jokes around dawn! The point I am making here is that this is music-making just for the sheer pleasure of it—worlds apart from the common run of the music industry we have seen above under the section "Commodification and Commercialization."

This is not the place to discourse on the role of the Buddhist temple as the centre of a community. There is no need to stress that it is not just a place for religious worship. Worldly, and sometimes very worldly, problems are to be addressed there too. There is a temple near the notorious slums of Khlong Toey, known as Wat Khlong Toey Nai, which has distinguished itself as a self-appointed conservatory. Youngsters from the slums go there for musical training. Some of them—there is no secret about it—are former delinquents or drug-addicts, but once they fall under the spell of Thai classical music, they begin to realize their own worth, strive for perfection, and gain thereby self-confidence and self-respect. A few of them have been praised as virtuosos. Perhaps in their music-making, they may have experienced those *Augenblicke* which

are much, much more felicitous than the kicks they get out of drugs. If this is one way in which music can function as a therapy, it is a therapy that is based on man's creative ability. Engagement in music can in this case combat base instincts.

Perhaps we can extrapolate a little from the above episode that music-making is also conducive to the development of personality, both at the individual and the collective levels. It is not too difficult to recognize the individual personality of a distinguished musician, but it is by no means easy to speak of the distinct personality of a musical ensemble. The aforementioned research project "Criticism as an Intellectual Force in Contemporary Society" did invite two orchestras from the province of Saraburi to perform at the same concert at the Sirindhorn Anthropology Center, Talingchan, Bangkok, on June 12, 2005, in the programme called "Pupils of the Same Master Compete at Taling Chan." The two orchestras consisted of members and friends of two families who were relatives, lived as next-door neighbours in the same village, and were trained by two masters (also relatives) who studied under the same master musician in Bangkok. Yet their styles of playing were different; the sounds of the respective orchestras were different, too, even when they were performing the same set pieces. So, living physically close to each other and being next-door neighbours did not homogenize their distinct collective musical personalities. This is the wonder of music, and music-making is probably one of the most effective means of achieving intellectual and spiritual cohesiveness. When we turn to the Western world, we encounter complaints that most symphony orchestras these days sound alike because

they do not work continuously enough under their chief conductors, who jet around the globe guest-conducting this and that orchestra. The quasi-religious belief about the "sound" of an orchestra can go very far, and Sir Simon Rattle has been accused of destroying the "German sound" of the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, as though that sound was ethnically and racially determined. But the sound of the Philharmonia Orchestra of London under its chief conductor Otto Klemperer in the 1960s was perhaps more "German" than that of any German orchestra! I am more inclined to side with the conductor Eugene Ormandy (1899–1985) when he said: "The Philadelphia sound, it's me!" The young musicians from the Thai province of Saraburi would readily agree with him.

But such distinctiveness does not necessarily preclude a certain degree of flexibility in adjusting themselves to changing circumstances. Thai classical musicians do not operate exactly in the same way as their Western counterparts when they perform with guest soloists. With the Western system of notation, the soloist, the home orchestra, and its resident conductor do not have absolute freedom to veer from the written text, although a certain freedom is there that is agreed upon during the rehearsals between the soloist and the conductor/orchestra. A Thai orchestra is not score-based, and when a guest musician joins in, the orchestra (with no conductor) and the guest musician have to find their relationship, which has not been prescribed beforehand or written down in the form of notation. They must *instinctively* feel together, be attentive to each other, listen to each other, and be prepared to sacrifice individual personality in order to achieve a new *collective personality*. The process requires great

skills, as well as humility. And we must not forget that they, more often than not, perform together *without a single rehearsal*. I am not claiming that this is a prerogative of Thai music, for jazz music too admits of such collaboration. *Civilized collegiality* is the order of the day.

There is a *ranad* (xylophone) player in Bangkok known by his nickname Pom who roams about town (and sometimes up-country) with two *ranad* sticks in his bag and joins in with various orchestras. (I heard him live once.) As I have explained above, we still live in an age in which each orchestra retains its own style and its own sound, so when Mr. Pom comes for a visit and asks to be allowed to play the main *ranad*, the orchestra has to adjust itself. But the greater the adjustment, the greater is the challenge, and the greater the pleasure of music-making. Of course, such collaborative feats are not possible for the entire repertoire, for certain compositions belong to certain schools and guest musicians will find it hard to fit in. But the available repertoire that permits such collaboration is large enough. Naturally, the way both parties adjust themselves may not be perceptible to the uninitiated, and this is where Thai classical music remains, to a certain extent, music for connoisseurs.

A question may arise as to what, in the nature of Thai music itself, is supportive of such flexibility that, in turn, facilitates collective music-making. The answer is quite straightforward: *improvisation*. Thai classical music is played from memory (and one master musician, Bunyong Ketkhong, had a repertoire of roughly 20,000 tunes),¹¹ that still leaves room for

¹¹ This information was transmitted to me by the German theatre director, Gert Pfafferodt,

improvisation. A classical Thai musician is expected to be not only a performer but also a composer, and it is this second capacity that enables him to accommodate whatever the guest artist may have come up with. Of course, all this freedom to improvise does not happen wildly without design but must respect a common framework within which each musician can be both himself and part of an ensemble.

The concept of *composition* in Thai classical music also needs some clarification. A composition need not be something completely novel. The composer can take a folk melody or an old composition by a past master and adapt it, vary it, curtailing and supplementing the original. He may draw on a common pool of existing melodies and make out of them something of his own. What the French thinker Roland Barthes (1915–1980) says about "the immense dictionary from which he [the scriptor] draws a writing that knows no halt"¹² can perhaps be applied to the process of composition in Thai classical music, although we would never go as far as Barthes in denying the creative role of the artist/composer. Composition,

who worked closely with the Thai music master for almost two years from 1982 to 1984 in the process of preparation for the production of the "hybrid" drama, *Phra Sang-Iphigenie*. I have sought advice on this issue from a number of experts in Thai music, who are of the opinion that, as a "composition" in Thai classical music is an adaptation/variation/extrapolation/recomposition of other works, the assertion may not be an exaggeration at all.
¹² Roland Barthes, *Image-Music-Text. Essays*. Selected and translated by Stephen Heath. London: Fontana Press, 1977. 147.

in our sense, is therefore "intertextual," but intertextuality does not deny originality altogether. In this free-for-all process of give and take, it is difficult to identify the origin, and the modern notion of copyright which is supposed to be one of the hallmarks of a civilized society can hardly be relevant to the practice of Thai music. The joy of listening to Thai music is that you have the impression of having heard this music before, but what you are hearing here and now is not exactly what stuck in your memory from previous hearings. It is as though you were awakening to the memories of your past lives!

Knowing Thai music does not concern only the music; Thai music can function as a gateway to Thai culture in general. I shall cite a specific example: the constitution of a *piphat* orchestra. Two *ranad* (xylophones) are placed in front of the orchestra: the first, called *ranad ek* in Thai, is responsible for carrying the main melody. The musician in charge of the *ranad ek* is accorded a distinct prominence and is encouraged to demonstrate his virtuosity. Sitting at his side is a colleague who plays the *ranad thum*, literally a *ranad* with a soft sound. The latter musician gives the appearance of playing a secondary role: he syncopates, accentuates, and at times comments on the principal melody. He seems to be content with assuming the role of the buffoon of the orchestra.

But appearances are deceptive. More often than not, the master himself opts to play the *ranad thum*, while giving a chance to one of his top pupils to shine out with the first *ranad*. In his apparently subordinate position, the master directs the orchestra. The colleagues have to listen attentively to him: he may relax or hasten the pace. It

would be a blunder to translate this orchestral structure in occidental terms such that the first *ranad* is likened to the first violin and the second *ranad* to the second violin. The English expression "to play second fiddle" does not apply here. In the Western context, a chamber orchestra without a conductor is directed by the concertmaster, who still maintains his prominence at the first desk of the first violins. We Thai have reversed that hierarchical disposition. I have elsewhere elaborated a theory of the second xylophone, which in some ways can be helpful in the understanding of Thai culture.¹³ Ours is a *ranad thum culture* which does not fit into the contemporary craze for visibility and publicity. The dilemma facing present-day Thailand could be explained in terms of our facile abandonment of our *ranad thum culture* in favour of a hasty and unreflected espousal of superficial values.

A return to chamber music?

In a way, a Thai classical orchestra is akin to a Western chamber orchestra in terms of its size and the intimate rapport among the musicians. The futile efforts to increase the size of a Thai orchestra to rival, or even to outdo, a Western symphony orchestra have produced disastrous results, simply because our instruments sound extremely ugly when played in a very large ensemble. To counter the craze for big sound and gigantic ensembles, invariably exploited by technology and the music

industry, which have turned out docile listeners and consumers, it would be desirable to hark back to music-making at the community and family levels. There is no better way to achieve this than by returning to chamber music. Let us take counsel from one of the most professional of professional musicians, who remained an enlightened amateur at heart.

We shall always come back to chamber music—the quartet, the string quartet in particular—as the highest form of musical activity . . . It is not aimed to produce mammoth effects in volume on mammoth audiences in mammoth halls . . . It is perhaps the greatest contribution Europe has made to civilization.

Chamber music should be played, almost, by amateurs rather than by professionals. Naturally the professional quartet is an amazing achievement, but the civilization that I would love to know rests on amateur performance, on those innumerable small groups that gather in private homes—too few today, the age of “The Knob.” It is my prayer and hope that . . . , when the present generation grows up, they will have the means to play for themselves, for their friends, for their families, to make chamber music at home; . . .¹⁴

¹³ Chetana Nagavajara, "Wechselseitige Erhellung der Künste in der thailändischen Kultur," (1992) in Chetana Nagavajara, *Wechselseitige Erhellung der Kulturen. Aufsätze zur Kultur und Literatur*. Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 1998. 69–73.

¹⁴ Yehudi Menuhin and William Primrose, *Violin & Viola*. Yehudi Menuhin Music Guides. New York: Shirmer Books, 1976. 89–90.

There could not have been a more eloquent plea for music-making and a more convincing defence of the role of the amateur than the above statement by Lord Yehudi Menuhin. Thirty years have passed and, let us face it, we shall have to continue hoping—and praying. A strange phenomenon came about in Thailand two years ago when the film *The Overture*, based on the life of a great Thai classical musician, was shown, first to empty houses, and subsequently, through concerted campaigns in the media, to full houses, resulting in an upsurge in the sale of musical instruments—especially the *ranad*, as the hero of the film plays the *ranad ek*—and in the demand for music lessons. Alas, as with most good things that happen in this hapless Land of Smiles, the whole excitement was a fleeting affair. The media's interest was not genuine, and there was no firm educational foundation to keep the flame burning. The state and private organizations have failed to capitalize on the golden opportunity to revive music-making, and we are now back to square one, where millions of television viewers get bewitched by a television show called "Academy Fantasia," which brings young aspirants together in residence (whose every move, including the most intimate ones, is captured by television cameras), and who are trained to compete in a weekly popular song contest, adjudicated by a popular vote via SMS. The weekly contest takes place in a mammoth hall, the ticket price being naturally exorbitant. The age-old *ranad thum culture* has had no chance. We are back to the push-button culture which is situated at the other extreme of the dream cherished by the likes of Lord Yehudi Menuhin.

Education as the last resort?

Over thirty years ago, I went to the Philippines as member of the Secretariat of the South East Asian Ministers of Education Organization (SEAMEO), serving the Council of Education Ministers, which was meeting in Baguio City. We were impressed by the warm welcome accorded us along the mountainous route, where school bands were greeting us as we passed by. The Permanent Secretary of Education told us that it was the government's policy to encourage *every school child* to learn a musical instrument. Within less than twenty years, most musicians playing in the lobbies of first-class hotels in Thailand were Filipinos. They had sensitivity, musicianship, and skills with which local Thai musicians could not compete. They have had *education*, the kind of education that their Thai counterparts did not have. Of course, with the advent of *karaoke*, our Filipino friends have had to pack their bags and go home. Once again in this Land of Smiles, technology and money (or to be more precise, money-saving mechanisms) have eliminated music-making.

The case of the Philippines is of exemplary nature. Concerted efforts on various fronts have been initiated, which are not restricted to actual teaching and learning but also take into account activities of promotional character. The state can be relied upon as the prime mover in constructive thinking and action, including such measures as the passage of the Music Law as far back as 1966.¹⁵

¹⁵ Viola E. Hornilla, "Music Education in the Philippines' Primary and Secondary Schools," *Articles on Culture and Arts*. [National Commission for Culture and the Arts]

Thailand can certainly learn from the experiences (the successes as well as the setbacks) of our ASEAN friends. But who cares about those music-loving monks at innumerable temples who have, as managers and impresarios, kept classical music alive? In the formal sector, the teaching and learning of the arts have not received sufficient attention, and the learning of the various arts is combined into one weekly session. We need a large pool of amateurs out of which professional musicians can be formed. The schools can be instrumental in this endeavour. In one particular area, namely the training of marching bands, they have excelled themselves, even at the international level, but the craze for winning competitions can go too far. In any case, the standard of playing brass instruments is high in our country, and the brass sections of our symphony orchestras often astonish visiting Western conductors. It should not be too difficult to emulate our "top brass" in other musical sectors. Furthermore, to have a substantial number of amateur musicians is a guarantee that there will be sufficient listeners who know how to appreciate good music, for those who play an instrument or sing are, more often than not, better listeners than those who do not. Besides, a school is a tightly-knit community that can encourage meaningful interaction between performers and listeners.

In terms of education for the public, the media have been indifferent, to say the least, and television must be branded as the chief culprit. Prime time is devoted to tasteless soap operas, and at the time of this writing, the government, pressured by

groups of concerned parents, is taking concrete measures to regulate TV programming by allotting prime time to more constructive programmes suitable also for children. A plan to launch a Public Television Station is also being initiated.¹⁶ As far as music, especially Thai classical music, is concerned, they need not worry about a dearth of able musicians and ensembles to create meaningful programmes. Those music-loving janitors and their pupils can get together anytime, and the above-mentioned repertoire of 20,000 pieces is there to serve the needs of the listeners. "Management" of the arts has almost become a dirty word, because we only know the kind of management driven by cupidity. We need a new concept of management intent on promoting a broad-based education for the public good.

Epilogue: An idealistic aside

In an effort to combat the exploitation of music to satisfy materialistic ends, I began this paper by drawing analogies from the notion of *Augenblick* as expressed in Goethe's *Faust*. I must clarify that I do not mean to say that music, as the other arts, must of necessity be an end in itself. I am not prepared to go as far as Roger Scruton, who in his book *The Aesthetics of Music* categorically states that "we must consider a work of art as an end in itself; only then does it become a means for us."¹⁷ I do not think that in real life we distinguish ends and means in a categorical manner at all. In his recent work, *Late Beethoven: Music*,

<http://www.ncca.gov.ph/about_cularts/comarticles.php?artcl_Id=159>.

¹⁶ The idea has since been realized with a substantial state subsidy. The new channel is trying very hard to create meaningful programmes that other commercially driven stations have not been able to deliver.

¹⁷ Roger Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 375.

Thought, Imagination (2003), Maynard Solomon demonstrates how a shift in the composer's thinking about life and art has a bearing on his mature creation. Instead of referring to scholarly authorities, I shall return to the musician I most admire. Lord Yehudi Menuhin reminisced about his childhood in a very thought-provoking way:

As a small child playing the violin, my naïve dream was to be able, thereby, to heal the suffering heart, fulfilling thus the Jewish mission. Ever since I can remember, I have tried to relate the beauty of great music to the harmony of life. As a small child I even imagined that if I could play the Chaconne of Bach inspiringly enough in the Sistine Chapel under the eyes of Michelangelo, all that is ignoble and vile would miraculously disappear from our world.¹⁸

The young Menuhin was not overly concerned with the philosophical question of whether music is an end or a means. What sounds most assuring is that here was a child who had already mastered the difficult Chaconne of Bach, who was conscious of the immense possibility of music and also of his own prowess as a musician, and who was filled with an aspiration to rise beyond the common run of music-making to an ideal world. The references to the Jewish mission and Michelangelo's masterpiece in the Sistine

Chapel confirm that he had had a good *education* (though his was a thorough home-schooling), which enabled him, even at that tender age, to anchor his music and music-making in a relevant and meaningful cultural context. Let us face it: we are dealing here with an idealistic aspiration.

The facts of life may not be as rosy as one would like them to be. The exterminators of Auschwitz too were fervent music lovers and saw to it that a chamber orchestra consisting of female prisoners was set up under the direction of Alma Rosé. When she unexpectedly died of food-poisoning, they did her the kind of honour usually due to a highly respected person.¹⁹ How are we to explain such a paradox in human nature? Another story could perhaps better illustrate the power of music to create friendship, and this was told in a television interview by the French composer Olivier Messiaen (1908–1992). While a prisoner of war in the camp at Görlitz (a town now split into two halves, one German and the other Polish), where, he maintained, the Germans treated their prisoners well, although food was very scarce, Messiaen composed a deeply religious work, which has since been immortalized in the repertoire of chamber music, known as the *Quatuor pour la fin du temps*, which was performed in the prison camp on January 15, 1941. The audience consisted both of prisoners and German officers of the camp, who were united in brotherhood under the spell of this music. (The temperature outside the

¹⁸ Transcribed from *Yehudi Menuhin: The Violin of the Century* DVD - EMI CLASSICS (DVB 4 92363 9).

¹⁹ Richard Newman with Karen Kirtley, *Alma Rosé: Vienna to Auschwitz*. Portland, Oregon: Amadeus Press, 2000. 303.

improvised concert hall was –4 degrees!)²⁰ Messiaen was trying to convey in this work his vision of the Apocalypse, but, in all modesty, he admitted that this "vision" might have come from the hunger he was experiencing at that time!

We could multiply the stories about the *pros* and *cons* of music indefinitely and never be able to reach a definitive conclusion on the healing and redemptive power of music. "The child is father of the man," an English Romantic poet once said.²¹ And I for one would be ready at any time to align myself with the child prodigy Yehudi Menuhin, who ideally believed that the aesthetic and the moral value of music are identical. A little grain of idealism can carry us very far.²²

²⁰ Rebecca Rischin, *For the End of Time: The Story of the Messiaen Quartet*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003. 61–70.

²¹ From William Wordsworth's poem "My heart leaps up when I behold / A rainbow in the sky."

²² Keynote Address presented at the 6th Asia-Pacific Symposium on Music Education Research (APSMER 2007) at the Faculty of Education, Chulalongkorn University, July 25, 2007.

THE ANATOMY OF THAI FACE

Larry Scott Persons¹

Abstract

This article, based upon qualitative ethnographic research from the perspective of social anthropology, clarifies the meanings of five abstract social constructs in Thai society: nata, kiat, saksi, chuesiang, and barami. The author proposes that these five words form the “anatomy” of Thai “face.” The central argument is that although these words adhere together in the minds of Thai people, data from field research reveal that they are distinct, though not mutually exclusive, in meaning. The author offers a visual model that demonstrates the dynamic relationship shared by these five constructs.

Introduction

The psychosocial phenomenon of face is embodied as a pervasive, dominant honor system in many East Asian and Southeast Asian societies. However, the store of cultural knowledge about Thai face is tacit. Its dimensions, rules of play, and effects upon daily living lay almost entirely unexamined.²

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² One could present a reasonable argument that “Thai face” is a fabricated and mythical notion, similar to such sweeping categories as “Chinese face” or “American face.” Most countries are ethnically diverse, and face is so molded by context, by localized expressions of cultural values, that to speak about face on the macro, national level is of limited value and

While many scholars now are researching face in China, Japan, and Korea, there is little research or writing coming from Southeast Asia. Since 1975 just two Thai scholars have written directly on the subject, and their claims are not linked to data from ethnographic research (Smuckarn 1975, Boonmi 1999). Suntaree Komin, in her research on the psychology of the Thai people, briefly cites face while describing “ego orientation” as the first of nine Thai value clusters (Komin 1990: 133). Three scholars have analyzed the Thai language for clues about face (Deephuenton 1992, Bilmes 2001, Ukosakul 2003). Christopher L. Flanders offers the first and only piece of *research-driven* writing on the meaning of Thai face from the perspective of social anthropology (Flanders 2005).

Thai face can seem as ethereal as thick fog shrouding an unfamiliar mountain path. You can see it right there before your eyes, but to explore its properties can be disorienting. The starting point for such a quest is not altogether clear. The Thai do not refer to this psychosocial phenomenon with the simple word “face.”³ To enter the dialogue about face, one must ask about *kan mi na mi ta*, or what I will refer to as ‘having face-eyes.’ Every competent Thai social actor behaves like he or she has face. Each can lose face or gain face. In fact, each staunchly defends and maintains

can cloud our understanding. I find this term useful, however, in referring to dominant expressions of face in Thailand—those demonstrated in national and local power structures and projected by the national media.

³ I was often asked by Thai friends, “What is your topic?” When I responded, “I am studying about face,” they were entirely confused. To dangle the term all by itself always conjured up its concrete connotation—the human face.

his or her possession of face.⁴ Yet only some Thai people 'have face-eyes.' I contend that, although face behavior is pronounced and highly visible among those who 'have face-eyes,' the notion of Thai face is multivalent—broader and deeper than the meaning of face-eyes. My research demonstrates this.

Methodology

Using the central Thai language, I conducted qualitative research in Bangkok, Pathumthani, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Phanom, and Chiangmai provinces over the course of two months in 2005, employing participant observation, unstructured interviews, eight focus groups, and twenty-one long interviews. My fifty-eight pages of field notes documented insights from observation and casual conversation.

The sixty-four informants were from diverse levels of society.⁵ The youngest was nineteen years old, and the oldest seventy-three. The median age was thirty-seven, and the average age thirty-nine. The sample was 60.9% male and 39.1% female. In terms of religion, 59.4% were Buddhist, 39.1% Christian, and 1.5% claimed no religion. Informants resided in a total of seven provinces, but they were originally from a total of twenty-three different provinces, approximately thirty percent of all provinces in the nation.

⁴ Thirayuth Boonmi alleges that Thais in general "believe the maintenance of their *nata* 'face-eyes' to be the most important matter in life" (Boonmi 1999: 275).

⁵ Because I was born and raised in Thailand, I was able to access a "purposeful" sample (Kreuger and Casey 2000: 204) of informants through networking with many friends and contacts.

The long interviews lasted an average of approximately 140 minutes and the focus groups 105 minutes. My questions probed the characteristics of those who possess *nata*, *kiat*, *saksi*, *chuesiang*, and *barami* in Thai society, along with the benefits awarded to a given social actor who may gain one of these forms of social capital.⁶ I also pursued an understanding of what happens to each possession in the case of face gain (*dai na*), face loss (*sia na*), and face redemption (*ku na*), as well as how a change in the possession of one construct might impact each of the other possessions.

I compiled a total of over fifty-six hours of digital recordings of interviews, which I analyzed over the course of 300 hours by listening to recordings and typing 242 pages of single-spaced notes containing quotes, dynamic equivalency translations, and personal insights.

Summary of significant data

Thirty years ago a Thai academic wrote that "the face of Thai people is of grave importance" (Smuckarn 1975: 505). I know of no scholar who would argue with him on that point. But what exactly is the composition of this precious abstract notion? What are its dimensions from within the Thai worldview?

I propose that to understand Thai face one must be familiar with five abstract words: *nata*, *kiat*, *chuesiang*, *saksi*, and *barami*. It is my experience that if you engage a

⁶ Each of these constructs is abstract and carries "cultural grammar" not found in English-speaking societies. For most of this article, therefore, I will not attempt to isolate English equivalents of each term, but will use *transliterations*. I prefer to let the meanings of each term rise from the data.

Thai person on the subject of how people maintain face, lose face, redeem face, and gain face, he is likely to use every one of the above five words within a span of fifteen minutes. When asked to pull the meaning of these words apart, however, virtually every one of my informants responded with comments like, “They go together. They are mixed together. They cannot be separated.” Yet these very same people, when asked if having *nata* is the same as having *saksi* would say, “No, there is a difference.” Or if I asked if having *kiat* is the same as having *chuesiang*, they would answer “no.” In the course of my interviews, I had just two instances when, after pressing an informant for clarity, he or she continued to maintain that a given pair of words had identical meanings. I argue confidently in this article that although these words adhere together in the minds of Thai people, they are distinct in meaning.

One would not conclude this, however, after reading the most current government dictionary. For the word *kiat*, the first meaning given is *chuesiang* (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 147). Predictably, the first meaning given for *chuesiang* is *kiattiyot*, a derivative of the word *kiat*, meaning, “honor by virtue of one’s position of status or one’s class in society” (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 147, 367). In defining the content of the connotation of “face” relevant to this paper, the dictionary says it means *kiat* and *saksi* (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 1245). For the word *saksi*, the meaning given is *kiatisak*, another derivative of *kiat* meaning “honor according to the status of each person” (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 147, 1094). The only word that is not semantically tangled, though still related, is the word *barami*, which is defined as

“accumulated goodness” (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 625).

NATA: The appearance of being honorable

What does it mean to have face-eyes? I gathered data in answer to this question by asking informants about: 1) whether or not as a young person they desired to have face-eyes (and why); 2) who in society has face-eyes (and why); 3) the key characteristics of people with face-eyes; and 4) the benefits of having face-eyes in Thai society.

A desirable possession

Seventy-three percent of respondents reported that as a youth they desired to have face-eyes, often mentioning the desire to be acceptable, respected, liked, and comfortable. The commonly repeated benefits were that: others accept you, others respect you, life becomes more convenient, life becomes more comfortable, others approve of you, you get special treatment, you get frequent gifts and favors, it is like having good credit, others cooperate with you, it gives you power over others, and you gain “connections.” I also asked, “True or false? Most Thai people desire to gain face.” Four out of five respondents said the statement was “true.”⁷

Those who possess *Nata*

In identifying people who ‘have face-eyes,’ informants shared an instinct to pick those who are famous: the prime minister,

⁷ Their answers were remarkable because the phrase “to want to gain face” (*yak dai na*) has a widespread negative connotation for most Thai people.

privy councillors, ministers of the cabinet, senators, members of parliament, the wealthy, movie stars, well-known singers, the “hi-so,”⁸ and sports stars.⁹

I suspected that the majority of people with face-eyes in society probably are not famous, so I asked, “True or false? Every society and every village in Thailand has people with face-eyes.” Ninety-five percent of respondents answered, “True,” citing the following examples: the village headman, the district officer, the governor, leaders in the community, successful business people, the supreme patriarch, abbots, priests, those who truly benefit society, doctors, teachers, soldiers, and policemen. Their answers suggest that having face-eyes is not so rare or unattainable as it may initially seem.

Characteristics of a person with *Nata*

Informants identified the following descriptions of “people with face-eyes,” listed in descending order of the number of informants who mentioned each characteristic: possessing wealth (55), being accepted by society (42), holding a position of authority (37), being respected (33), assisting society (23), having *chuesiang* (22), being known by others (21), being virtuous (20), being approved by others (19), having education (19),

being remarkably skilled or talented (18), being influential (17), being powerful (14), being successful (14), being lovable (12), having *barami* (11), having *kiat* (11), being popular (11), being credible or trusted (9), and having *saksi* (2).

What it means to possess *Nata*

The most prevalent connotation of this phrase in contemporary Thai society, by far, is that the possessor has money. It is remarkable that every single personal interviewee and four out of five focus group members mentioned this trait. There is good reason to suspect that today most Thai people assume that people with face-eyes are people with money.

This phrase is the most common way to say that a person “fits” in Thai society, that he has value that others must take into account. When one possesses face-eyes one wins acceptance from society, garnishes respect, and draws the approval of others. To possess face-eyes is to possess formidable social capital.

Informants commonly attributed this phrase to those who have official positions in society, those who have power to make decisions that affect others—especially those who serve society by means of some formal appointment or election.

There is reason to hypothesize that the phrase “face-eyes” is closer in meaning to *chuesiang* (number six in the progression above) than it is to *kiat*, *saksi*, or *barami*.

Summary of *Nata*

“To possess face-eyes” carries the most comprehensive meaning of all the constructs I am addressing in this article. The above list of characteristics is much

⁸ This term, taken from the English words “high society,” is used often in the Thai media to describe the extraordinarily wealthy who keep a high profile and spend money frivolously.

⁹ I am confident that the only reason His Majesty the King of Thailand and members of the royal family were not mentioned first is because it is a foregone conclusion that they have more face-eyes than anyone else in Thailand.

longer, more delineated, and contains far more variability in shades of meaning than the lists for the other four words.¹⁰ This appears to be the “umbrella phrase” for Thai speech about human worth. Often society awards this appellation based upon the *appearance* of a person. It confers that the person so judged is worthy of acceptance, respect, and special favors. It is often used to describe someone who possesses one or more of the other parts of the anatomy of face.

KIAT: Genuine respect and approval

Informants identified the following characteristics of people with *kiat*, listed here in descending order of the number of informants who mentioned each characteristic: being respected or listened to (18), feeling pride in oneself (15), being virtuous and doing good (14), having positional authority (12), being praised by others (9), sacrificially serving society (9), being competent or successful (9), being accepted by society (9), being influential (6), having status (3), having *saksi* (2), having *nata* (2), having *chuesiang* (2), having *barami* (1), having wealth (1), and having knowledge (1).

What it means to possess *Kiat*

True *kiat* commands genuine respect and approval. It conveys an aura of legitimacy. One informant called it “approval that really has value,” asserting that those with *kiat* have a broader acceptance than those with simple *nata*. *Kiat* is a lifter. It says to others, “This person truly deserves to be shown respect and listened to.” *Kiat* raises

certain people above others, and those people can be seen from a greater distance away. Still, this attribute is not a matter of breadth or girth; it is a matter of *height*. Awards, citations, certificates, prizes, promotions and trophies often serve to elevate a person. To do so is to award *kiat*. Only sometimes, however, will society recognize character and actions reflecting *kiat*; sometimes *kiat* goes unheralded.

According to the responses of many informants, there seems to be a strong correlation between *kiat* and being virtuous (*pen khon di mi khunnatham*).¹¹ One informant said, in speaking of virtue, “This is true *kiat*.” Another claimed that without virtue a person does not possess *kiat*—the two are attached. Possessing *kiat*, therefore, is something more than possessing power. It is more than wielding influence because of one’s position or wealth. It is more than being excellent, skilled, or gifted in a special way. It is more than being well known or famous. To qualify as truly possessing *kiat*, according to many informants, one must be a virtuous person.

Kiat often has a connotation of possessing rank or a position of authority, signified by a title or a prefix to one’s name. Members of the military and the police often feel this sense of *kiat*. Certain derivatives of this word carry the connotation of difference in status or rank: *kiattiyot* and *kiattisak*. One informant said that Thailand is like a triangle with His Majesty the King at the top, and it is the desire of most

¹⁰ However, I am not saying that it is the most abstract of the five words. That honor goes to “*saksi*.”

¹¹ Many informants claimed that when a person with *kiat* commits a major violation of moral standards, he instantly loses his *kiat*. This harkens back to the alleged moral bedrock of this construct—virtue.

Thai to raise their level of *kiat* to be as close to the King as possible. Another informant reported that, perhaps as a carryover from the era of absolute monarchy, Thai people still view positional leaders as having *kiat* because they are visible representatives of the King, serving His Majesty in helping the citizens of the country. Several informants cited the *ongkhamontri*, or members of the king's privy council, as having tremendous, uncontested *kiat*, because they are people whom the King has inspected and declared to have "made the grade."

Informants claimed that *kiat* has its counterfeits. Those with true *kiat* win genuine, spontaneous respect from others because they consistently assist others with no ulterior motives. However, there is a false *kiat*. Society sometimes awards *kiat* to a person who does not possess the quality inwardly. Informants commonly asserted that if someone holds a position of *kiat* yet is dishonorable in the way he treats others, or if he uses his position for selfish and dishonest gain, then he does not possess true *kiat*.

Whether a person has face due to *nata* or *kiat* he is likely to be treated as honorable by other members of society. But it is possible to have *kiat* without face-eyes (to be highly respected, but to live a kind, simple and unassuming life), or conversely, to have face-eyes without *kiat* (to possess social capital but to lack the genuine approval of others). "I think people confuse face and *kiat* and speak of them as the same thing," mused one informant.

Kiat, therefore, is both something society bestows and something within. One informant claimed that every person has

kiat, but each demonstrates it to differing degrees. Also, it is possible to possess *kiat* inwardly, yet lack the proper affirmation of society.

It is advisable, then, to separate the words *kiat* and *kiattiyot*. Data suggest that *kiat* is much more widespread than *kiattiyot*. *Kiat* is the quality of being truly honorable, regardless of awards or titles. *Kiattiyot* has to do with rank and position. It is an echo of response that society sometimes gives to certain individuals—some deserving, some not so deserving.

Sometimes *kiat* that is great in height has a rather narrow base. There are circles of society within which a given title, award, certificate, or ability holds deep meaning and renders influential power. Yet someone right next door who is outside of that circle or in-group may be entirely unimpressed. An informant argued that having face-eyes often "cuts a broader swath" of societal recognition than having *kiat* does. However, to possess *kiat* or *kiattiyot* has more substance than simple, broad recognition.¹²

Summary of *Kiat*

Kiat is that quality in human beings that commends them to others as worthy of genuine acceptance and respect. It is founded upon virtue, but it has many counterfeits. It brings its possessor a sense of legitimacy and contentment.

¹² It is both valid and helpful to consider that the dimension of *kiat* connotes quality, and the dimension of broad recognition connotes quantity or extensiveness. To have either is to have face-eyes, and both lend significant social capital to the one who possesses them. If one puts the two together, however, one has an extraordinarily potent combination.

CHUESIANG: “How big is your stage?”

What does it mean to have *chuesiang*? The most common connotation is being known or broadly recognized by others. The word *chue* means, “a word that has been designated [for use] in calling a person,” and *siang* carries the meaning, “something received by the ears” (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 367). The etymology suggests that if someone has *chuesiang* his name has reached the ears of others. One informant said, “*chuesiang* is about acceptance,” and described it as “a fragrance that drifts a long distance.”

However, when I first began interviewing I found that if I asked, “What are the characteristics of a person with *chuesiang*?” I often heard a question in return: “What kind of *chuesiang*? You know, don’t you, there is both bad *chuesiang* (*chuesiang mai di*) and good *chuesiang* (*chuesiang di*). Which do you want me to talk about?” In other words, informants found it difficult to elaborate on this word without giving it a moral rooting. Since each of the other constructs I was researching—*nata*, *kiat*, *saksi*, and *barami*—had positive connotations, I decided to ask my informants about *chuesiang di*.¹³

¹³ At that moment I was not aware that I was making a classical researcher’s mistake: mixing two variables so as to make the analysis of data extremely tenuous. I wish I had exercised the wisdom to ask two questions: 1) What does the word *chuesiang* mean? 2) What are the characteristics of someone with *chuesiang di*? Had I done so, I would have been able to distill their distinct meanings.

Characteristics of a person with *Chuesiang Di*

I submit that the following data contains moral content that is extraneous to the pristine meaning of *chuesiang*. What the reader sees below reflects more than just the dimension of “being known by others.” To state it more clearly, I am confident that my data supports the following statement: “*Kiat* plus *chuesiang* equals *chuesiang di*. In other words, I believe that the data below lies in the impressive shadow of *kiat*.

Informants identified the following characteristics of people with *chuesiang di*. Once again, I list these in descending order of the number of respondents who mentioned each: having the acceptance or confidence of society (20), having virtue expressed through doing good for society (19), being known by others (12), feeling pride in oneself (8), being a good example (7), being capable, competent, or successful (6), being respected (6), having the cooperation of others (5), being lovable (3), being credible (2), and having *barami* (1).

What it means to possess *Chuesiang Di*

The word has a strong connotation of acceptance (*pen thi yom rap*). For example, when a person with *chuesiang di* meets others, they show acceptance toward him. They have confidence in him and are willing to interact and cooperate with him. He is known and accepted by others (numbers one and three in the list above).

Chuesiang di can have a high correlation with virtue. *Chuesiang*—wide recogni-

tion—can be good or bad, but the person with *chuesiang di* must show evidence of having strong moral values. He must do good works on behalf of society.

However, not all *chuesiang di* is rooted in *kiat*. I must expose the trickiness of this term. The word “good” can have two subtle but distinct meanings: 1) that a person is good because of truly selfless, virtuous living (he is renowned for being virtuous); or 2) that a person is the object of the interest and adoration of others. In this second case, people in broader sections of society “know” a person, like him, wish to see him, wish to observe his talents, and wish to express adoration for him. This second type of *chuesiang di*, captured by the English words fame and popularity, is rather like an impostor. A person is considered “good” not because he leads a truly virtuous life but because he is in some way unique, gifted, prominent, nice to look at, or excellent. It is advisable to keep in mind that, in practice, both kinds of *chuesiang di* exist.¹⁴ But the data show that most informants chose to describe the connotation of virtue more often than the connotation of fame.

¹⁴ Today, the media amplify the “recognition game.” A prevailing tendency to idolize entertainers, athletes, politicians, high-ranking police/military, the “hi-so,” etc., seems to have brought an increase in the incidence of this latter type of “good” reputation. Since fans and the public in general have little personal contact with famous persons, and since the media continually portray contrived and “retouched” images on behalf of the famous, it is possible that fans often grant to those who are famous an aura that they are also good *people*, without carefully weighing the level of true virtue in their attitudes and behavior.

To possess *chuesiang di* is to be held in esteem as being exemplary (*pen baep yang*) and respectable (*na nap thue*). One informant explained that *chuesiang di* could be either present or lacking in someone who has *kiattiyot*. If someone has rank or a titled position, people will show him respect whether or not he is truly honorable. If such a person lacks *chuesiang di*, however, he will almost certainly not receive respect (*khwam nap thue*) from others, because in their eyes he is not truly respectable (*mai na nap thue*).

Chuesiang di, like *nata*, can be fickle and unstable—depending upon its foundation. All five abstract possessions can be damaged, but *kiat*, *saksi* and *barami* are more stable, secure, and enduring than *chuesiang*. Yet if *chuesiang di* is built upon the goodness of *kiat*, it is less capricious. *Chuesiang di* built not upon goodness but upon grandeur (the greatness exhibited by possessing wealth, position, popularity and influence) fades easily on the day that a person diminishes in those things.

However, whereas *chuesiang di* based upon good character and good deeds is extremely difficult to redeem if lost, *chuesiang di* based upon things such as wealth, good looks, talent, or excellence is much easier to redeem. One must simply make another stab at success and then work the media to recall the mercurial affections of the public. As the managing director of a music company said, “Thai people forget *chuesiang* [*mai di*] easily. Wait six months. Try a new approach. You build an image for them.”

Chuesiang di is usually achieved, and very rarely ascribed. It is possible for a son of a man with this quality to be ascribed the same quality because he shares his father’s

famous family name. But if that son does not behave in virtuous ways, society will withdraw its genuine approval no matter what his surname may be.

Most people, according to informants, want their goodness to be known. This might be described as “placing gold leaf on the *front* of the image of the Buddha.”¹⁵ On the basis of data, however, I argue that such behavior does not generate *chuesiang di* quite as easily as one might think. *Chuesiang di* is more difficult to acquire than *chuesiang* by itself. It is won by proving one’s truly good qualities over a long period of time. It often can have a smaller radius than simple *chuesiang*, but it commands a greater level of respect. People really know the person, and they cannot deny that he is worthy of honor. Many of my informants showed a healthy skepticism in evaluating face-gaining behaviors. They assured me that when a person is exposed as having done good deeds with ulterior motives, his *chuesiang di* is diminished.

Summary of *Chuesiang*

The element of *chuesiang* is about the recognition of society. It adds to the greatness or the goodness of a person by giving it the reinforcement of societal feedback. It is either a fragrance or a stench that drifts a long distance.

¹⁵ This is a twist on a common Thai idiom: “to place gold leaf on the back of the image of the Buddha.” The term comes from the custom of making merit by placing gold leaf on an image of the Buddha. Those who do good with no ulterior motives quietly place the gold leaf on the back of the image because they do not wish for their actions to be noticed.

SAKSI: A view from the inside outward

It is now time to dissect a word that is the most obtuse of the five. Informants had the most difficulty isolating the meaning of this term. One person called *saksi* “a very loosely defined word.” Another called it “beyond abstract,” noting that it is a concept that varies according to how much each individual maintains it or believes in it. He also added, “Thai people believe that *saksi* is more significant than any other thing.”

In terms of etymology, the word *sak* comes from the Pali and Sanskrit languages and has three related meanings: power or ability, strength, and status (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003: 1094). The word *si*, also from those ancient languages, carries the following meanings: shining brightness, auspiciousness, beauty, and progress (The Royal Institute 2542 B.E. 2003:1093).

I accept that there are many connotations of meaning for this word and I have been careful to avoid reductionism in analyzing it. Still, I am confident that I have uncovered valuable information that separates this word as being clearly distinct from the other four. The key was my good fortune in investigating the meaning of this word from the perspective of face and facework theory. It is difficult to unmask its phantom-like qualities if you do not study Thai face. A majority of informants claimed that Thai face is founded upon *saksi*.

Characteristics of a person with *Saksi*

Informants identified many characteristics of people with *saksi*, listed here in descending order of the number of respondents who mentioned each: self-determination or willfulness (27), being aware of and defensive of one's own worth (27), having a moral compass (16), being human (12), feeling content about oneself (10), possessing something innate, not fabricated (7), being confident in oneself (6), being responsible and not unnecessarily dependent on others (6), having society's respect (5), having good *nata* (2), and having rank or position (1).

One can see immediately that this list of characteristics is decidedly different from the three previous lists. This is significant. In the minds of many Thai people, *saksi* is tangled in a giant ball of conflated terms. Yet despite its whimsical adhesion to the other constructs, it is paradoxically the easiest to separate from the others. I am aware that this claim will be met with healthy skepticism on the part of many scholars, so I will tread carefully in articulating both the many shades of meaning of this term as well as the ways in which it is so distinct from the other major components of Thai face.

What it means to possess *Saksi*

Saksi is the independent, individualistic force within a Thai person that stands in contrast to the strong collectivist sanctions and pressures to conform. It is a counterforce that helps individuals retain a satisfactory equilibrium or balance between individuality and community. It is a substratum that lends a person freedom to think for himself. It is a reservoir of personal convictions and

principles that enables one to stand up for what he thinks is right.¹⁶ It frames the "bottom line" non-negotiable issues that a person will fight for. In a society of people known for an easy-going outlook and a lack of rigidity, *saksi* appears to be an anomaly. It is, as many informants explained, the essence of being your own person (*pen tua khong tua eng*). One might attempt to translate this particular connotation as "autonomy" or "willpower."

Saksi is rooted in the self. In the informants' descriptions, the word *tua eng* (myself) surfaced repeatedly—many times over.¹⁷ Every one of the first nine characteristics above has to do with a person's self and not with the awards of society.¹⁸ My findings clearly and strongly suggest that although *saksi* is many things to many people, in present-day Thai society it is conceived most commonly as

¹⁶ One of the most common phrases used was "*mi chut yuen*"—the person has a "standing place."

¹⁷ This flatly was not the case with regard to the other abstract words.

¹⁸ I am aware of the Buddhist teaching that there is no such thing as "the self," but based on the behavior of many Thai people one can suspect that many give only lip service to this. Suntaree Komin has written: "The Thai are first and foremost ego oriented, characterized by the highest ego value of being Independent—being oneself (*pen tua khong tua eng*), and a very high value of Self esteem. Closer inspection reveals that it is constantly ranked top priority . . . Thai people have a very big ego, a deep sense of independence, pride and dignity. They cannot tolerate any violation of the 'ego' self. Despite the cool and calm front, they can be easily provoked to strong emotional reactions, if the 'self' or anybody close to the 'self' like one's father or mother, is insulted" (Komin 1990: 133).

an inward quality, not an external possession.¹⁹

I am not claiming that Thais never treat *saksi* as an external possession. In fact, some of my informants did exactly that. I found this tendency especially among the many policemen I interviewed.²⁰ Still, as far as my careful notes tell me, all of my informants acknowledged that *saksi* is something within a person. It is the proprietary space within, the space from which a social actor speaks, and in this way it is similar, though not identical, to the Western concept of ego.

Saksi is the amount of worth accorded by a person to himself. It is a personal opinion held by a person that says, "I have value."²¹ This instinct can be seen in the oft-quoted saying, "You can kill a real

man, but he won't let you despise his worth" (*luk phu chai kha dai tae yam mai dai*).

This construct appears to stand in contrast to the other four components of Thai face, all of which represent worth awarded by society. This word does not.²² One informant said, "*Saksi* adheres to the person always." Another contended that *saksi* and *kiat* are similar but differ in that *kiat* is given by society, whereas *saksi* is something from within us that we establish ourselves (*pen chak tua rao eng...pen thi rao kamnot khuen ma eng*).

This is not to say, however, that others in society will not make judgments about a person's *saksi*. They reportedly do, and not infrequently. If someone behaves in a socially unacceptable manner, such as lying around drunk in public or raping a young girl, most members of society will respond by speaking the following phrase: "He has no *saksi*" (*khao mai mi saksi*).²³ Broad public consensus concerning such a judgment can obliterate any *kiat*, *chuesiang*, *nata*, or *barami* previously awarded by others to the person, but it is not the determining factor in establishing his *saksi*. Ultimately, the person himself

¹⁹ "We commonly believe," writes Boonmi, "that everyone has his or her own *saksi*. *Saksi* has abstract characteristics that are concealed within every person." (Boonmi 1999: 265).

²⁰ Boonmi documents how this construct is often linked to status, rank or a titled position. "In Thai society," he writes, "*saksi* is important in establishing the 'place' or position of people in society, and it has many possible meanings that have to do with other terms, such as *kiat* and *kiattiyot*, which we are prone to use to refer to 'groups,' 'institutions' and 'formal positions'.... In the era of *sakdina*, there was rather clear division in levels of honorable rank" (Boonmi 1999: 269).

²¹ Georg Simmel was very close to the meaning of *saksi* when he wrote, "An ideal sphere surrounds every human being...into which one may not venture to penetrate without disturbing the personal value of the individual. Honor locates such an area. Language indicates very nicely an invasion of this sort by such phrases as 'coming too near' (*zu nahe treten*). The radius of that sphere...marks the distance which a stranger may not cross without infringing upon another's honor" (Simmel 1906: 453).

²² There was some contradictory evidence to say otherwise, however. Three members of a focus group of six lower-ranking policemen said that society determines one's *saksi*. Nevertheless, they were the only informants to answer in this way.

²³ One informant shed light on what the Thai are really saying when they declare that someone "has no *saksi*." Seeing her neighbor lying inebriated in his yard and shouting profanities at eleven in the morning, she said with both disgust and pity, "He is behaving as though he has no value" (*tham tua muean wa mai mi khun kha*).

must decide if he agrees with society's low opinion of him.

Every human being has worth, but others often cannot resist judging his claims of inherent worth against the way he lives his life.²⁴ In other words, a person's actions will either prove to others that he has *saksi* within, or they will cast doubt upon his *saksi*.

For many informants, *saksi* was linked with virtue (number three in the list of descriptions of this word).²⁵ The association between this construct and virtue can be seen in how quickly one is judged as "not having *saksi*" if caught violating either a moral code or a widely shared social convention.

²⁴ Informants seemed to display diverse standards and convoluted reasoning in judging if a given person has *saksi*. For instance, one informant, when asked if beggars had *saksi*, said no. His reason was because they do not take responsibility for themselves, so they obviously do not have a sense of their worth as human beings. Road-sweepers, however, do have *saksi*, because they are law-abiding and they do their work. The disabled have *saksi*, but not if they go begging. However, a blind beggar who makes his living by walking down sidewalks and singing over a portable sound system has *saksi*, because he gives something in return for the generosity of others. If a former governor becomes addicted to alcohol after he retires and lies around drunk in public, he loses his *saksi* because he is "behaving inappropriately" (*praphruet mai mo som; tham tua mai di*). "People like this don't even think about *saksi*," he said. In Buddhist language, "they are a lotus still beneath the surface of the water" (*khon praphet bua tai nam*).

²⁵ As one informant said: "The human animal is good. But how much virtue does a given human actually have in his heart?...If we share, if we assist others, our *saksi* in being human, like a lotus, will be very alluring."

According to the majority of the informants, *saksi* is innate, not manufactured or fabricated. It is a possession from birth. One informant called it the "resident locus" (*chut pracham tua khao loei*) of a person. Another said, "It is already within human beings." In the opinion of most informants, this possession is not something that can be accumulated in greater quantities, as can be done with *nata*, *kiat*, *chuesiang*, and *barami*.²⁶ A third informant suggested that when a person speaks of "gaining *saksi*" due to rank or a recent promotion, he is confusing the term with other concepts, such as *kiat*.

In the opinion of all who responded to my questioning, *saksi* can be diminished or even terribly damaged. Yet no one was ready to say that it can simply disappear or be irretrievably lost altogether.

²⁶ Boonmi states otherwise. He cites the Buddhist word *watsana* "that does not refer to *saksi* directly, but communicates the idea of something concealed and buried deep in individuals or [something] that might spring into existence during a certain interval of time that will cause an increase in a person's *saksi* or status....*Watsana* is power within an individual that can wax and wane over the course of time. There is also a belief regarding certain 'magical objects' (fetish[es]) which, if one is able to gain control of them, will enable one to increase the power of one's *watsana* and *saksi*" (Boonmi 1999: 270–271). Furthermore, a number of the informants identified the word with the idea of "self-confidence." This conception views *saksi* as dynamic and expandable, as something that remains internal but grows greater with success and good fortune. One informant articulated this view of *saksi* as expandable when he said, "See, the potential increase in *saksi* is infinity [using the English word]!" He came the closest of all informants to conflating this word with the other four major constructs.

Informants often referenced the Thai constitution which states that *saksi* as a human being is something every person has with him from birth, regardless of ethnicity, skin color, gender, language, religion, political views, or other things. This connotation of *saksi* seems similar to the Western concept of human dignity. However, if *saksi* is a measure of worth, which it most certainly is, my data are not clear in answering the question if all human beings in Thailand are believed to have equal inherent worth.

Many social actors instinctively bind *saksi* to the external.²⁷ I will explain this in two ways. First, according to my informants, in discourse this internalized construct has a tendency to drift outward and mix into various commentaries on what is taking place in social space.

²⁷ Boonmi claims that since ancient times Thai people have characteristically attached *saksi* to things in three categories: (1) valuable material possessions; (2) women or lineage; and (3) certain vocations in society. Specifically, he notes the connection between *saksi* and external objects, citing how Simmel “suggests that people tend to create symbolic attachments between themselves and certain physical objects, turning them into ‘honor spheres.’ If anyone appears to offend these spheres it is tantamount to insulting that person’s *saksi*. For example, nobility in past eras cared deeply about *lawm phawk* (a *chada*, or a headdress worn to display one’s rank). It had to be stored in an appropriate place. If someone else touched it or acted disrespectfully [toward it], that action would bring contempt into the relationship.” Boonmi claims that “in former Thai societies, before the development of the *sakdina* system, there were vestiges that indicate that certain material things had absolutely no dispensable value except as symbols of *saksi*” (Boonmi 1999: 265–266).

It was not uncommon to hear informants use the word *saksi* interchangeably with the four other outward concepts. I acknowledge that most Thai people conflate these terms to a considerable extent.²⁸ Consequently, the word *saksi* still finds its way into contexts that are normally the domain of one of the other four words.²⁹ One informant suggested that when people lose face and immediately reference their *saksi*, what they are really saying is, “This is an affront to my power.” Another informant hypothesized that these days, as people have turned outward toward material things, their general concept of *saksi* has drifted from the inside to the outside.

According to a great majority of informants, another way that this construct is “bound to the external” is that the public often considers a person’s major loss of face to be a loss in *saksi* as well. *Saksi* is organically related to the other dimensions of Thai face. If you damage or even “touch” (*tae tong*) any part of a person’s face (*nata*, *kiat*, *chuesiang*, or *barami*), often he will feel it instantly in the depths of *saksi*.

So after arguing on the basis of data that *saksi* is largely an internal affair, I want to be clear to concede that it is organically

²⁸ Yet when I pressed my informants as to whether *saksi* is outward or inward, the overwhelming majority said that it is inward and self-determined.

²⁹ For example, one informant spoke of *saksi* in the sense of “behaving appropriately according to one’s status.” He claimed, for instance, that if someone with a lot of *nata* eats at a small restaurant or a noodle stand alongside the road, he will lose *saksi*. If he does something for entertainment, it must be first-class. These are issues appropriate to maintaining *nata*, but he alluded to *saksi*.

related to all that is going on in social space. This is not so difficult to understand if one considers that Thai society is highly collectivist (Komin 1990).³⁰

Based upon data provided by informants, I am inclined to describe the relationship of *saksi* to the other four constructs as one living organism with distinct parts so interconnected that if someone touches one part, it is felt in all the other parts. If my sampling of informants is representative of their fellow Thai citizens, I suspect that most Thais assume there is an immediate connection between *saksi* and any significant loss of one or more of the other four possessions.

When I probed as to which of these abstract attributes “leads” the others, 81.5% of respondents said that *saksi* must come first—that it precedes the others and is the foundation for building the rest. *Saksi* appears to be the critical core of Thai face. It is the starting point for the accumulation of *nata*, *kiat*, *chuesiang*, and *barami*. As one informant put it, a person must have “*kiat* within” for society to be willing to give a public grant of *kiat* to him.

Summary of *Saksi*

Saksi is a view of Thai face from the inside outward. It is both impossible and

inadvisable to attempt to capture its many complex shades of meaning with just one English word. It carries connotations of such words as autonomy, self-determination, dignity, self-esteem, self-confidence, conscience, pride, and sometimes possession of rank or status.

BARAMI: A large tree giving shade

In gathering data on this word I did not ask, as I did for the previous four words, about the characteristics of a person with this possession. My adjustment was for two reasons: (1) based on my review of literature regarding Thai face, I concluded that the other four constructs had not been researched with the care and interest that researchers had given *barami* (see Conner 1996; Johnson 2002; Maha Chakri Sirindhorn 1989); (2) I wanted to research *barami* within the context of another line of questioning regarding power, by exploring how leaders view their own *nata* and how they treat the *nata* of others.³¹

Characteristics of a person with *Barami*

One ethnographic researcher explains that *barami* “originates in the moral goodness or virtue of the individual,” and that it drafts power from the perceptions of others who have observed and benefited from the leader’s consistent expression of “meritorious selfless behavior” over a period of many years (Conner 1996:240–242, 275).³² According to my informants,

³⁰ A distinction between independent and interdependent construals of the self can assist us in understanding the attachment of *saksi* to things that happen in social space. “According to this perspective, the self is not and cannot be separate from others and the surrounding social context. The self is interdependent with the surrounding social context and it is the self-in-relation-to-other that is focal in individual experience” (Markus and Kitayama 1994: 97).

³¹ I will reserve my data on face and power for another publication.

³² Based upon his own research, Alan Johnson argues that Conner may have dismissed “evidence of linguistic diversity and multiplex usages” of the term *barami* (Johnson 2006:

such a person—usually a natural leader in a local community—tends to respond to others from the perspective of virtue. He is not self-serving but uses his social capital to mobilize others to work together for the collectivity.

What it means to possess *Barami*

In speaking of the five components of Thai face, my informants found it easiest to describe a person with *barami*. Their descriptions were virtually the same every time: such a person must have a truly virtuous heart. Although at times this word is attributed to certain non-virtuous patrons who are “good” to their entourage and certain clients, the pure meaning of the term implies that the patron is a virtuous person.

Barami reportedly flows downward in Thai society from His Majesty the King,

167). Johnson isolates four distinct connotations of the word: (1) “an ideal moral sense;” (2) “a prestige sense;” (3) “a negative sense in which it is used to refer to *chao pho* (godfather types);” and (4) “a charismatic sense as used by Weber” (Johnson 2006: 168). This reality of multiple connotations is immediately evident, I suggest, in that no single English word can suffice in capturing the meaning of this Thai construct. However, my opinion is that Conner acknowledges all of the above connotations and consistently addresses connotations one, two and four in his definitions of *barami*. He downplays connotation number three because many of his informants claimed that it represented a case of false attribution. Although my informants acknowledged that people sometimes attribute the term to a leader who lacks virtue, I discovered (as Conner did) that informants consistently contended that such attributions were illegitimate—that they were merely attempts on the part of leaders to gain social capital by subverting the honor system.

by means of his virtuous example in leadership. The ultimate stamp of approval that certifies one’s *barami* status is an appointment by the King as a privy councillor. But according to data, *barami* is found outside of that elite circle at many levels of leadership in Thai society. This kind of person uses goodness, not position or power, to gain the cooperation of others. In response, others accept him willingly. This facet of Thai face is an accolade awarded to a person who is judged broadly as having a truly good heart.

An indispensable characteristic of someone with *barami*, however, is that he must also use his resources for the good of others. In other words, his goodness is judged to a great degree by the way that it frequently and consistently expresses itself in selfless assistance of others. In doing so a social actor comes into the view of many people and builds a wide audience, expanding and solidifying *chuesiang di*. This quality is not accrued by just any act of kindness, however. Informants were quick to explain that people with *barami* are kind toward others with no strings attached—they do not act for the purpose of receiving reciprocal kindness.

Although it is possible for one’s *barami* to give rise to considerable power, the person with this attribute does not set out with power in mind.³³ He does not seek power,

³³ Boonmi makes a connection between *barami* and a sacral power that may or may not be related to moral strength. *Barami*, he claims, is “a kind of *saksi* that comes from the highest of things, things sacred, or things ‘above the earth.’ [The term] *barami* tends to be used to refer rather specifically to kings, magicians, the meritorious, or prominent gangsters in the countryside....Those with *barami* in Thai society frequently are those with great power

and does not “use power” (*chai amnat*). Nevertheless, he wins a potent influence over others as they respond to his kindness by rallying around him in loyal support.

My data also suggest, however, that this trait is the most scarce of the five that are the subject of this paper. Several informants contended that true *barami* is increasingly rare today.

Its scarcity may be due to at least two things. First, to simply do good or make merit is not enough. One must have a virtuous heart. It is likely that power and money, available to leaders in Thai society today, serve as temptations that test their level of virtue by wooing them to pursue these things as goals in and of themselves. Second, it takes a long time before others willingly ascribe *barami* to a person. One must serve others honorably and successfully within the bounds of various positions of authority. One must nurture good relationships with others over a very long period of time, negotiating with fairness through the relational and political fractures that often occur due to disagreements and contention.

The overwhelming majority of informants claimed that a person with true *barami* would have little interest in gaining face. He does everything with sincerity, with a pure heart, without thinking of what he might gain if the other party reciprocates. “He will have almost no interest in possessing face-eyes,” claimed one informant. “This [selfless behavior] reflects *barami* back to him.” His motivation is love and mercy, and he does not view his own repository of *nata* as something to which he must cling.

who have a great number of attendants or people serving them” (Boonmi 1999: 270).

Barami is based upon respecting others. Someone with this quality shows deference to the faces of others (*wai na khon uen*). He treats as honorable those who are worthy of honor. The fact that he consistently gives *kiat* to others causes him to gain *barami* in increasing measure as a byproduct of his virtuous leadership. “If someone has *barami* you can see it,” said one informant. “There is no need for him or her to ‘build up his *barami*.’ *Barami* is a personal characteristic that [simply] emerges.”

On the basis of my limited data, I feel very confident that *barami* is the most valuable of the five abstract treasures. Someone with true *barami* has a monumental stock of the other four assets as well. It is the height of honor. Genuine *barami* clings to a person long after he has left a position of power or influence.

Summary of *Barami*

Barami is accrued by virtuous people of means who selflessly and equitably use their resources to solve problems in the collective. This path is risky because this kind of person may not be able to compete with those who desire face for the sake of face or those who desire power for the sake of power. Yet, in the end, if someone is granted this possession his *saksi* is incontestable, and he is granted everything else with it: *nata*, *chuesiang di*, and *kiat* of the highest order.

The integration of Thai face

I have described each of these five valuable treasures so that its unique aspects might emerge, much as facets of a diamond become visible when held in the bright halogen light of a jewelry shop. Nevertheless, my data argue convincingly

that these terms are fused as one in the minds of most informants. Virtually every informant expressed discomfort in attempting to explain how one term differed from the other. It is certain that I was probing into unplumbed depths of tacit cultural knowledge, investigating things that few Thai people have ever subjected to analytical scrutiny. Because of the consistency of my informant's reactions, I assume that the conflation of these five terms is very widespread in Thai society.

On the other hand, informants competently identified unique aspects of each term. When they hesitated to answer, it was simply because they had to think very hard before answering. On the basis of their assertions I argue confidently that *although these five constructs adhere together in the minds of Thai people, I*

have data documenting that they are distinct (though not mutually exclusive) in meaning.

In light of my descriptions of these pivotal components, what might the big picture look like? How do they fit together? I now present a visual model with a view towards integration and explanation (Figure1).




Figure 1 The anatomy of Thai face

The first thing the reader should observe is the thin horizontal plane of distinction that separates a person's sense of self from the varied face presentations he makes in social space. Everything below that plane represents *endogenous* honor—the amount of worth granted by each person to himself. Everything above this plane represents some form of *exogenous* honor. It is a loan of worth from society, not an outright gift. Society can rescind *nata*, *kiat*, *chuesiang di*, or *barami*.

It is also important to notice that by virtue of this model's design, *saksi* is organically related to the other constructs. Whatever happens in the outer dimensions is often immediately felt below.

Saksi

I argue that *saksi*, though it has many Gordian shades of meaning, functions as the foundational piece of all Thai face. Lying below the imaginary plane (above), it is the only valuable possession that is not granted by society. It is the amount of worth an individual in society grants to himself. Others in social space often will comment upon the validity of a person's *saksi*, but it is just that—a comment from afar. They do not give him his first grant of *saksi*, and it is not their place to remove it.

When in the midst of severe interpersonal conflict, a Thai will sometimes resort to using a vulgar personal pronoun (*ku*) to refer to himself. This pronoun communicates that he is making a stand, holding his ground, resisting the threat or intrusion of another person. He is intimating that he is willing to put up a fight for that which he sees as valuable. *Saksi* is the “*ku*” in face threatening situations—the part of a Thai person that

will doggedly argue for his own worth and rights. It is not “the self,” but it appears to be a volitional part of the self that functions as an attorney to represent one's case in the face of the conforming powers of Thai society. Understanding the essence and dimensions of this highly abstract indigenous construct is pivotal to understanding Thai face behaviors. In fact, it is impossible to talk with any degree of depth or specificity about Thai face without first pondering the mysteries of *saksi*.

The sense that one “has *saksi*” is the source of a claim-right to honor that initiates face behavior.³⁴ It is what lends to most Thai a formidable, seemingly inexhaustible tenacity to avoid a loss of face at almost any cost. In highly collectivist Thai society, shame plays a major role as a social sanction in gaining the cooperation of the individual for the sake of the community. *Saksi* functions as a counterforce to constraining pressures. It is that part of a person that argues for the validity of his own worth in the face of shame.

Saksi is intrinsically tied up with shame. Yet it is remarkable that the Thai language has relatively few common words for shame. When informants talked at great length about face values and the loss of face, very seldom did they use the common word for shame (*khwaam ap ai*). On the surface, this appears to be somewhat of a mystery. The concept of *saksi*, however, sheds light on this mystery.

³⁴ Frank Henderson Stewart conceives of honor as a “claim-right,” a right to be treated as having a certain worth (Stewart 1994: 21–22).

To “have *saksi*” is a delightful feeling of having honor within. It is to feel a sense of worth. To “not have *saksi*” (*mai mi saksi*) is to feel shameful. When others accuse a person of being in this state, it means that they are doubting his basic worth. When a person feels this way, *he* is questioning his inherent worth. It is this accusation—“you have no *saksi*”—that is the juggernaut of shame in Thai society.

I submit that to gain an increased understanding of *saksi* is to take a significant step toward understanding the paradoxical “loose” aspects of collectivist Thai society that anthropologists have pondered for decades (Embree 1969; Evers 1969; Kirsch 1969; Phillips 1965, 1969). This claim-right to personal worth is powerful. It is always there, though most of the time it seems to lie dormant. Only when one is pushed too far does one become self-aware of this insatiable hunger within, yet it forever lies ready to pounce into action at a moment’s notice.

One might even contend that *saksi* is at the heart of what the Thai mean when they use the word “*khwam pen thai*” (“the state of being free”). It lends courage to the lesser party in situations of abuse due to asymmetry in power. If a certain patron “touches the face” (does not give proper regard for the worth) of a client, *saksi* might empower that client to turn on a dime and pursue a better patron.

Saksi is the volitional epicenter of face attachment. To “have *saksi*” is to fight for respectability. It is to acknowledge that the rules of face are important, and that one is willing to behave in ways that

demonstrate and defend one’s worth in social space.³⁵

Kiat

Kiat is honor. *Chuesiang* is not honor; neither is *nata*. *Kiat*, though it has counterfeits, is a person’s true honor as displayed in social space, and often (but not always) this display of genuine honor will receive society’s echo of genuine acceptance, approval, and respect. *Kiat* is the guarantor of Thai face. It is what lends (and denies) quality to every avowal of *nata*, *chuesiang*, *barami*, or *saksi*. It is both the height and the depth of value.

Kiat is based upon moral goodness—upon a virtuous character and moral deeds. It is to the benefit of those who wish to subvert the honor system to have *nata*, *kiat*, *chuesiang*, and *saksi* all lumped together, because it confuses the whole issue of what is truly honorable. Because these four constructs “always go together,” if an individual appears on the surface to possess any one of them, society often jumps to attribute to him all the rest as well. But such a practice is both fallacious and unfortunate. *Kiat* is morally founded. Unlike *nata* and *chuesiang*, true *kiat* cannot be purchased with money.

³⁵ I contend that a publicly inebriated person is considered to “not have *saksi*” (*tham tua yang mai mi saksi*) because the alcohol makes him disregard the normal conforming pressures of face rules and sanctions. Others are pejorative because he appears to have given up the fight for respectability. As Boonmi puts it, “*Saksi* is in part a standard of measurement in society...that plays the role of regulating people in their various states to play their roles with caution and propriety” (Boonmi 1999: 272).

To grant *kiat* is to make a judgment of worth about a human being. To judge worth is to ask a deeper question: “By what standard is worth to be judged?” In dissecting my data, I could not resist the strong sensation that beneath the social games of face occurring daily in Thai society there is a primordial tug-of-war taking place over the question, “What is honorable: power, or goodness?” At first glance, it seems advisable to answer, “Power.” Those with power control society. They are prominent; they possess most of the key characteristics of what it means to have *nata*. It is prudent to treat a person of power as someone who is also honorable, because to do otherwise can attract threats to one’s own well being. Our survival instincts beg us to feign respect whether or not we really respect the person.

But is our act of pretense proof that such a person is truly honorable? We know otherwise. Something within us implores us to say, “You are powerful. You have money. But do you have true honor?” To suppress this thought is to suppress the notion of honor altogether. Is having face-eyes simply about hegemony? If so, we would do well to separate it from honor altogether, for there is nothing inherently honorable about having a bigger piece of the pie than someone else.

An honorable person, by my informants’ descriptions, is a good person. He is spontaneously other-centered, merciful and just at the same time. He is sincere in sharing resources—giving out of heart-felt affection, void of any scheming to obligate the other. The honorable person is *not* necessarily the person with great power, but the one who chooses to use his power for the benefit of others.

The crowning evidence of this is to be found in the unrivaled reverence Thai citizens feel toward His Majesty the King. One informant described the King as “a fountain of honors.” All that is truly honorable in Thailand seems to trickle downward from the throne. His Majesty’s power resides in his goodness, a quality that wins the unbridled affections of his people. His goodness sets the standard of what is truly worthy of honor.

Barami

In the upper reaches of what is truly honorable lies *barami*. To say that one has *barami* is to say that one has great *kiat*, but not all possessors of *kiat* have *barami*. Candidates for *barami* must be those who, over a very long period of time, display a truly virtuous heart and do good works on behalf of others with no thought of what they will receive in return.

A person of honor can grow in *barami*. As he accumulates material resources and social capital, he can willfully choose to assist others, show kindness to them, and put the good of society over his own vested interests. As he continues to do this with sincerity and consistency, his *barami* can grow, as can be seen in my visual model by the small arrow pointing downward near the top of the cone.

Chuesiang

Chuesiang is the breadth of recognition in society. It can be great or it can be very small. If someone is allegedly honorable, *chuesiang* is the dimension that answers the question, “Who knows about it?”

Sometimes it lends social capital to a person who has done little to prove that he or she is truly honorable, such as a popular

movie star who is really quite self-absorbed. In this case, the person's "cone of honor" might be broad but very short in height, a case of "simple *chuesiang*." At other times a very honorable person may not be very widely known at all. His good deeds may not receive the amplification of *chuesiang*, yet his honor is evident to those who know him. Such a person's "cone of honor" is tall, but has a narrow base, representing a case of "unheralded *kiat*."

The evolution of modern day media has served to add a ghastly speed to the processes of increasing or damaging a person's *chuesiang*.³⁶ Those who showcase their success, status, beauty, talent or goodness over the air waves or through the print media will often experience a decided gain in face. Prominent leaders must use the media to manipulate a desired image. The very same media, however, can also severely damage a person's repository of face. To have one's failure, misstep, weakness, or violation of the law printed in a newspaper or magazine is a grave loss of face. Because this is an area of potential face loss that is difficult to control completely, the media are a source of considerable anxiety for acclaimed members of society. At the heart of this dread is a fear of a loss of face.

³⁶ In ancient Siam, the *chuesiang* of most prominent persons had a small geographical circumference. When a person's *chuesiang* was disassembled by the wildfires of gossip, news took time to travel geographically. In the present day, wildfires rage into infernos as the media impact viewers and readers, increasing exponentially the potential for damage due to gossip. It is this sinister synergy—the media fueling gossip, gossip feeding the media—that strikes fear into the hearts of high-profile people.

Nata

To "possess *nata*" is the umbrella phrase for all alleged instances of honor in Thai society. Often this label is granted to a person on the basis of things like money, skill, beauty, intellect, performance, success, and influence—things that have little to do with the person's character. It connotes an *appearance* of honor. It is the most superficial layer, the veneer of Thai face, but it is dreadfully important. To "lose face, lose eyes" (*sia na sia ta*) can be at least uncomfortable and at most completely devastating to one's life and psyche.

What is the essence of losing face? It is a sense of shame that one's inherent worth has been devalued. This is not a mere feeling of slipping up, of being less than perfect, of being embarrassed. It has strong *moral* connotations. By verbalizing that a given person has lost face, others are saying more than, "He did poorly." They are saying: "He is not good. He is *morally defective*." If the person's *saksi* has been shaken by an incident that triggered a loss, he himself is saying, "*I am bad. I am morally defective.*" The acceptance of others—the "nectar" that belongs to a person with *nata*—appears to have vaporized. He feels rejected. This apparent withdrawal of affection represents a break in relationships with his primary supportive in-groups. This long fall from lofty heights elicits excruciatingly painful emotions. One begins to ask, "If I am now unacceptable to others, am I of any value at all?"

Nata is a flashpoint for the maintenance of the other abstract notions. This outer layer of appearance is innately tethered to a Thai person's most cherished abstract treasures. For many Thai there seems to

be an invisible lightning rod that plunges from the external to the internal, instantly sending the “bolt” of a loss of face down to the depths of *saksi*, traveling with the speed of light from the superficial to the deep chasms of one’s very self-acceptance.

Summary

Thai face is a highly complex phenomenon comprised of five polysemic, conjoined social constructs. They are distinct from one another. Nevertheless, they form a whole, and it is normative for them to be treated as a whole in all judgments of honor. It is for the true student of honor to separate them in his or her thinking and living.

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NOUN CLASSIFIER CONSTRUCTIONS IN THAI: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR

Unchalee Singnoi¹

Abstract

This paper is a study in the framework of Construction Grammar that seeks for how much information grammatical units like noun classifier constructions in Thai can reveal and why such information must be presented as distinctive grammatical properties. The findings show that noun classifiers, occurring in nominal phrases, have a large number of grammatical functions not restricted to syntax but encompassing semantics and pragmatics, as well. They function syntactically by constituting numeric phrases, standing for head nouns, substituting for nouns, acting as the heads of modifier constructions, acting as noun modifiers and disambiguating constructions. Semantically, they are divided into generic and perceptual main types, which evince different syntactic behaviors. Finally, they pragmatically function by unitizing nouns, referring to particular entities, individuating items, and indicating the numeral 'one'. It is these pragmatic functions that motivate their forms/structures. Therefore, information types such as semantic and/or pragmatic properties need to be included in the explanation and viewed as a cluster of information, rather than autonomous syntax.

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Introduction

In this study, classifiers are dealt with in terms of grammatical constructions, whereas syntax, semantics, and pragmatics are viewed as direct associations in single rules or constructions rather than in separate modules. That is, not only the syntactic formation of these classifier constructions but also their semantics and pragmatics are implicated in form-meaning correspondences that operate in those constructions. This study differs from other works on the Thai grammar in that grammatical patterns are described using both “central” fine constructions, on the one hand, and “non-central” ambiguous constructions, on the other.

According to a new grammatical viewpoint called Construction Grammar developed within a functional approach (e.g., Fillmore 1985 and 1988, Lakoff 1987, and Goldberg 1995),² a grammatical pattern should be allowed to be as complex as necessary. That is to say, a grammatical unit may specify not only syntactical but also semantic and pragmatic information (which may include extralinguistic factors like social milieu, culture, and so on), since linguists using this approach argue that such classes can help provide fundamental insights in

² Construction Grammar is a non-derivational generative framework that makes use of the notion of construction as a principle. While the framework also recognizes powerful generalizations of both language-specific and language-universal types, it aims at full coverage of the facts of any language, including elements peripheral to traditional grammars, and allows the study of grammatical patterns to be as complex as necessary. See Singnoi (2000) for further theoretical background and an analysis of the Thai language.

accounting for grammatical units that are differently defined by traditional approaches viewing structures as the only part of “core grammar.”³ In this point of view, any grammatical pattern is accounted for by simultaneously analyzing the grammatical structures, semantics, and pragmatics to which the rules of grammar are sensitive and which need to be registered in the lexical component, viewed in terms of the rules or constructions of an adequate grammar. This complex of information is then stated as form-meaning correspondences called grammatical constructions which are viewed as the basic units of grammar.

In Construction Grammar, the lexicon is not strictly divided from syntax, and lexical items may also be viewed as constructions in themselves, since both syntax and lexicon represent data structures in terms of form-meaning pairs. The only recognized difference concerns internal complexity. Lexical entries are treated as constructions with minimal constituent structures consisting of a tree with a single node. That is, they are considered the lowest level and least complex grammatical structures that constitute constructions. According to Koenig (1999), lexical knowledge may be divided into knowledge of individual words and knowledge of relations between words. In the present work, my concern is with the study of the latter. I will draw from these relations an overview of the classes of phenomena that can be mapped together to account for the correlations between form and meaning within words; that is, the correlations that are treated as

plans or patterns for combining words into larger constructions. Viewed as a construction containing complex information itself, a classifier construction is supposed to include information about syntactic properties and semantic properties independently. Such constructions also need information about the uses or pragmatics that give them license to be employed in actual situations.⁴

The purpose of this study, therefore, is to investigate the syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects of classifier constructions in Thai and to demonstrate how the syntax (especially the forms) of these constructions is motivated or determined by the complex information of their constructions, and vice versa. To present the resulting classifier constructions, I will present various types of syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic information to which the rules of grammar are sensitive and which need to be independently posited since each of the types makes significant contributions to the grammar of Thai classifiers. In doing this, I first discuss syntactic properties such as external structures and syntactic functions. Next, I present a semantic description of classifiers in Thai, identify discrete contextual meanings diverging from the meaning proper as a different set of linguistic properties, and, thus, class these divergences under the scope of pragmatic information. Finally, I demonstrate the correlations among these three parts and show how they, rather than syntax alone, determine the forms of the classifier constructions. To represent the

³ Zwicky (1996) also points out that the possible connection between constructions and extragrammatical values is especially recognizable when alternative constructions express the same semantics.

⁴ In fact, the phonological information also has a right to be placed in constructions. However, in the present study, this will not be presented regarding to a personal limitation.

resulting constructions, I employ a formal model of grammatical construction similar to the box notation of Construction Grammar, which provides a simultaneous representation of a variety of properties.

Classifier categories

DeLancey (1986) states that the modern Tai languages are well-known for their elaborate classifier systems. And indeed, in Thai, a large number of words function as classifiers. Noun classifiers in Thai generally derive from nouns both diachronically and synchronically. And there is, in principle, no limit on the number of objects that can serve as measuring containers (e.g., ‘cup’, ‘glass’, ‘spoon’, ‘box’). Additionally, a comparatively small number of classifiers are verbs, for example, *càp* ‘to catch’ for the noun *khanǒm-ciin* ‘vermicelli rice noodles’, and *múan* ‘to roll over’ for videos; however, these entities have been posited as a category distinct from regular nouns or verbs with respect to their significant syntactic functions (Singnoi 2000).

Syntactic properties

Syntactic forms

In Thai, noun classifiers are categorized as a separate grammatical class from nouns due to their external structures; that is, noun classifiers occur in different positions from nouns and thus have different functions in noun phrases. Consider example (1):

(1) N + Num + Clf

<i>bâan</i>	<i>sǎw</i>	<i>lǎŋ</i>
house	two	Clf: roof

In such a noun phrase, the noun occurs in the initial position and acts as the head. The classifier co-occurs with and appears after the numeral in the modifying phrase, Num + Clf, which tells us the number of the head noun, resulting in a particular pattern known as a numeric phrase.

In addition to the above pattern, a simple noun phrase may be composed of a noun as the first constituent with the second constituent being something capable of modifying⁵ that noun, as exemplified in (2):

(2) *bâan nán*
house that
‘that house’

The remainder of the noun phrase, if there is anything else, will consist of a classifier, resulting in another noun-phrase pattern, as shown in (3) below:

(3) N + Clf + Mod

bâan lǎŋ nán
house Clf: roof that
‘that house’

Furthermore, if the modifier is the number ‘one’, it may either be demoted from the numeral position in (4) to a more peripheral position, as in (5), or disappear completely, as in (6):

(4) *sít kây nìŋ tua*
buy chicken one Clf: body
‘One chicken, please.’
(5) *sít kây tua nìŋ*
buy chicken Clf: body one
‘A chicken, please.’

⁵ See Singnoi (2000) for details about modifiers in noun phrase constructions.

- (6) *sít káy tua*
 buy chicken Clf: body
 ‘A chicken, please.’

The examples show that while the number ‘one’ is still in the typical position for a numeral in (4), it is not in (5). This can be accounted for in terms of a reduction process whereby the numeral is demoted from its prototypical position to the end of the noun phrase. The suppression eventually results in an absent element, as in (6).⁶ This evidence suggests another structure distinct from (3)—where the modifier is something else—as shown in (7):

- (7) N + Clf + (‘one’)

Consequently, we have come up with three distinct structures for noun-phrase constructions associated with classifiers, which are, thus, considered the forms/structures of classifier constructions in this article.

- I. N + Num + Clf
 II. N + Clf + Mod
 III. N + Clf + (‘one’)

Syntactic functions

When they occur in the structures discussed above, classifiers perform quite a number of syntactic roles: they constitute numeric phrases, stand for head nouns, substitute for the head nouns of nominal phrases, act as the head of certain modifying constructions, act as noun modifiers and distinguish noun phrases from other constructions appearing in the same pattern.

Constituting numeric phrases

Classifiers principally co-occur with numerals or quantifying morphemes to form numeric or quantified phrases, as already shown in Form I: N + Num + Clf, where, in use, they serve as measure units. This function is exemplified in (8) and (9):

- (8) *bâan sǎŋ lǎŋ*
 house two Clf: roof
 ‘two houses’

- (9) *náam sǎŋ kǎæw*
 water two Clf: glass
 ‘two glasses of water’

Standing for head nouns

In Form II: N + Clf + Mod, the head nouns can be absent if, of course, the contexts are understood and thus leave the classifier to stand for it. For example, in (10B) the classifier *lûuk* ‘small round object such as fruit, balls, and the like’ stands for the absent head noun, *tææŋmoo*, referring to the same item previously denoted by the head noun, in (10A):

- (10) A: *cà? sít tææŋmoo lûuk nǎy*
 will buy watermelon Clf which
 ‘Which watermelon would you like to buy?’
 B: *sít - lûuk níi*
 buy Clf this
 ‘I’ll take this one.’

In fact, certain classifiers, such as *khon* ‘person’, can even stand for their head noun regardless of context. (This will be later discussed in the section on semantic properties.)

⁶ See Singnoi (2000) for more details.

Substituting for nouns

This function differs from the preceding case. In the previous case, the head noun needs not be stated when the context is clear and thus leaves the classifier to stand for it syntactically. But, in the present case, a classifier is used as a subsequent reference to an already introduced referent. In conversation and writing, we normally have to keep track of who or what we are talking about for more than one sentence at a time. After the initial introduction of some entities, speakers will use various anaphoric expressions such as pronouns, noun phrases, or proper nouns to make references. Like those regular expressions, classifiers can be used to refer to or to substitute for nouns. Thus, consider example (11):


- (11) A: *sĥ tææŋmoo nỳ*
 buy watermelon FPart
 ‘A watermelon, please.’
 B: *cà? ʔaw lûuk năy*
 will take Clf which
 ‘Which one would you like?’

In the example above, after the initial introduction of the entity *tææŋmoo* ‘watermelon’, the speaker uses the corresponding classifier *lûuk*, which did not appear together with the noun in the preceding noun phrase and thus is not simply a remnant, as a pronoun substituting for the noun.

Acting as the heads of modifying constructions

Classifiers also behave like regular nouns in the sense that a classifier can occur as the head of a nominal construction called a “classifier construction” (Singnoi 2000).

That is, when a classifier is required to play a pragmatic role in a noun phrase, it may form a smaller construction with a modifier and, thus, structurally heads the construction, as shown in (12):



In the noun phrase model above, the demonstrative *năn* does not directly modify the head of the entire phrase, *sĥa*. Instead, it directly modifies the classifier *tua* and the entire classifier phrase *tua năn*, in turn, modifies the head noun. The classifier *tua* is thus the head of the classifier phrase syntactically.

Acting as noun modifiers

A classifier itself can even directly modify the head of a noun phrase when its modifier in the modifying phrase is the absent numeral ‘one’ as shown in (13):

- (13) *khǎo kaafææ kææw*
 beg for coffee Clf
 ‘May I have a cup of coffee, please?’

Here, the classifier *kææw* modifies the head noun *kaafææ* in the noun phrase

kaafæw kæw, maintaining the meaning ‘a cup of coffee’. In this case, it is obvious that the classifier functions like a noun modifier, and thus it may not be surprising that it is posited as a different function from that discussed in the previous point.

Disambiguating constructions

Lastly, classifiers can also function as a syntactic device to disambiguate structurally similar constructions. In particular, despite a clear context, a sequence of words such as noun + verb can occasionally have more than one interpretation: as a noun phrase, compound noun, or clause, as shown in (14):

- (14) *bâan lék*
house small
→ noun phrase: ‘a small house’
→ compound noun: ‘a secret wife’
→ clause: ‘The house is small’.

In this case, the occurrence of a classifier between the two constituents can distinguish the noun-phrase structure from the others, since it forces the form to be interpreted as a noun phrase, as shown in (15):

- (15) *bâan lăŋ lék*
house Clf small
→ noun phrase: ‘a small house’⁷

⁷ It is also possible that *lăŋ lék* is interpreted as a nominal predicate, but this interpretation would require a more specific structure, for example, if there were a demonstrative pronoun *nán* defining the periphery of the noun phrase, as in the sentence *bâan nán lăŋ lék* ‘That house is small.’

The correlation between the three forms of classifier constructions previously shown and their syntactic functions is summarized in the following table:

Syntactic Functions	Syntactic Forms		
	I	II	III
Constituting NumPs	✓		
Standing for HNs		✓	
Substituting Ns		✓	
Acting as Hs		✓	
Acting as NMods			✓
Disambiguating Cons		✓	

The table shows that, in Form I, classifiers constitute numeric phrases. In Form II, they can stand for head nouns, substitute for nouns, head modifier phrases, and disambiguate constructions. Finally, in Form III, they act as noun modifiers, meaning ‘one’.

Semantic properties (meaning proper): classifying

Many attempts have been made to account for the semantic function of noun classifiers in Thai (e.g., Noss 1964, Placzek 1978, 1984, and 1992). Most of them have focused on the semantic regulation of the co-occurrence between nouns and corresponding classifiers, with less attention being paid to the association between their semantic and syntactic roles. Here, classifiers are examined in terms of their relevance to or association with the syntactic structures within complex nominal constructions.

In principle, the semantic function of noun classifiers is to classify nouns into groups depending on properties such as kind, shape, and function. Placzek (1978), for instance, accounts for classifier semantic

properties in terms of two distinctive categories based on their application to nouns: generic classifiers and perceptual classifiers. Generic classifiers are based on the mixed grouping of factors that depend on a notion of “kind” or “essence,” such as function and material. In the vast majority of cases, perceptual classifiers are based on shape, as discussed below.

Generic classifiers

A prototype of generic classifiers, as exemplified in Placzek (1978), is *khon* ‘person’, which applies to ordinary people in all classes, as opposed to the honorific type of people, such as royal families (*?on*) or monks (*rûup*). The classifier *khon* is applied on the basis of someone ‘being a person,’ not because of shape or other perceptual features that might be present.

Associated with the syntax of the constructions in which they occur, generic classifiers can independently occur in noun phrases without requiring a context. This is not surprising since, according to Placzek, they are synchronically borrowed into the classifier lexicon from the noun lexicon and thus are sufficiently meaningful to stand by themselves. Consider examples (16) and (17) showing that the head noun *khon* ‘people’ can be omitted, leaving its corresponding classifier *khon* to stand alone:

(16) *bâan nîi mii (khon) hâa khon*
house this have person five Clf
‘There are five people in this house.’

(17) *(khon) khon nîi mây dii*
person Clf this not good
‘This person is not good.’

Here, the classifier can stand alone in the absence of any special pragmatic factors because it can only be interpreted as ‘person’.

Perceptual classifiers

Good examples of perceptual classifiers include *sên* ‘line’ and *phæn* ‘plank, plate.’ Used in the context of shape, *sên* applies to a wide range of nouns that are long and flexible, such as blood vessels, nerves, noodles, necklaces, strings, and so on. It also applies to routes and paths. Similarly, *phæn* is used for flat rigid things, such as ‘paper’, ‘plank’, and the like.

In contrast to generic classifiers, perceptual classifiers cannot stand alone without a proper context. They require additional nouns referring to materials or to some generic concepts. Example (18) shows that the perceptual classifier *sên* cannot be used in the same syntactic frame in which the generic classifier *khon* occurs:

(18) *?bâan nîi mii hâa sên*
house this have five Clf
‘There are five ___?___ in the house.’

This proposition requires a presupposition such as ‘There are two strings of rope in that house,’ where ‘rope’ indicates what the classifier *sên* refers to.

However, the semantic boundary between generic and perceptual classifiers is somewhat fuzzy as there are certain classifiers that seem to act as generic in some cases and perceptual in others. Take *tua* ‘body’ for example, as presented by Placzek. This classifier generically applies to ‘animals’, but it also extends to ‘pieces

of furniture' that have legs and to clothes because they have 'body shapes' that are limbed. Thus consider examples (19), (20), and (21):

(19) *bâan nîi mii mææw sǎw tua*
house this have cat two Clf
'There are two cats in this house.'

(20) *bâan nîi mii tót sǎw tua*
house this have desk two Clf
'There are two desks in this house.'

(21) *chǎn mii sǎa sǎw tua*
I have shirt two Clf
'I have two shirts.'

Like generic classifiers, the classifier *tua* 'body' represents that *mææw* 'cat' in (19) is an animal, *tót* 'desk' in (20) has a body shape with a raised flat surface and four legs, and *sǎa* 'shirt' in (21) has two arms. However, syntactically, such classifiers act like perceptual classifiers since they cannot stand alone; i.e., one cannot say sentences like * *bâan nîi mii kîi tua* when talking about animals in the generic sense unless the context has already made it clear. Instead, the presence of the head noun as *bâan nîi mii mææw* (cat) *kîi tua* is required.

Another problematic classifier is *lêm*, whose synchronic application appears to be arbitrary. That is, the semantic function of this classifier is far from clear. It applies to objects such as 'book', 'cart', and 'knife', which evince no similarity or association that could be a criterion for classification (Placzek 1992).

Moreover, there is another classifier, *ʔan* 'item', which is the most widely extended

of all classifiers and can alternatively apply to certain concrete nouns that refer to small objects. This is another classifier whose criteria for classification are most semantically puzzling (Placzek 1992). Examples (22) and (23) show the application of *ʔan* to certain nouns outside its traditional application:

(22) *chǎw sǎw khan/ʔan*
spoon two Clf: long/item
'two spoons'

(23) *khēm sǎw lēm/ʔan*
needle two Clf: volume/item
'two needles'

As has been discussed above, classifiers generally classify nouns into two main groups according to their type: generic classifiers classify human beings, whereas perceptual classifiers classify nonhumans. In the latter type, animals and things are classified into a huge number of perceptual groups, resulting in various classifiers known in the Thai language. However, it is not worth discussing the semantics of classifiers exhaustively since a number of previous studies have elaborated on this subject (e.g., Placzek 1978 and 1992) and a list of classifiers and their corresponding nouns has also been standardized by Royal Institute of Thailand (2003).

Pragmatic properties (meanings in context)

So far, much less attention has been paid to the distinction between the semantic and pragmatic roles and either their association between themselves or their association with the forms in communication. As proposed by Yule (1996), what is said is not necessarily what

is communicated. This means that the meaning proper, or semantic meaning, which refers to what is said, is not the whole of what one intends to communicate. A communicative meaning, thus, includes not only the semantic side of an utterance but also its pragmatic information, i.e., how its use in a particular context helps a listener interpret what is said. For example, if one says *Could you open the door?* to someone, one does not mean to ask him or her a question; rather one is telling/asking him or her to open the door since the situation or context is that one needs help.

The fact that communicative functions necessarily involve pragmatic information in the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context also suggests that communicated meaning has more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than with what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. As Yule (1996: 3) succinctly put it, “pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning.” Therefore, in order to arrive at an interpretation of a speaker’s intended meaning, it is crucial to explore what is unsaid (invisible meaning) as part of what is communicated.

In this section, I discuss a number of pragmatic roles played by classifiers that illustrate such a notion. These pragmatic functions include, at least, unitizing nouns, referring to particular entities, individuating items, and indicating the numeral ‘one’, as discussed in more detail below.

Unitizing nouns

To serve the speaker’s purpose in counting, classifiers are used as units for their modified nouns. Particularly

speaking, they help to unitize the items identified by nouns so that the nouns can be counted. In fact, Croft (1993) provides as a reason for the occurrence of classifiers in classifier languages the idea that nouns in those languages are not countable by themselves. Even “count” nouns, like *dog*, are not countable. They just refer to individual items, and thus classifiers like *tua* are required to designate units when these nouns are being counted. This distinctive pragmatic role can be seen in a particular syntactic structure, numeric noun phrases (Form I: N+Num+Clf). Examples are given below:

(24) *khâaw sǝŋ caan*
 rice two Clf: plate
 ‘two plates of rice’

(25) *pàakkaa sǝŋ dâam*
 pen two Clf: long object
 ‘two pens’

Here, the classifiers *caan* and *dâam* identify the units of the nouns *pàakkaa* and *khâaw* in numeral phrases as such. The classifier *caan* provides a unit for counting the uncountable noun *khâaw*, denoting ‘two units of rice represented by plates.’ One can also see that, even though *pàakkaa* is classified as a count noun, it still needs the corresponding classifier *dâam* to unitize it when it occurs with a numeral or when the noun *pàakkaa* is counted, as follows:

(26) *pàakkaa nìŋ dâam 1*
pàakkaa sǝŋ dâam 2...

Moreover, a classifier can also express an instance of a countable noun in a

collectivity of individuals, as shown in example (27):

- (27) *dinsǎɔ* *sǎɔŋ* *klòŋ*
pencil two Clf: box
‘two boxes of pencils’

Here the countable noun *dinsǎɔ* is re-unitized as a group expressed by *klòŋ* instead of as an individual item like *dâam*.

Referring to particular entities

When classifiers occur in noun phrases Form II: N+Clf+Mod, they serve to refer to particular entities. This contrasts with plain nouns, whose function is to describe or denote objects. As pointed out by Denny (1986), a noun (e.g., *dog*) only expresses the property of ‘dog’, it does not refer to any kind of individual. The reference to the individual dogs themselves is achieved by developing a noun phrase from the noun with the help of modifying elements, including classifiers. Therefore, it is classifiers, rather than the nouns, that are used to refer to particular individuals, thus marking the noun phrases as definite when the reference needs reinforcing. Consider examples (28) and (29):

- (28) *dèk* *nán* *son*
child that naughty
‘Any children/child are/is naughty.’

- (29) *dèk* *khon* *nán* *son*
child Clf that naughty
‘The child is naughty.’

In example (28), the noun *dèk* does not refer to anyone in particular: it applies the property of ‘child’ to the item (and is therefore non-referential and indefinite).

The demonstrative *nán* does not indicate any particular child.⁸ By contrast, in example (29), the classifier *khon* ‘person’ is used to give the noun phrase a definite referent, making it clearly referential.

Individuating items

In the same syntactic form, classifiers also help disambiguate the number of associated nouns by individuating those nouns. Count nouns in Thai are not marked for number. Classifiers are thus used to indicate singularity. Consider example (30):

- (30) *kây* *nîi* *kin* *dii*
chicken this eat good
‘This/these chicken/s is/are good to Eat.’

In this case, the noun *kây* ‘chicken’ has no numeral construction to indicate the number and, therefore, allows for two readings: singular or plural. A particular classifier is needed to express singularity by providing a picture of the noun as a single substance, as shown in (31):

- (31) *kây* *tua* *nîi* *kin* *dii*
chicken Clf/ ‘body’ this eat good
‘This chicken is good to eat.’

Indicating the numeral ‘one’

In Form III: N+Clf+(‘one’), where the numeral ‘one’ functioning as a modifier in the classifier phrase is absent, the classifier

⁸ Here, the demonstrative *nán* has a discourse function among the functions such as drawing attention to, switching attention, tracking entities, controlling the flow of information, and reintroducing a topic (Singnoi 2001).

alone carries the meaning ‘one’. Consider example (32):

- (32) *khǎw kaafææ-yen kǣæw*
ask for ice coffee glass
‘One ice coffee, please.’

Example (32) shows that, in the absence of the numeral expression, the classifier must be interpreted as ‘one (ice coffee)’. Some other familiar sentences where such is the case are given in examples (33) and (34):

- (33) *khǎw maa mii sǎa phǎn*
he come have mat Clf
mǎw bay thǎw nán
pillow Clf only
‘He came here with only a mat and a pillow.’
- (34) *chǎn mii bǎan lǎŋ rǒt khan*
I have house Clf car Clf
kô phǒccay lææw
so satisfied Asp.
‘It’s okay for me that I merely have a house and a car.’

As shown in (33) and (34), all the classifiers (*phǎn*, *bay*, *lǎŋ* and *khan*) indicate the number ‘one’ when no numeral is present.

As has been discussed in this section, I have tried to emphasize, via the case of classifiers in Thai, that the semantic information, or meaning proper, does not provide enough information by itself to allow for successful interpretation when people communicate. One also needs pragmatic information, or contextual meaning, when using language in particular circumstances. In fact, the meaning proper merely provides a basic idea of what is being communicated. It is

the pragmatic information which crucially limits and thus enables the interpretation of what people mean.

Correlation between forms and meanings

I have shown that classifier constructions contain a variety of information such as syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties, rather than being restricted to an autonomous syntax, which need to be differentiated and separately presented. This paper also differentiates their syntactic forms from their syntactic functions since it is obvious that the forms vary according to the functions. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that, the meaning (semantic and pragmatic properties), also determines or motivates the forms. In fact, it is the pragmatic information, rather than the semantic properties which determines the forms. As already shown, classifiers of both semantic types can occur in any form. The only difference is that generic classifiers need no context to appear with their nouns, while the perceptual ones do. This section attempts to illustrate the association among the relevant grammatical properties in terms of form-meaning mappings, focusing on how the structures/forms of the classifier constructions are motivated or determined by the meaning, especially the pragmatic information, and vice versa.

As mentioned earlier, one can see that classifiers occur in three different syntactic structures or forms. In Form I, where classifiers syntactically form numeric phrases, they serve to unitize nouns, thus making a classifier construction, or form-meaning pairing as shown below.

Construction 1

Form	:	Meaning
N+Num+Clf		unitizing nouns

This has already been illustrated in (24), which is repeated below:

- (24) *khâaw sǎɔŋ caan*
 rice two Clf: plate
 ‘two plates of rice’

In Form II, where classifiers syntactically stand for head nouns, substitute for nouns, act as heads of nominal constructions, and disambiguate constructions, they have at least two different meanings or interpretations: 1) referring to particular entities and 2) individuating items. The mapping of one form and two meanings results in two different constructions, as shown in Construction 2 and Construction 3:

Construction 2

Form	:	Meaning
N+Clf+Mod		referring to particular entities

Construction 2 has already been illustrated in example (29), repeated below:

- (29) *dèk khon nán son*
 child Clf that naughty
 ‘That child is naughty.’

Construction 3

Form	:	Meaning
N+Clf+Mod		individuating items

Construction 3 has already been illustrated in example (31), repeated below:

- (31) *kày tua nîi kin dii*
 chicken Clf this eat good
 ‘This chicken is good to eat.’

Lastly, in Form III, where classifiers syntactically modify head nouns directly, they are interpreted as the numeral ‘one’, resulting in another construction, as shown in Construction 4:

Construction 4

Form	:	Meaning
N+Clf+(one)		indicating the numeral ‘one’

This has already been illustrated in (32), which appears again below:

- (32) *khǎɔ kaafæ-yen kâæw*
 ask for ice coffee glass
 ‘One ice coffee, please.’

These form-meaning mappings are summarized in the following table:

Meanings: Pragmatic functions	Syntactic forms		
	I	II	III
unitizing nouns	✓		
referring to particular entities		✓	
individuating items		✓	
indicating the numeral 'one'			✓

The above table shows that classifiers are employed in Form I when they are used to unitize nouns. They are employed in Form II when they are used to refer to particular entities and to individuate items. And, finally, they appear in Form III when they are used to indicate the numeral 'one'.

Construction presentation

Classifier constructions in Thai and the associations among their properties are better formally presented using the box-model device of Construction Grammar since it is able to provide for the simultaneous presentation of an array of information. Consider the box model below:

syn	{	lex	+	}
		cat	Clf	
		max	+	
		func	...	
sem	{	'.....'		}
		type	...	
prag			

In this device form, a lexical item shown as [lex +] is categorized as a classifier, thus containing the attribute value [cat Clf]. Structurally, it can stand independently, like a regular noun, thus [max +]. It is given a function attribute (e.g., standing for head nouns, substituting for nouns, etc.) to fill the unspecified attribute-value [func ...]. Regarding the semantic properties, its proper meaning may be shown literally, thus '.....'. Along with the meaning, its type would appear, which represents its semantic property, thus [type ...]. A pragmatic function is registered separately alongside the semantic.

An example of such a presentation form is provided for the classifier *phæ̀n* 'flat-like,' which can occur in a nominal construction like *kradàat phæ̀n* in the context:

- (35) *khǎo kradàat phæ̀n*
 ask for paper Clf
 'Give me a piece of paper.'

The presentation of *phæ̀n* is given below:

syn	{	lex	+	}
		cat	Clf	
		max	+	
		func	noun modifier	
sem	{	'flat like feature'		}
		type	perceptual	
prag		indicating the number 'one'		

In the figure, *phæ̀n* is a lexical item, thus [lex +]. It is categorized as a classifier, thus [cat Clf], which cannot stand

independently, thus [max -]. It has the syntactic function in such a noun phrase as a noun modifier, thus [func noun modifier]. For its semantic properties, it means ‘flat-like feature’ and is thus grouped in the perceptual category, thus [type perceptual]. In this particular structure, the classifier performs the pragmatic function of indicating the numeral ‘one’.

Concluding remark

In this paper, I have suggested an explanation based on a functional framework which, among other advantages, allows grammatical categories to include complex bundles of information, rather than simple atomic categories. I believe that classifier constructions in Thai, as well as other constructions, are better viewed as informative constructions with their own particular syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic constraints. Here, it has been made clear that not only syntactic and semantic information but also pragmatic information is a significant factor since it serves to determine the possible interpretations and even the allowable structures and thus should be considered as an obligatory factor, or at least non-ignorable information, of a grammatical construction.

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SELF-AWARENESS OF LUANG PHRABANG LAONESS IN THAILAND:¹ A CASE STUDY OF MYTH AND RITUAL²

Bourin Wungkeeree³

Abstract

This article offers a study of Lao people who migrated from Luang Phrabang to settle in Thailand, especially at Amphoe Lom Kao and Lom Sak, Phetchabun Province and Amphoe Dan Sai, Loei Province. These migrants have maintained their self-awareness as Luang Phrabang

¹ The Lao identity here means, in the context of the research, the fact that they are aware that they are from Lao Luang Phrabang in the Kingdom of Lanxang. The tradition, ceremonies, beliefs, religions, and languages emphasize their identity and language. In this context, the awareness of being Luang Phrabang Lao is part of their identity. However, as they have lived in Thailand for a long time, they call themselves “Thai people of Luang Phrabang ancestry.”

² This article is a part of a Ph.D. thesis entitled, “Folk Literature in Luang Phrabang Laotian Communities and Its Role in Transmitting Luang Phrabang Laoness in Thai Social Context,” Ph.D. Program in Literature and Comparative Literature, Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University. An earlier version was presented to the International conference “Thai Language and Literature: Wisdom and Dynamism in the Global Context,” November 10–12, 2006, at the Imperial Queen’s Park, Bangkok, Thailand. I would like to thank Associate Professor Dr. Siraporn Nathalang for her guidance and for inviting me to join this conference.

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Lao by transmitting their own folk literature—for instance, local legends and hero tales, and rituals. Such ethnic transmission has been interpreted as an important mechanism for ethnic maintenance. Repeatedly reproduced in a discourse of myth telling in the context of spirit offering rituals, this transmission helps the community realize and remember that they are from Luang Phrabang, Lanxang, which was once a prosperous Buddhist centre in ancient times.

Introduction

A legend or a myth is an ancient story that has been passed on over many generations in a given culture. As such, it is a vital tool in recording the events, attitudes, and thoughts of the society. Most legends are generally related to supernatural or mysterious things. They might be variably interpreted across the course of their history. There are several types of legends: most notably, the legend of the origin of the world and the universe; the ghost legend; the ritual legend; and the local legend. Ritual and local legends are distinctive in their purposes to show cultural origins, to explain local geography and how to build a community, or to explain the background of each ritual. Thus, legends and myths make it possible for people in the community to understand their culture as well as to create mutual appreciation of their history.

Luang Phrabang Laotians have migrated into Thailand since the reign of King of Thon Buri, who led the military conquest of Vientiane, then under King Siriboonsan. After his victory, King of Thon Buri appointed two noblemen, Chaophraya Chakkri and Phraya Phichai, to lead the Luang Phrabang Laotians to the city of Nam Pat, Lom, and Loei. There were

subsequent migrations into Thailand between the reigns of King Rama I and King Rama III, especially during the war of Chao Anuwong of Vientiane which saw the largest single wave of Laotian migration. Even after resettlement, the Luang Phrabang Laotians maintained much of their lifestyle, society, culture, and attitude in their new home.

Two key issues emerge out of a consideration of this history of Lao-Thai migration. Firstly, why do the Luang Phrabang Laotians in the city of Lom Kao and Lom Sak (excluding the Vientiane Laotians in Tambon Ban Tio, Ban Rai, and Ban Wai) in Petchabun Province and in the city of Dan Sai in Loei Province still have a strong sense of Luang Phrabang Lao identity even though they have lived in Thailand for more than two hundred years? Secondly, how is it that these people continue to pass on the Luang Phrabang Laoness from one generation to the next?

The importance of Luang Phrabang Laoness in the context of Thai society

In preliminary research for this study, it was found that there were two factors driving these people to try to maintain their identity. The first reason is that Luang Phrabang Laotians in Thailand retain strong pride in the glorious past of the Kingdom of Lanxang Luang Phrabang. The second reason is the desire to resist the influence of Thai society and to maintain a sense of cultural distinction. Therefore, they try to keep their culture and maintain beliefs and attitudes through such things as ghost feast rituals or local legends. The first point offers a good case to illustrate the causes of this practice. Luang Phrabang Laotians' thoughts,

beliefs, culture, and their sense of Luang Phrabang Laoness are obviously derived from their motherland, the Kingdom of Lanxang Luang Phrabang. This area used to be highly prosperous both in terms of society and culture. Therefore, people carried a rosy perception of their happy homeland. Away from home in Thailand, and surrounded by different ethnicities including Thai, Lanna, Isan, Hmong, and Chinese, the latter two groups having moved into Thailand over the past eighty years, they try harder to keep their identity and culture. One of the methods of maintaining their culture is to distinguish themselves from other groups. In particular, they feel that their culture is superior to others (the Chinese, Hmong, and Thai Tai⁴) because they used to be the people of the capital city of Laos. This kind of thinking still remains prevalent among the Luang Phrabang Laotians in Thailand. This attitude can also be noticed in their folklore, especially comic tales. The competing character traits and differences between each culture are the topics most frequently criticized and pilloried. This is interesting and implies a sense of cultural separation. For example, Hmong people migrated to settle down in Lom Kao district and Dan Sai district after the communists were defeated. Due to cultural and ethnic differences, Hmong people are often perceived as uncivilized, dirty, and different. They have a lower social status compared to Luang Phrabang Lao people. This can be seen in a

⁴ Luang Phrabang Laotians residing in these three districts still call Isan people "Thai Tai" as their ancestors used to do while living in Luang Phrabang. In the past, they did not realize that "Thai Tai" was the same as Isan people. They only identify those living on the right side of the Mekong River as Thai Tai or people living in the South of the Kingdom of Laos.

humorous tale called “Yak Dai Mia Maeo” (“Wanting to have a Maeo Wife”) and “Kin Khao Ban Maeo” (“Having a Maeo Meal”). These stories foreground ethnic and cultural differences as a source of comic effect. In addition, Luang Phrabang Lao people have a better social status in every respect. Similarly, Isan Lao people who mostly come to be workers in Lom Kao and Lom Sak, have been perceived as inferior to Luang Phrabang Lao people. Institutionalized further via the differential relationship of an employer and an employee, the unequal status encourages criticism and making fun of the culture and lifestyle of Isan Lao people. They are perceived to be people who like drinking, arguing, being cheerful and being poor. On the other hand, the Luang Phrabang Lao people think of themselves as peaceful, neat, and civilized. This perception can be seen in the humorous tale “Tai Tai Kin Khi Maphrao” (“Thai Tai eat coconut dregs”). Chinese people, by contrast, generally have high influence in terms of economics because most of them are merchants who buy agricultural produce from people in the community and lend money through a black market financial system with high interest rates. They are often perceived as always trying to take advantage of others. This motivates compensatory tactics through local humorous and sarcastic tales such as “Bak Lak Bak Laem” (“The Intelligent Person”), “Bak Siang Jip” (“Story Related to Former Monks”), and “Bak Po Khi Tua” (“The Lying Po”). The common theme of these stories is the cheating behavior of the Chinese. It is satirized and reversed in narratives where the Chinese are cheated by Luang Phrabang Lao people. In summary, the Luang Phrabang Laotians distinguish people from other cultures through the use of humorous tales passed from generation to generation in

the community. The feeling of strong ethnic difference can still be found in the Luang Phrabang community.

In this way, the pride of being Lao descendants of a great and prosperous royal culture has largely taken root in their mind. Because of their pride in their origins, it is not strange for them to continue to identify themselves as Luang Phrabang Laotians and to use this identity to separate from other groups of people. Considered more deeply, even though they have moved to Thailand, the sense of being Luang Phrabang Laotians still remains. They have tried to maintain the culture, thoughts, lifestyle, and customs of Luang Phrabang. The pride in Luang Phrabang Laoness can be today seen from their acting, tone of voice and reaction toward people from different groups. This clearly shows their feelings of difference and separation.

The sense of pride and distinction profiled here has not only been found in the Luang Phrabang community in Thailand, but it can also be found in those currently living in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. People there are also very proud of their ancient culture and art.⁵ When UNESCO announced Luang Phrabang’s World Heritage listing, this kind of feeling became even more intense. However, people here do not feel separated from others. It is because in the past the city of Luang Phrabang was occupied by people of varied ethnicities, as detailed in the Khun Burom legend. This situation didn’t create a feeling of separation but rather one of negotiation and cooperation as they

⁵ Interview with Professor Nou Xayasithivong, special lecturer in the Department of Lao Language and Mass Communication, Faculty of Arts, the National University of Lao on July 24, 2006.

worked together to build a rich and prosperous culture. In addition, the Lao people of all ethnicities were united in their common struggle against colonialist enemies, France and America, until they were free. Furthermore, cross-ethnic marriage is common among Laotians. For example, Lao Lum people regularly get married to Lao Toeng and Lao Sung people.⁶ The equality in ethnicity is highly accepted in Luang Phrabang. Therefore, this kind of ethnocentrism in Luang Phrabang is less intense than in Thailand because of different political, historical, and social factors. In summary, pride in a prosperous past, a civilized culture, and former geopolitical centrality, help Luang Phrabang Lao people maintain a strong sense of distinctive identity which has been passed on through generations via socialization.

The (local) legend: implication of space, identity, and how to find new reference for the community

Every society has its legends, but they might be slightly different depending on objectives, cultural and social factors, and interpretation. The same legend can differ depending on its purpose, how it is told, why it is maintained, and its role. Therefore, to study the same legend across different societies can help us understand more about the people in those cultures. For Luang Phrabang Laotians in Thailand, legends are very important in passing their identity and cultural self-awareness to successive generations. Significantly, their local legends always refer to their

⁶ Interview with Mr. Humphan Rattanavong on July 24, 2006. At present, he is a freelance researcher on art, culture, and literature. He was born in Luang Phrabang and still has the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness.

migration into Thailand and subsequent settlements, to heroes who established their society firmly in the Kingdom, and to places of settlement. Each legend emphasizes each concern of the society.

The legend of the city and geography: the link between the past, the present and the existence of the community

The local legends told widely in the Luang Phrabang community can be divided into two types. The first kind is the establishment of the city, geography, and heritage. This is called a city legend. A city legend actually describes the geographical aspects of the community such as the Mueang Lom legend.⁷ This legend tells of Grandpa Bua and Grandma Phan who moved from Luang Phrabang and set up their big family here. One day, a father and his son went into the woods to hunt. They caught a white squirrel, the meat of which was shared among other villagers. A widow was the only one who missed eating the white squirrel. Eating this white squirrel doomed the city. It was besieged by the Naga who was very angry

⁷ This legend is sometimes called “Nong Ko Legend.” Nong Ko is a big swamp in Ban Na Ko, Tambon Na Ko, Amphoe Lom Kao, Phetchabun Province. There are two kinds of legend for Nong Ko. The first one is similar to the legend of Nong Han in Phadaeng Nang Ai story. The second one is related to the spread of Buddhism by the Lord Buddha to Mueang Lom and Mueang Dan Sai. It was told that the Naga (a giant sacred snake) was angry with the monkeys that flocked to pay respect to the Lord Buddha. The Naga put a spell on the land, causing it to sink into a swamp. The city has from that time been called [mian-lòm] (เมืองหล่ม) or [mian-lòm] (เมืองลุ่ม).

with the fact that the citizens/villagers had eaten the white squirrel. The city was then called [mian-lòm] (เมืองหล่ม) or [mian-lôm] (เมืองล่อม).⁸

This type of city legend, rather than the version related to Buddhism, is widely told in Mueang Lom Kao. The assumption is that, like other Thai-Lao people, locals know the story of the falling city well because of the Nakarae (Nakara disguises as a white squirrel) such as the one told in Nong Sae legend, Suwan Khom Kham city legend, and Nong Han legend (Pha Daeng Nang Ai story). It is possible that the people use the same story of the falling city to describe the existence of the swamp in their new land. More importantly, this story represents how the people transform their identity and self-awareness. They attach the story of moving to the new land to the city legend. Grandpa Bua and Grandma Phan emigrated from Luang Phrabang to set up their new city in the Lom Kao area. The adaptation is to try to maintain the story of their origins and ensure that people do not forget their past, thus helping maintain traditions of culture and society and a general sense of continued Luang Phrabang Laoness. The revised version of the Mueang Lom legend relates the original land, Luang Phrabang, to the new home, Mueang Lom Kao. When the story is told from generation to generation, people maintain awareness of their origins and emphasize their Laoness.

In addition, the story of the people's immigration appears in the legend of other minor communities such as Ban Huai Ma Khuea legend. It was told that two monks

led people to escape from the war and difficulties in Luang Phrabang during the reign of King Chai Chettha Thi Rat. While wandering through a basin area, they found many eggplant trees growing. There was a river passing through the fertile land. This area was then named "Ban Rong Makhuea" (the village of eggplant ditch) and later changed to "Huai Makhuea" (eggplant creek). After setting up a community, people built a temple beside the Nam Phung River, where there was a pure, white sand beach. The temple was then named "Wat Sai Ngam"⁹ (the temple of beautiful sand). This legend has been continuously told.

The researcher found that the Lom Kao legend and Huai Ma Khuea legend are told in order to link the story from the past during the reign of Lanxang Luang Phrabang Kingdom with the identity of Lao people currently residing in Thailand. By so doing, they are reminded of the time when the community used to be located in the prosperous ancient Kingdom of Lao Luang Phrabang. The Laoness is signified by the culture and the fact that their kingdom is ancient. The message has been passed through the word "Capital city." The capital city here does not mean only the geographical location, but it means culture and the thinking of the community. According to Khongwijit (2000: 78), the Luang Phrabang people in Laos have been deeply aware of their identity through ceremonies such as Heatkhong. These ceremonies show that they saw their city

⁸ Interview with Mrs. Lam Nualchorn, a villager in Tambon Ban Noen, Amphoe Lom Kao, Phetchabun Province on May 25, 2006.

⁹ Interview with Mr. Phleang Chansae, a villager in Tambon Na Saeng, Amphoe Lom Kao, Phetchabun Province on April 4, 2005. According to him, there had been sacred palm leaves describing the immigration of Luang Phrabang Laotians during the reign of King Chai Chettha Thi Rat. They used to be kept at Wat Sai Ngam but are now lost.

as ‘a capital city’ which was ancient and full of culture. It is the city where the king used to reside and where a lot of temples and holy places were constructed. Therefore, the dignity of being the people of “the capital city” or the community which possessed prosperous culture has been deeply rooted in the minds of Luang Phrabang people in the district of Dan Sai, Lom Kao, and Lom Sak. This kind of thinking has been passed from generation to generation through legends. Their legends are a key point in distinguishing them from people of other ethnicities. In addition, they help to emphasize the existence of their community and ethnicities in order to pass on knowledge about their tranquil and happy land to the next generation. Likewise, people in the early Rattanakosin period still yearned for the prosperity of the kingdom of Ayutthaya. They referred to that period as “the time when the city was still prosperous” (meaning the time before the city was destroyed by the Burmese). The researcher of the present study contends that the identity of being Luang Phrabang has been continuously passed to each generation with a particular period of concentration during the reign of King Rama III. Chuethai (2004: 180–206) shows that during that time, the prosperity of their city was shown through wall paintings at Wat Si Mongkhon, Ban Na Sai, Lom Kao District. The paintings feature prosperous Luang Phrabang symbolized as a new land. The people in this community used to join the Lao military led by King Anuwong to gain independence from Thailand during the reign of King Rama III. This obviously shows that their primary allegiances were with “Lao” rather than “Thailand.” The belief in their Lao nationality has been deeply rooted in the community.

In summary, Luang Phrabang Laotians have linked their history with local legends. These legends are important because they record stories, transmit principles, attitudes and thoughts. The theme of these legends is related to space. The space here means physical geography like the mountains that help define the territory of the Luang Phrabang Lao people. The unity in the community then becomes more intense. However, space here does not only mean geographical aspects, but it also covers cultural and ethnic borders. In other words, space plays an important role for Luang Phrabang people both in tangible and intangible terms. It separates Luang Phrabang people from other communities nearby. The legend serves this objective well. The stories have been continuously told, so they emphasize the message and help maintain the awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness.

The hero legend:¹⁰ how to select stories to transform history

The hero legend here means a story about leaders in the community of Lao Luang Phrabang. They believe that these heroes really existed, ruled the community and/or initiated good things for the community. The legends are both about heroes who are Lao and those who are Tai (Thai). The legends about the two kinds of heroes serve to emphasize collective thoughts and history and the Lao identity.

The legends about Lao Luang Phrabang heroes

Heroes here mean the leaders of Luang Phrabang people who really existed and

¹⁰ In fact, a hero legend is a kind of local legends. Here, the author explains it separately to emphasize its role.

led the community to migrate from Lao to settle in the area of Lom Kao district. These heroes are therefore very important as they are considered the ones who led the Luang Phrabang Lao people to settle in a new land. The Luang Phrabang identity is thus reinforced through these heroes such as the ten Luang Phrabang leaders legend mostly told in Lom Kao. It is about the heroes moving from “Luang Phrabang.” It is told that:

In the past, the Thai and Lao people were enemies. They often fought with each other. The Lao leaders saw that a lot of people died, so they led their people to the city of Lom Kao and settled down at Ban Hin Kling, Ban Wang Ban, Nong Kham, Nam Khrang, Na Sai, Cho Wo and others. The important leaders included Chao Pho Khun Chok, Pho Khun Si, Khun Krai, Khun Chai, Khun Det Raksa, Chao Pho U Kaeo, Chao Pho Lek Si, Chao Pho Suliwong, Chao Pho Kham Daeng, and Chao Pho Phromthat. These heroes were good at fighting in a war. In addition, they were leaders with strong ethics. After they died, these heroes became the “holy spiritual guards” who protected the community.¹¹

It can be noticed that the aforementioned legend not only emphasizes the Luang Phrabang identity and their migration into Thailand, it also shows the social development of the Luang Phrabang community in Lom Kao. After the

settlement, the Luang Phrabang Lao people were grouped into ten communities. Each of the ten leaders ruled ‘Khum’. These ten groups have since become the communities residing in Lom Kao. They are linked closely with one another by the ceremony to pay respect to the ancestral hero spirits. The ceremony is conducted annually. In addition, the legend of *Chao Pho Ban Umkathat*, another small community in the town of Lom Kao, also mentions heroes from Luang Phrabang:

In the past, these hero spirits used to be human beings. They led people to flee the war and to settle down in Thailand. Chao Pho Simala and Chao Pho Bua Khai are the key leaders. After they died, they were respected as guardian or leader spirits to protect the people. During these ceremonies, the people who act as the medium are believed to be possessed by the guardian spirits, and will do a sword show and fighting. They also dress like the leaders in the past such as wearing decorative string on arms and legs, folding cloth around head, wearing Khao Ma cloth around waists, chewing betel, and smoking traditional cigarettes.¹²

It can be noted that the Lao Luang Phrabang hero legend is mostly about the courage of the leaders, the migration to a better place, and setting up a new community in a new land. This imbues the leaders with wisdom, strength and

¹¹ Interview with Mrs. Booncham Meebuathong on April 22, 2005.

¹² Interview with Mrs. Ladda Mahawan on April 14, 2005.

efficiency. It is because they are able to take the people from drought, food shortage, and crisis. Understandably, the hero for Luang Phrabang Lao people should be good and do good jobs for the group, especially during the crisis such as leading the group to a land with more food and natural resources or creating a new community. In the context of diaspora, those having important roles in setting up and ensuring prosperity for the community will be much respected. Therefore, the heroes for Luang Phrabang Lao people are not those who won a war, but those who led the people through the crisis whether it be a drought or a war. They can settle up a new and strong community. The respect for “the hero” has been passed on to the next generation through the local legend. There is also the ceremony to pay respect to these hero spirits. The legend plays an important role in controlling the thought patterns, and beliefs, both at the individual and community levels. It can be said that the hero who is Luang Phrabang Lao hero can help emphasize the Luang Phrabang Lao identity and encourage the people to be aware of their history.

The legends talking about the heroes who are Tai (Thai)

In the process of creating the identity of the Luang Phrabang Lao in the Thai context, people need to select things they prefer to focus on or to ignore. These identities are created from interpreting history, legends, and tales. These identities do not have a single, homogeneous meaning. Rather, they can be interpreted in different ways and will not be consistently interpreted. It can be changed all the time, especially the identity interpreted from the hero legend. They start to accept the heroes of the Thai

people and take them as their own heroes. The researcher discovered that the Luang Phrabang Lao people in Thailand had mentioned the cultural heroes of Thai people including Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao and Pho Khun Pha Mueang, as their leaders. Luang Phrabang people in Dan Sai community choose Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao or Pho Khun Si In Thra Thit as their hero. They think he led a group of people to establish a community in Dan Sai before moving to Bang Yang and Sukhothai respectively. In Lom Sak community, people paid respect to Pho Khun Pha Mueang as their cultural leader. According to Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao legend/Dan Sai:

Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao moved from Lao (some said that he was from Luang Phrabang) to settle a new community in the town of Dan Sai, which is located on the side of Hueang river and is presently named Ban Kao. Later, he moved to settle another community in “Dan Sai Mai” at the area of Ban Dern. The old Dan Sai was then called Dan Sai Kao and the new city was named Dan Sai Mai. Later, their name was shortened to Dan Sai and Ban Kao respectively. Pho Khun then moved to settle the city of Bang Yang and ruled Sukhothai.¹³

Pho Khun Pha Mueang, the ruler of Rad, is believed to be from the same area as Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao. He is celebrated for his bravery and outstanding prowess in fighting the Khmer troops to

¹³ The information is summarized from interviews with local philosophers and leaders in Tambon Na Ho, Dan Sai district, Loei Province.

re seize the city of Sukhothai and his subsequent ruling of the city of Rad. It is believed that the city of Rad is presently Lom Sak. According to the legend:

Pho Khun Pha Mueang moved from Dan Khwa to settle the city of Rad. Later, he married the Khmer princess, Singh Khon Dhevi, who was the daughter of the Khmer king. He ruled the city of Rad, but later joined Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao to seize Sukhothai back. Princess Singh Khon Dhevi got angry. She burned the barn and killed herself. This is why there is at present a lot of black rice in the area of Rad city.¹⁴

The interesting question is why people in Dan Sai and Lom Sak regard the Thai hero as their own. According to historical and social analysis, Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao was an important king of Thailand because he was the founder of the kingdom of Thailand. He was much praised by Thai people, but his origin and history are not clear because of limited sources of information. It can be interpreted that Pho Khun Pha Mueang and Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao are the “heroes of Tai people.” It can also be understood that they are Thai-Lao. It is because “Tai community” and “Tai ethnic” mean “Tai people” both residing in Thailand and in Lao and other groups. Professor Dr. Prasert Na Nakara, an expert in language and ancient scripts, writes:

¹⁴ The information is summarized from interviews with local philosophers and leaders in Lom Sak, Phetchabun Province.

It cannot be explained that Pho Khun Pha Mueang and Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao are Thai or Lao. However, they are Tai, leading people to migrate from the South of China and settle a new community on the land called presently Thailand.¹⁵

The researcher thinks that whether Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao and Pho Khun Pha Mueang were Thai or Lao, the more important point is how the Luang Phrabang Lao people utilize and analyze the legends. They use the ambiguous history to create a “cultural advantage.” They apply and adjust it to their context as the “shared identity” between Thai and Lao (being Thai and being Lao) through a hero who is Tai (Thai). In other words, to regard the Thai hero as their own hero is an effort to identify themselves as the “Thai people from Luang Phrabang.” Although they are Thai and live in Thailand, these people are still willing to continue the Luang Phrabang Lao identity. This can be seen from the fact that they claim that Pho Khun Bang Klang Hao and Pho Khun Pha Mueang migrated from Laos. This interpretation can be changed. To claim a historically popular ancestor as their own leader does not happen only in the Luang Phrabang Lao community. In the past, many leaders became heroes in several communities. For example, Phaya Chueng is the hero of Lanna, Tai Lue, Tai Khern, Tai Yai, Tai Dam, Lao, Khamu, and Hmong people. According to Wongthet (2002: 31), all of them respect Phaya Chueng as their heroes. This is how to enjoy the benefits of the existing history by using “the cultural and ethnic hero” to strengthen the community identity. This is

¹⁵ Interview with Professor Dr. Prasert Na Nakara on August 26, 2004.

to “make the interpretation” in defining and transferring the identity of Lao Luang Phrabang people by linking it to the person and community in an intelligent way.

In summary, the legend about heroes who are Tai (Thai) or Luang Phrabang, is to define the identity and the awareness of being Luang Phrabang Lao through the interpretation of history, legends, and Tai heroes. Then the legend is linked to the identity and the awareness of being Luang Phrabang Lao. Luang Phrabang Lao people try to emphasize that they are Thai but of Lao ethnicity (Luang Phrabang). Therefore, the aim in reviving legends related to Luang Phrabang Lao heroes and Tai (Thai) heroes is to pass on the identity and awareness of being Luang Phrabang Lao. This process can be a direct effect from the Luang Phrabang Lao hero story or through the interpretation of legends and history in the context of Thai historical discourse, globalization, tourism and local trends. This reflects the changes in defining their identity, the awareness, and the interpretation. As such, these legends are extremely valuable. They are not mere nonsense stories because “the strongest point of legends that enable them to endure for a long time is the fact that they are flexible and their contents can be adjusted to suit every condition. They seem to be tangible and real but at the same time are intangible and may not exist. According to Pulsuwan (2001: 152), this qualification enables legends to be flexible in every situation under the changing culture. Luang Phrabang people intentionally create their own hero legends to transfer their historical story and Luang Phrabang Lao community to cope with the lifestyle in Thai society. They emphasize their long and enduring history and the right to live in Thailand, similar to that enjoyed by other ethnicities, as Thai

people who have Luang Phrabang Lao ethnicity and who still maintain the identity of Luang Phrabang Lao. As producers of discourse and its users, Luang Phrabang people accept and understand themselves more in terms of where they are from, who they are, what is their lifestyle, and how to adapt themselves to Thai society which is increasingly influenced by globalization and materialism.

Ritual legends and rites: roles, identities, and Luang Phrabang Laoness

Luang Phrabang people possess legends related to many rites. There are two types of rites. The first one is the ritual directly related to the progress of life such as eliminating bad luck, averting one's poor fate, reviving one's predestined life, removing one's astrological star, subduing calamities, wiping out bad luck, and recalling lost spirits. The second type is communal rituals such as Nang Thiam ghost feast, house blessing, and the recitation of the last life of the Boddhisattava. In this article, legends related to two rituals practiced in the community will be discussed: Chao Pho Dan Sai Ghost Feast and the annual ten Luang Phrabang Lao hero ghosts feast. The objective of this brief study is to analyze how these rituals maintain the identity, culture, and the awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness in Dan Sai community.

Chao Pho Dan Sai ghost feast: implications and roles of the rites

In Dan Sai community, Loei Province, people practice the rite of Chao Pho Dan Sai Ghost Feast (the ruler ghost). These ghosts refer to the ancestral rulers. When they passed away, their spirits would be respected by the people in the community. It is believed that Chao Pho Dan Sai refers to the first rulers of Dan Sai.¹⁶ The spirits possessing Chao Pho Kuan (the medium) in this ritual are Chao Ong Luang, Chao Ong Thai, Chao Mueang Wang, and Chao Mueang Klang. From the ranks and titles, all of them are Lao rulers, with the exception of Chao Ong Thai.¹⁷ For the spirits of rulers who possess Chao Mae Nang Thiam, they include Chao Nang Khao, Chao Nang Chuang, Chao Nang Chan, and Chao Nang Noi. They are all female members of Lao royal family. These spirits take possession of Chao Pho Kuan and Chao Mae Nang Thiam in the seventh month of the Lao calendar or the month of June in Thailand, although the exact date changes from year to year.

Chao Pho Dan Sai, the spirits of female members of Lao royal family, as well as their servants, play an important role and

have a strong influence on the lives of Luang Phrabang Laotians in Amphoe Dan Sai, Wang Saphung, Phu Ruea, Na Haeo, Nakhon Thai, Lom Kao and Lom Sak. These spirits also protect other groups of Luang Phrabang Lao people in other areas such as Sa Kaeo, Amnat Charoen, and Bangkok. When the annual ghost feast's day arrives, everybody respecting Chao Pho Dan Sai must take it seriously and attend this rite. It can be considered a reunion among relatives and people in the community. This encourages people to come back and renew their communal ties. In addition, this helps emphasize the same identity through the shared belief in the same ghosts and the awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness.

Chao Pho Dan Sai ghost feast ritual encourages Luang Phrabang people to be together. It has been practiced by Luang Phrabang people for their own benefits. The ritual is a focus for the people's spirituality and it also maintains their beliefs, faiths, and cultural symbols. How the Chao Pho acts and what he says are symbols mutually understood between sender (the medium) and audience (the rite participants). This enhances the semiology of the culture and is what the Luang Phrabang people understand in the same way. They respect the same spirit. They are all Luang Phrabang people or are relatives in the same community.

¹⁶ This city was established in the reign of King Chai Chettha Thi Rat, contemporaneous with King Chakkraphat of Ayutthaya. The two kings agreed to form an alliance by building a monument to house the holy relics of the Lord Buddha. The monument was located at the boundary in Dan Sai, now called Phra That Si Song Rak. Therefore, the city of Dan Sai forms the boundary between Lao and Ayutthaya. As part of the Ayutthaya-Lao co-operation, high-ranking Lao lords were sent to help the Ayutthaya people, and they were granted leave by the Lao King to rule the city of Dan Sai.

¹⁷ In this community, Chao Ong Thai was meant as the King Chakkraphat of Ayutthaya.

The annual ten Lao Luang Phrabang hero ghosts feast:¹⁸ how to revive the awareness and the search for the identity of Luang Phrabang people in Lom Kao

The legend of the ten Luang Phrabang Lao heroes or Chao Pho Tomat Legend has been told widely in Lom Kao area, in addition to Nong Ko and Mueang Lom legends. This legend refers to the time when Luang Phrabang people migrated to settle down in this area. Most villagers cannot identify when exactly their ancestors moved into this area. However, it may be inferred from historical documents, local novels, myths, and the stories told by old people¹⁹ that this group migrated here during the reigns of King of Thon Buri and later between the reign of King Rama I and King Rama III. According to the ten heroes legend, the Lao leaders took a group of people to Thailand, passing Bo Taen City and Kaen Thao to settle down in Dan Sai and Mueang Lom.²⁰ At Mueang Lom, they

divided the area into ten parts and each part was separately ruled. The ten rulers agreed to meet again on the New Year occasion at Wang Ban community. When the ten rulers passed away, their spirits were respected by villagers and taken up as guardians for the people. Every year, the ten spirits possess the medium and attend the ghost feast. Like the Chao Pho Dan Sai Ghost Feast, the ten hero ghost feast is held in the seventh month of the Lao calendar but on a different day.

The importance of the ten heroes ghosts feast ritual to Lom Kao people can be identified in three ways. Firstly, it helps explain the immigration of the Luang Phrabang Laotians to Lom Kao because of the war between Lao and Thailand. Secondly, this ritual creates a feeling of unity as well as spiritual support and security for Laotians in Lom Kao. Thirdly, this ritual is the reproduction of culture both to emphasize the Luang Phrabang Lao identity and self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness. This last point is borne out by the details according to which the ritual is observed.²¹ With the reunion of the heroes to join the annual feast, the community prepares food and drinks, comprising pork, duck, chicken, and desserts. They also prepare other offerings such as flowers, joss sticks, candles, cigarettes, Miang (tidbits wrapped in leaf), and betel nuts. People usually use this occasion to request for what they wish. In this ritual, the ruler ghosts help relieve their believers' anxieties through fortune telling, or find resolutions for

¹⁸ This legend is sometimes called "**Chao Pho Tomat Ghost Feast.**" The spirit mentioned refers to the ghost of Mat tree or thingan tree. According to the legend, Mat tree is gigantic. The governor of Dert city (นครเด็ด) wished to construct a ship from this tree and send it to Ayutthaya. He commanded the ten heroes to cut the tree down and take it to Ayutthaya. On reaching Saraburi city, the wood could not be pulled further and was lost in the water. The ghost tree wanted to return home. It cried every night. The area was later named Mueang Sao Hai and is now Amphoe Sao Hai (meaning a crying pillar).

¹⁹ For example, Suthep Chanwang (1998); Chanthana Chanbunchong (2000); and *The history of Lom Sak District, Phetchabun* (1999).

²⁰ See Krom Praya Damrongrajanuphap. (n.p.; n.d.)

²¹ However, the ritual has grown over the last ten years because the thingan tree ghost (called Chao Pho Tor Mat) also possesses the medium of Chao Pho Khun Si. The ritual is now more widely believed, especially regarding the miracles and magic of the thingan ghost.

problems.²² What must be stressed is that the ritual is crucial for the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laotians. In the ritual, Chao Pho Khun Si tells the people about their history and origins, especially those related to the immigration from Luang Phrabang. (This theme is often mentioned in the city legend, hero legend, village legend and ritual legend). It is the effort to revive the collective cultural memories through the stories passed from old people. When emphasized by the ghost feast ritual, the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laotians is even more intense. This is further enhanced by the actions of the hero spirits such as sword play and mock war scenes. The conversation between the spirits and the villagers is similar to that between a ruler and his people. The spirits also greet each other. These actions emphasize the background of the community and reinforce the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness for Lom Kao people.

The self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness through contemporary rituals

Chao Pho Ghost Feast ritual is compulsory for all Luang Phrabang people. Actually, they have to pay homage to the spirits on every Buddhist Holy Day. The medium of Nang Thiam has to go to Ho Phi (the ghost hall) to conduct this ritual. Chao Pho Kuan, Chao Mae Nang Thiam, and their servants are present to accept the respect. For the ghost feast in the seventh month,

every family (or its representative) must attend. Therefore, the ritual helps build the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness both at the individual and the community levels. This belief is regularly reproduced through the ritual that symbolically unites the people with shared origins and history in a sacred atmosphere. This ritual therefore serves the community objective: that is to maintain the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness.

However, Luang Phrabang Laotians in some villages respect different spirits other than Chao Pho Dan Sai or the ten heroes of Lom Kao. They might believe in other guardian ghosts. Furthermore, some villages also invite ancestral ghosts from Luang Phrabang. In Tambon Sila, Amphoe Lom Kao, the ruler spirits from Luang Phrabang have been invited to take care of their people. These ghosts are ancestral ghosts or lord ghosts. They have been respected since they were alive such as Chao Phi Si Thon, Ai Phaya Hanhok Kadi, the Two Sisters, Lady Kiang Kaeo, Chao Pho Bua Khai, Chao Pho Si Mala, and Ai Mo.²³ These guardian ghosts protect their people from bad things and create peace and happiness. This makes the villagers feel safer in the new land. Furthermore, this shows the relationship between the new world (the home land) and the old world. In political respects, this practice (both in stories and rituals) is the effort to maintain culture, identity, and self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness in Thailand.

The legends, beliefs, and the ghost feast rituals in Luang Phrabang Laotians communities are important tools for maintaining the self-awareness of Luang

²² This duty is taken by Chao Pho Khun Si. It is told that when Khun Si was alive, he was a Lao nobleman and was very good at fortune telling. He was also the leader in conducting rituals. After his death, his spirit assumes responsibility for these duties.

²³ Interview with Mr. Salee Wungkeeree on April 22, 2005.

Phrabang Laoness. Their narratives of the past, influential in maintaining the Lao Luang Phrabang cultural identity, are regularly reproduced. The self-awareness in Laung Phrabang Laoness is linked to the belief in lord spirits, and the ghost feast. This is deep in the people's minds and is powerful in maintaining the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness.

Postscripts

The effort to maintain the self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness in the three areas mentioned in this article indicates how much the people here yearn for their glorious past in the Kingdom of Lanxang. It is an important factor in differentiating their community from others. It is also to bolster self-confidence and to build symbolic bridges from the past to the future. The legends and the rituals are tangible and help the villagers feel more confident. Their self-awareness of Luang Phrabang Laoness is revived through stories. Moreover, in addition to reproducing the narratives of the past, they invent new ones such as the story about Phi Ta Khon or a ghost mask. This shows the effort of maintaining their self-awareness. It is not surprising the Luang Phrabang Laotians in Thailand still maintain the same self awareness and culture although they have lived here for over 300 years.

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BOOK REVIEW

Graham Huggan, *The Postcolonial Exotic: Marketing the Margins*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.

When Monica Ali's first novel, *Brick Lane*, was published in 2003, it became an instant blockbuster. The novel blazed its way to literary fame. Shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize and the Guardian First Book Award, it won the award for the Granta Best Young British Novel that is granted only once a decade. Its commercial success was also spectacular. Beside £200,000 advanced by Double Day only on the evidence of the first five chapters, the novel sold 150,000 hard copies and remained on the list of bestsellers for 46 weeks and was translated into 25 languages before its film adaptation was released in 2006. The novel's portrayal of the Bangladeshi community in contemporary London also provoked much critical reception, ranging from praise for its treatment of the universal theme of love, its representation of Britain's new hybrid society and heralding the glorious future of black British fiction, to fierce attack for perpetuating racial stereotypes and capitalizing on the popular interest in immigrant fiction, especially the autobiographical novel by female writers.

The phenomenal success of *Brick Lane* highlights some critical concerns that have recently been voiced within the field of postcolonial studies. What do postcolonial studies do as a practice of cultural criticism when their critique of the fetishization of cultural difference seems to be what makes the field so popular? Do postcolonial studies also contribute to the commodification of alterity? How does the postcolonial talk about cultural difference

without appearing to connive with the mainstream discourse of multiculturalism of late capitalism? Given the current success of the alterity industry, of which *Brick Lane* is only one instance, is postcolonial resistance still possible at all?

These are some of the questions raised and explored in Graham Huggan's *The Postcolonial Exotic*. Given that postcolonial theoretical debate has always been self-critical, Huggan's intervention is timely and compelling in that his argument addresses the questions first by looking at the institutionalization of the postcolonial itself both as a rapidly growing field of intellectual enquiry and a fast-growing area of cultural production and consumption and, second, by asking to what extent and in what ways postcolonial studies are involved in the practices of cultural production and power relations that they seek to critique.

Huggan's argument focuses on the paradox which he sees as central to the postcolonial discourse: what he terms "the postcolonial exotic." This is the contradiction between "postcoloniality" or "a value-regulating mechanism within the global late-capitalism system of commodity exchange" and "postcolonialism" or "an anti-intellectualism that reads and valorizes the signs of social struggle in the faultlines of literary and cultural texts" (6). The former is an "implicitly assimilative and market-driven" regime, while the latter "implies a politics of value that stands in obvious opposition to global processes of commodification" (6). Huggan makes clear that these two regimes are not at odds but are "mutually entangled" and "bound up with" each another. This means that in the "overwhelmingly commercial context of late twentieth-century commodity culture,

post-colonialism and its rhetoric of resistance have themselves become the consumer products" (6). The two processes, according to Huggan, are subsumed under the category of "the postcolonial exotic," defined as "the perfect term to describe the domestication process through which commodities are taken from the margins and reabsorbed into mainstream culture" (22).

Drawing on Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital, Huggan is relentless in his analysis of the workings of the postcolonial exotic. In an impressive array of case studies like the Heinemann African Writers Series, the Booker Prize, the interest in contemporary Indian fiction and the "Raj revival," tourist novels, autobiography by ethnic women writers, multiculturalism and the Margaret Atwood Society, he maps out how cultural resistance and marginality come to act as "commodified vehicle[s] of symbolic power" (29). Two main ingredients for successful marketing of the postcolonial exotic are authenticity and cultural difference that act as a fetish, compensating for what has been lost but still desired, given the "pathology of cultural representation under late capitalism" (33) dominated by the global consumer culture of simulacra. The success of Heinemann's African Writers Series, for instance, rests on the purchase of unmediated "Africa." Particularly illuminating is Huggan's analysis of the history and the carefully managed image of the Booker, "a meticulously staged media event" (108). Its sponsorship derives from the wealth of the company founded by Booker McConnell, who prospered from sugar plantations in Guyana. Now rebranded as the major literary patron, the Booker has been praised for heralding "the postcolonial literary era": "the Booker, more than any

other literary prize [...] has blazed a trail in the commercialization of English-language literature [and] exerts a major influence over the cultural perceptions, as well as the reading habits, of its consumer public" (108). As Huggan is quick to note, it is in praises such as this where the "usage of the 'postcolonial' is strategically malleable, conflating patterns of commodified eclecticism and multicultural cachet," and thereby working to "contain (self-)critique by endorsing the commodification of a glamorized cultural difference" (109).

Given this pervasive and inexorable entanglement of the postcolonial in the marketplace, what strategy of resistance is then possible? It is clear that Huggan does not share the skepticism of critics like Aijaz Ahmad, who, faced with "the spiraling commodification of cultural difference," seek to "disclaim or downplay their involvement in postcolonial theoretical production or to posit alternative epistemologies and strategies of cultural representation;" or others who "defy [...] the process of commodification and institutionalization that have arguably helped to create a new canon of 'representative' postcolonial literary/cultural works" (32). Rather, he follows Appadurai in arguing that "global processes of commodification may engender new social relations that operate in anti-imperialist interests, empowering the previously dispossessed" (12), and "anti-imperialist resistance is not necessarily diminished when 'resistance' itself is inserted into global-capitalist networks of cultural consumption" (262). Drawing on Spivak, Huggan points out that postcolonial writers, or at least some, engage in what he calls "strategic exoticism" (32), or "staged marginality" (87), whereby the "exotic" is subverted and "exoticism" is

exposed to be “an at best unstable system of containment: its assimilation of the other to the same can never be definitive or exhaustive” (32). Works such as Chinua Achebe’s *Things Fall Apart*, “still far and away [Heinemann’s] leading generator of revenue” (51), is both “a recuperative attempt at celebratory ethnography” and “a deconstructive exercise in ethnographic parody,” exposing “such ideas of ‘disappearing cultures’, and of an untrammelled cultural authenticity [to be] the stuff of a European anthropological exotic” (43), and thereby making Europe “fall apart” when brought to confront the limits of its own knowledge and preconceptions of “the other.” Even Vikram Seth’s *A Suitable Boy*, a novel certainly not celebrated for self-conscious theoretically-informed sophistication that makes Rushdie’s *Midnight’s Children* a favourite with postcolonial critics and elite readers, is still a good example of strategic resistance because the novel “anticipates its own reception as a technically proficient blockbuster novel that seeks (and inevitably fails) to encapsulate a deliberately exoticised India,” and is aware of “the metropolitan formulae within which it is likely to be read and evaluated” (76).

Huggan cautions that even such strategies incorporated into postcolonial texts by postcolonial writers are “not necessarily a way out of the dilemma,” only an “option” (32). There is no easy answer, as indeed Huggan’s own analysis seems to admit. At times, one wishes for a clearer reading of how these strategies function in the texts that he chooses to examine, similar to what he illustrates in the case of Kureishi’s challenge of the stereotypes of the native Indian by playing up the stereotypes in *The Buddha of Suburbia*. Yet, it is

sobering to heed Huggan’s suggestion that “postcolonialism needs a greater understanding of the commodifying processes through which its critical discourses, like its literary product, are disseminated and consumed” (18). Such undertaking is important at this particular historical moment when the growing success of postcolonial studies and literature risk becoming a liability. To be more aware of the shortcomings and pitfalls of the postcolonial’s complicity with the marketplace may result in less self-promoting reading of the pathology of late capitalist cultural consumption and unequal power relations but, it is perhaps to be hoped, more clear-headed and committed resistance.

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THE USAGE OF CAUSATIVES IN CLASSICAL CHINESE: A REVIEW

Suree Choonharuangdej

ในการศึกษาไวยากรณ์ของภาษาจีนโบราณ นักวิชาการหลายคนได้มองไปที่ประเด็นปัญหาเกี่ยวกับการใช้การิต (causatives) และต่างพบว่าระบบวิธีการสร้างคำของภาษาจีนโบราณ (ซึ่งรวมถึงการใช้การิตด้วย) บ่งถึงความสัมพันธ์เชื่อมโยงกันโดยปกติระหว่างความแตกต่างทางด้านไวยากรณ์และความหมาย กับความแตกต่างในเรื่องเสียงวรรณยุกต์ ซึ่งต่างจากระบบวิธีการสร้างคำที่พบในภาษาอินโด-ยูโรเปียนส่วนใหญ่ กระนั้นก็ตาม การจะแยกการิตออกจากอันมีที่มาจากวิธีการสร้างคำในภาษาจีน ออกจากการใช้การิตที่เกิดขึ้นหรือเป็นผลมาจากโครงสร้างทางไวยากรณ์นับเป็นงานที่ยากยิ่ง และความยากลำบากนั้นก็ยิ่งทวีเพิ่มขึ้นเมื่อพบว่า สืบเนื่องจากโครงสร้างผิวที่เหมือนหรือคล้ายกัน เราจำเป็นต้องแยกความแตกต่างระหว่างการใช้การิตกับการใช้อนุมาน (putatives) ในภาษาจีนเสียก่อน ด้วยเหตุนี้ บทความวิจัยชิ้นนี้จึงไม่เพียงแต่ทบทวนและสรุปงานในอดีตที่เกี่ยวกับการใช้การิตเท่านั้น แต่ยังนำประเด็นปัญหาต่างๆ เกี่ยวกับการใช้การิตในภาษาจีนมาศึกษาวิเคราะห์ใหม่โดยอาศัยปัจจัยหลากหลายทางภาษาศาสตร์ (ในด้านเสียง หน่วยคำ ไวยากรณ์ เป็นต้น) ร่วมกับเนื้อหาตามบริบทที่เกี่ยวข้อง แม้ว่าขณะนี้เราอาจยังไม่สามารถให้คำอธิบายอันเป็นที่น่าพอใจถึงความแตกต่างระหว่างการใช้การิตกับการใช้อนุมานในภาษาจีนก็ตาม แต่การเปรียบเทียบในแง่มุมของการเกิดขึ้นจริงหรือการไม่เกิดขึ้นจริง อาจใช้เป็นเครื่องมือในการแยกความแตกต่างที่ละเอียดลึกซึ้งในกรณีของการใช้อนุมานในภาษาจีนได้

PALI BUDDHIST IDEAS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Steven Collins

บทความนี้ศึกษามโนทัศน์เกี่ยวกับ “อนาคต” โดยมุ่งศึกษาประเด็นว่า “อนาคต” จะเลวร้ายขึ้นคงเดิม หรือดีขึ้น สำหรับปัจเจกชนและ/หรือสังคม ที่นำเสนอตามจินตวิสัยบาลีที่ปรากฏในกลุ่มตัวบทที่สร้างและรับรู้กันในสังคมกสิกรรมในยุคก่อนสมัยใหม่ในอาณาบริเวณเอเชียและเอเชียตะวันออกเฉียงใต้ อันเป็นตัวบทที่ตกทอดมาเป็นองค์ความรู้สำหรับผู้นับถือศาสนาพุทธในสถานะที่เปลี่ยนแปลงไปอย่างมากของสังคมโลกาภิวัตน์

PEACE, ECOLOGY, AND RELIGION: EVOLUTION AND BUDDHISM'S EMPATHIC RESPONSE

David Jones

การเปลี่ยนแปลงโลกทัศน์ตะวันตกเพื่อให้มนุษยชาติอยู่ร่วมกับธรรมชาติได้อีกนับเป็นสิ่งสำคัญยิ่งเพื่อบรรลุจุดประสงค์นี้ มีความเปลี่ยนแปลงที่จำเป็นสองประการคือ การยืนยันยอมรับกระบวนการวิวัฒนาการของธรรมชาติและการพัฒนาทัศนคติของมนุษย์ที่เอื้อต่อความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างปัจเจกชนกับชีวิตอื่น การดำรงอยู่ร่วมกันระหว่างมนุษย์และธรรมชาติจะเป็นไปได้เมื่อมนุษย์ตระหนักถึงธรรมชาติของสัตว์ในตัวมนุษย์เองได้อีกครั้งหนึ่ง บทความนี้เสนอว่าความเปลี่ยนแปลงดังกล่าวสำคัญยิ่งสำหรับการอยู่ร่วมกันอย่างสันติระหว่างสัตว์และสิ่งแวดล้อม และภายในสังคมมนุษย์เอง การนิยามความหมายของสันติภาพในมิติความคิดเกี่ยวกับนิเวศน์สัมพันธ์และความปรารถนาที่จะสร้างสิ่งแวดล้อมที่ยั่งยืนนับเป็นการนิยามสันติภาพที่จะนำไปสู่การออกแบบสถานที่อยู่ของมนุษย์ ระบบการผลิตอาหารและวิธีใช้ทรัพยากรธรรมชาติที่จะช่วยรักษาระบบนิเวศน์ให้ยั่งยืนซึ่งรู้จักในนามของ “วัฒนธรรมถาวร” (“permacultural”) อันเป็นแนวความคิดที่บทความนี้นำเสนอเพราะเป็นแนวความคิดที่มุ่งเน้นบทบาทและการมีส่วนร่วมของมนุษย์ในสิ่งแวดล้อมของมนุษย์เอง แนวความคิดนี้แตกต่างจากความคิดเชิงจริยธรรมที่มองว่ามนุษย์เป็นผู้พิทักษ์สิ่งแวดล้อม (ethical environmentalism of Stewardism) ซึ่งเน้นการมองธรรมชาติในสองแง่มุม คือด้วยความรู้สึก “สงสาร” และ “เคารพ” อย่างไรก็ตามไม่ว่าด้วยความรู้สึกใด ตามแนวคิดนี้ “สันติภาพ” เป็นสิ่งที่ได้รับมาอย่างตายตัวสมบูรณ์จากพระเจ้า บทความนี้เสนอว่าพุทธศาสนาเป็นทางเลือกที่แก้ปัญหาของแนวคิด “ผู้พิทักษ์” นี้ ทางเลือกนี้ไม่ใช่ความคิดใหม่และมีการกล่าวถึงมาแล้วร่วมสามสิบปี แต่ลักษณะที่โดดเด่นที่นำเสนอคือการประสานกันระหว่างความคิดเชิงปรัชญาและวิทยาศาสตร์ เช่น ความใกล้ชิดสนิทสนม การดำรงอยู่ในโลกนี้ สภาวะความเป็นสัตว์ วิวัฒนาการของธรรมชาติ ความรู้สึกร่วม และความเมตตา กรุณา โดยที่มองว่าแนวคิดเหล่านี้มีปฏิสัมพันธ์กับความสมบูรณ์ในตัวเอง ภาวะเหนือโลก การเป็นผู้พิทักษ์ ความสงสาร และความเคารพ

MUSIC-MAKING VERSUS THE COMMODIFICATION OF MUSIC: A CALL TO ENLIGHTENED AMATEURS

Chetana Nagavajara

การเล่นดนตรีนั้น แต่เดิมมาเป็นกิจกรรมของชุมชน ซึ่งสามารถสร้างประสบการณ์ทางสุนทรียภาพ อารมณ์ และจิตวิญญาณ อันเทียบได้กับ “ความปีติอันสุดซึ้ง” ซึ่งมหากวีเกอเธ่ตั้งไว้เป็นจุดหมายปลายทางในบทละคร *เฟาสต์* อันเลื่องชื่อของเขา วัฒนธรรมทางดนตรีในอุดมคติจะไม่ขีดเส้นแบ่งที่ตายตัวระหว่างผู้เล่นกับผู้ฟัง นักดนตรีสมัครเล่นกับนักดนตรีอาชีพ ซึ่งแนวทางดังกล่าวยังหลงเหลืออยู่ในดนตรีไทยเดิมตราบเท่าทุกวันนี้ ความสามารถของนักดนตรีอาชีพที่พัฒนาขึ้นอย่างต่อเนื่องถูกตลาดนำไปหากินโดยมีเงินกับเทคโนโลยีเป็นตัวหนุน ทำให้เกิดผู้บริโภคที่มักง่ายทำได้แต่เพียงกดปุ่มเปิดเครื่องเสียง ดนตรีจึงกลายเป็นเพียงสินค้าชนิดหนึ่งไปทางออกเดียวจากวิกฤตการณ์นี้คือ การกลับไปหาการเล่นดนตรีในระดับครอบครัว โรงเรียน และชุมชน โดยเน้นดนตรีที่เล่นกันเป็นกลุ่มเล็ก ๆ ซึ่งประกอบด้วยผู้รักสมัครเล่นเป็นส่วนใหญ่ และจากฐานอันมั่นคงนี้ นักดนตรีอาชีพที่แท้จริงก็จะเพาะตัวขึ้นมาได้

THE ANATOMY OF THAI FACE

Larry Scott Persons

บทความบทนี้เป็นการศึกษาแนวคิดพันธุ์วรรณาเชิงปริมาณจากมุมมองมานุษยวิทยาสังคมเพื่ออธิบายความหมายของมโนทัศน์สังคมห้ำประการในสังคมไทย คือ “หน้าตา” “เกียรติ” “ศักดิ์ศรี” “ชื่อเสียง” และ “บารมี” ผู้เขียนเสนอว่า คำทั้งห้านี้ประกอบขึ้นเป็น “สรีระ” แห่ง “หน้า” ของคนไทย โดยเสนอว่า แม้ว่าคำเหล่านี้จะเกี่ยวโยงกันในความคิดของไทย แต่ข้อมูลจากการศึกษาแสดงว่าความหมายของคำดังกล่าวแตกต่างกันแต่ไม่ได้แยกจากกันอย่างสิ้นเชิง ผู้เขียนได้เสนอแผนภูมิเพื่อแสดงพลวัตระหว่างมโนทัศน์ทั้งห้า

NOUN CLASSIFIER CONSTRUCTIONS IN THAI: A CASE STUDY IN CONSTRUCTION GRAMMAR

Unchalee Singnoi

บทความนี้นำเสนอการศึกษาเชิงหน้าที่ในแนวทางทฤษฎีไวยากรณ์หน่วยสร้างบูรณาการ โดยมีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อหาข้อสรุปต่อคำถามว่าในหน่วยไวยากรณ์หนึ่งๆ อาทิ หน่วยสร้างลักษณนามในภาษาไทยนั้นเผยให้เห็นถึงข้อมูลแง่มุมต่างๆ ได้มากน้อยเพียงใด และเพราะเหตุใดข้อมูลต่างๆ เหล่านั้นจำเป็นต้องนำเสนอโดยให้ความสำคัญเท่าเทียมกันในฐานะที่เป็นคุณสมบัติทางไวยากรณ์ที่แตกต่างกัน ผลการศึกษาแสดงให้เห็นว่าลักษณนามในภาษาไทย ซึ่งเกิดในนามวลีนั้น มีหน้าที่ทางไวยากรณ์ ทั้งเชิงวากยสัมพันธ์ อรรถศาสตร์และวัจนปฏิบัติศาสตร์ ในเชิงวากยสัมพันธ์ลักษณนามทำหน้าที่แทนคำนามหลัก ใช้แทนคำนามเยี่ยงสรรพนาม เป็นคำหลักในหน่วยสร้างขยายนาม และใช้กำจัดความกำกวม ในเชิงอรรถศาสตร์ลักษณนามแบ่งได้เป็นลักษณนามพื้นฐานและลักษณนามจากการรับรู้ซึ่งมีพฤติกรรมทางวากยสัมพันธ์ที่ต่างกัน และสุดท้ายเป็นหน้าที่ที่จำเป็นต้องแยกออกจากหน้าที่ทางอรรถศาสตร์นั้น ได้แก่ การใช้ทำให้คำนามเป็นหน่วยนับได้ การใช้อ้างได้ถึงสรรพสิ่งเฉพาะ การใช้ทำให้เป็นรายชั้น และการใช้บ่งถึงจำนวน “หนึ่ง” หน้าที่ทางวัจนปฏิบัติศาสตร์เหล่านี้เองเป็นตัวขับเคลื่อนให้หน่วยสร้างไวยากรณ์มีรูปแบบหรือโครงสร้างที่แตกต่าง ดังนั้นข้อมูลชนิดต่างๆ เหล่านี้จึงจำเป็นที่จะต้องรวมไว้ด้วยในการอธิบายและการพิจารณาหน่วยไวยากรณ์ต่างๆ ในฐานะเป็นการรวบรวมของข้อมูล มากกว่าที่จะพิจารณาข้อมูลทางด้านวากยสัมพันธ์เป็นสำคัญแต่เพียงประการเดียวเท่านั้น

SELF-AWARENESS OF LUANG PHRABANG LAONESS IN THAILAND: A CASE STUDY OF MYTH AND RITUAL

Bourin Wungkeeree

บทความนี้ศึกษาคนลาวหลวงพระบางที่อพยพมาตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศไทยที่อำเภอหล่มเก่าและอำเภอหล่มสัก จังหวัดเพชรบูรณ์ และที่อำเภอด่านซ้าย จังหวัดเลย ผู้อพยพเหล่านี้มีความตระหนักรู้ในความเป็นลาวหลวงพระบางตลอดเวลา ดังจะเห็นได้จากการสืบทอดวรรณกรรมพื้นบ้าน เช่น ตำนานและเรื่องเล่าเกี่ยวกับวีรบุรุษท้องถิ่น และการประกอบพิธีกรรมแบบดั้งเดิม การสืบทอดทางชาติพันธุ์เช่นนี้เป็นกลไกการธำรงชาติพันธุ์ การผลิตซ้ำเรื่องเล่าในบริบทของ

พิธีกรรมที่เกี่ยวกับการบูชาผี เป็นการสืบทอดทางวัฒนธรรมที่ช่วยให้ชุมชนตระหนักและจดจำว่าพวกเขาเป็นคนลาวจากหลวงพระบางซึ่งครั้งหนึ่งเคยเป็นศูนย์กลางพุทธศาสนาที่รุ่งเรืองในอดีต

Notes to contributors

Submission of the first version of the manuscript

We would like to invite researchers in the field of humanities to publish their works. Prospective contributors should submit to the Editor-in-Chief two copies of their papers (**including an abstract**) of 10-20 pages in length, printed in single spacing on one side of A4 paper. All papers will be reviewed by the issue editor and two readers. Within three months the author will be informed whether his/her paper is accepted or rejected.

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The revised version of the paper should be submitted in both Word and PDF versions along with one-page summary of the explanation of corrections via email to the Editor-in-Chief.

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Margins

Top:	1.75	inches or 4.44 cm.
Bottom:	1.75	inches or 4.44 cm.
Left:	1.5	inches or 3.81 cm.
Right:	1	inch or 2.54 cm.

Text layout and character formats

The text should preferably be prepared on Microsoft Word for Windows and set in Times New Roman. Each page must be split into two columns. The text alignment and character formats for different text functions are as follows:

Text Function	Align-ment	Font Style	Face	Point Size
Title	Left	All Caps	Bold	14
Main Text and Abstract	Justified	Normal	Regular	11
Author(s)	Left	Normal	Bold	14
Abstract Heading	Left	Normal	Bold	14
1 st Level Heading	Left	Normal	Bold	13
2 nd level Heading	Left	Normal	Bold	12
3 rd Level Heading	Left	Normal	Bold	12
Emphasis	---	Normal	Italic	11
Notes	Left	Normal	Regular	10

Heading

Headings should not be numbered and should be left-aligned.

Footnotes

Use the footnote command to insert all footnotes automatically. Footnotes are used only for adding useful information, not for references.

Page numbers

The revised version of the manuscript must not include automatically inserted page numbers.

References

Full bibliographical information of literature cited in the papers should be given in the list of references at the end. Within the text, only brief author-date citations should be made, giving the author's surname, year of publication and page number(s) where relevant. The use of footnote to indicate citations will not be accepted. Examples showing the system of citation in *MANUSYA* are as follows.

- According to Matisoff (1991:90),
- ... (see also Comrie 1989; 34-39)
- ... (Haas 1955, Scovel 1970, Sookgasem 1990, Bisang 2003, Kullavanijaya and Bisang 2004)

References

The following are examples of references placed at the end of a paper. Note that the indentation is at the position after five spaces.

Chambers, J.K. and Peter Trudgill. 1980. *Dialectology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Figures and Tables

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“What’s up in this volume?”

THE USAGE OF CAUSATIVES IN CLASSICAL CHINESE: A REVIEW **Suree Choonharuangdej**

Study of the system of word-derivation in Classical Chinese (causative usage included) reveals that, unlike in most Indo-European languages, certain grammatical and semantic contrasts are regularly associated with tonal contrasts. However, it is difficult to separate derivational causative verbs from the general causative usage to which the syntactic structure is ascribed, and to distinguishing the causative usage from the putative one given their similar surface structure. This paper reanalyzes certain problematic cases of causatives using different linguistic factors (i.e., phonological, morphological, and syntactical) together with relevant contextual clues and argues that the contrast between realis and irrealis can be employed as a means to clarify those subtle differences in the putative usage.

PEACE, ECOLOGY, AND RELIGION: EVOLUTION AND BUDDHISM’S EMPATHIC RESPONSE **David Jones**

It is increasingly vital to secure requisite changes in the Western Worldview to reintegrate humanity with the natural world. Only two possibilities exist: to reaffirmation the evolutionary process and to develop human predispositions that will intimately relate individuals to other lives. This paper argues that these changes are vital to defining peaceful human coexistence with animals and their environs as well as within the human realm. Recast in terms of ecology and sustainable environments, this definition of peace can lead to ecologically oriented designs of human habitats, food production systems, and the utilization of natural resources. Such designs and utilizations are known as “permaculture,” a position which focuses on active human participation in their environments, as opposed to the attitudes of pity and respect embraced by the ethical environmentalism of Stewardship. The paper also proposes that this concept of peace can be achieved through Buddhism with its synthesis of philosophical and scientific ideas such as intimacy, immanence, animality, evolution, empathy, and compassion.

MUSIC-MAKING VERSUS THE COMMODIFICATION OF MUSIC: A CALL TO ENLIGHTENED AMATEURS **Chetana Nagavajara**

Music-making, fundamentally a communal practice, is the source of aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual experience of a kind comparable to the Faustian “moment” (*Augenblick*). The most ideal musical culture is one in which no clear dividing line exists between practitioners and listeners, professionals and amateurs, the remnants of which are still discernible in present-day Thai classical music. The growing professionalism has been exploited by commercial manipulations driven by money and technology, resulting in a smug, push-button consumerism that treats music as a mere commodity. The only way out of this crisis is a return to the practice of music at the family, school, and community levels, whereby chamber music can be cultivated by a large pool of amateurs out of which real professionals can grow.